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A CASE ANALYSIS OF SECTION 8(a)(2) OF THE 
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, 1950 to 1974
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Section 8(a)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
. . . to dominate or interfere with the formation 
or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute financial or other support to it: Pro­
vided, that subject to rules and regulations made and 
published by the Board pursuant to section 6, an 
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting 
employees to confer with him during working hours 
without loss of time or pay . . A
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the 
effects of this section on the status of labor-management 
relations in the United States.
The time period selected for study was from 1950 to 
1974. The year 1950 was selected as the early cutoff date. 
Prior to that year a large number of studies were dedicated 
to determining the effects of the Taft-Hartley amendments on 
the Wagner Act. Since several of these admendments affected
^61 U.S. Stat. 136 (1947)
Section 8(a)(2), it was included in most of these studies.
However, after 1950 research in this area declined because
many felt that the Taft-Hartley amendments had corrected the
controversy surrounding Section 8(a)(2). Some authors have
even gone as far as stating, " . . .  under the amended NLRA
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the importance of 8(a)(2) has declined." However, an increas­
ing number of 8(a)(2) cases are being heard by the National 
Labor Relations Board which makes a study of this Section of 
some importance.
From 1950 to 1974 the National Labor Relations Board 
heard 832 cases involving 8(a) (2) charges. Over 250 of these 
cases were appealed to appropriate circuit courts and five 
were heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. This 
dissertation will attempt to analyze these cases and their 
effects on labor relations in this country.
Historical perspectives including a brief review of 
the literature on company unions and Section 8(a)(2) will be 
presented in Chapter Two. The development of company unions 
occurred in six distinct periods which are thoroughly discussed 
in this chapter. First, developments prior to the War Labor 
Board will be discussed. Then, in order, the following periods 
will be analyzed: the period during the War Labor Board, the
2
Charles 0. Gregory and Harold A. Katz, Labor and the 
Law, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), p. 363.
period following the War Labor Board but prior to passage of 
the Wagner Act and including the NIRA, the period prior to 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and including the Wagner Act, 
and the period following Taft-Hartley. The remaining chapters 
will discuss issues arising in the period following the Taft- 
Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act.
Chapter Three will be concerned with employer actions 
which the board has traditionally held indicative of company 
domination of a union. It will also explore the subtle differ­
ences between a Board finding of domination and one of mere 
unlawful support. In this respect, a number of cases will be 
examined in which the Board has reversed trial examiners (later 
called administrative law judges) and in which appellate courts 
have reversed the Board on these issues. A total of 184 cases 
will be examined in this chapter.
Chapter Four will analyze 254 cases in which discrimina­
tory treatment of employees or threats of discriminatory treat­
ment were significant issues. As a necessary side issue, free 
speech and its relationship to 8(a)(2) and discriminatory 
treatment will also be discussed. Additionally, topics such as 
employer threat of discharge, promise of concessions, threat of 
plant shutdown, threat of benefit withdrawal, interrogation of 
employees, control over employee transfers, and use of discre­
tionary seniority clauses will also be examined.
Financial and material support of a union by an employer
is the general topic of Chapter Five. In addition to finan­
cial assistance, such difficulties as employer provision of 
premises, materials, and various services will be examined.
In all, 228 cases were studied in this chapter.
Chapter Six addresses the most difficult issues to 
be covered in this study— employer contracts with and recog­
nition of unions. The Midwest Piping doctrine— probably the 
most complicated rule of law to originate under Section 8(a) (2) 
— will be discussed along with union majority problems and union 
security issues. Including a total of 458 cases, this chapter 
examines difficulties which occurred most freguently in cases 
heard by the Board.
Chapter Seven will reexamine the case totals of the 
previous four chapters from a different point of view. There 
are three possible union mixes involved in each case. These 
are two affiliated unions, one affiliated union and one unaffi­
liated union, and a single individual filing a charge. This 
chapter will explore these mixes and how they have changed 
over the years both within the four major types of cases (Chap­
ters Three through Six) and for all 8(a)(2) cases.
Conclusions will be drawn in Chapter Eight. A brief 
summary of previous chapters will be given along with some final 
insights about the 8 32 cases.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Before discussing the history of company unions, the 
term "company union" needs to be properly defined. Industry 
spawned many names for organizations which would otherwise 
be called company unions. Some of these names are: employee
association, joint conference, works council, industrial 
democracy, employee representation, goodwill plan, joint 
conference committee, industrial council, cooperative assoc­
iation, and shop committee.^ These names as well as others 
are encompassed by the definition of company unions set 
forth by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its excellent 
1935 study. For historical purposes the Bureau's definition 
will be adopted in this paper:
The Bureau has accepted the term "company union," 
using it in its generic sense, as an organization of 
workers confined to a particular plant or company and 
having for its purpose the representation of employees 
in their dealings with management.^
Of course, legal definitions of company domination or
U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Characteristics of Company Unions 19 35, Bulletin no. 634, 
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 3.
^luid.
interference will be used where appropriate.^
The history of company unions and laws affecting them 
can be divided into six distinct periods. This chapter will, 
therefore, be organized into six corresponding subdivisions: 
Developments before the War Labor Board, Developments under 
the War Labor Board, Post War Labor Board-Pre NIRA Develop­
ments, From the NIRA to the Wagner Act, From the Wagner Act 
to Taft-Hartley, and Developments Following Taft-Hartley.
Developments Before the War Labor Board
Important factors to be considered during these years
are the strength of the trade union movement and the attitude
of employers regarding this movement. The late 1880's and
1890's were lean years for organized labor. However, before
1901, some membership gains were made, and by 1914, union
2
membership reached 2.7 million. This growth alarmed employers
and evoked an expected response:
An open-shop drive resulted which was participated in by 
many employers' associations. The National Association 
of Manufacturers, the American Anti-Boycott Association, 
and the Citizen's Industrial Association, were leaders in 
the drive. They urged members to maintain open shops, 
sometimes maintained black lists, gave assistance to
^Legal definitions will be used after passage of the 
Wagner Act.
2
Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner 
Act to Taft-Hartley, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1950) , p. 15.
employers engaged in industrial disputes, and opposed 
legislation sponsored by unions.^
Prior to World War I there were relatively few
organizations which could be considered company unions. In
fact the first proposal for such a plan seems to have been 
2made in 1886. In addition, two very influential programs 
were initiated during this period, the Filene Co-operative 
Association and the Industrial Representation Plan of the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Other plans of lesser sig­
nificance were also introduced.
The Filene Co-operative Association^
The Filene store began as a small shop in Boston in 
1881. The founder, William Filene, believed in a philosophy 
of worker participation in management. Curiously, while he 
was head of the store no formal procedures for worker parti­
cipation were ever instigated. However, in 1898 a committee 
of employees v^ as established to administer an insurance plan
^Ibid.
2
John R. Commons, gen. ed.. History of Labor in the 
United States, 1896-1932, 4 vols. (New York: MacMillan Company, 
1935), vol. 3: Working Conditions by Don D. Lescohier, p. 336.
3
For an excellent appraisal of this association see 
Mary La Dame, The Filene Store, Industrial Relations Series 
(New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1930).
and medical clinic.^
The association was formally composed after Filene's
sons, Edward A. and A. Lincoln, took over the business from
their father. In 1903, the first constitution of the Filene
Co-operative Association was created. It was very democratic
in nature and originally provided for a full vote of all
members on any important matter. As the organization grew, it
became necessary to use a representative system of democracy,
and a council was formed. For the most part, expenses of the
2
association were born by the owners of the store.
Unions were never a problem at the Filene store. The 
reasons for this were twofold. Filene paid wages higher than 
the prevailing rate, and no dues were required to join the 
association.^ An interesting side light to this is a case where 
two union members quit paying their dues, renounced their union, 
and asked to join the association. Management, however, urged 
them to rejoin their union and they complied. Joint membership 
in unions and the Filene Co-operative Association was then 
allowed.^
^Lescohier, p. 337.
2
Mary La Dame, pp. 119-138, 
^Ibid., p. 334.
^Ibid., pp. 137-138.
The Filene brothers hoped that in future years worker 
participation could evolve into worker ownership. This never 
came to pass, and, indeed, the participation of workers rarely 
went very far. Adjustment of grievances was the association's 
primary bailiwick:
Throughout the history of the Association, its 
participation in the management of the store has been 
limited very largely to problems of personnel. In rela­
tion to the more vital of these, injustices excepted, it 
has had little weight. It has been chiefly concerned 
with matters of discipline and welfare. Furthermore, its 
activity in problems of management other than those rela­
ting to personnel has been exceedingly narrow.1
In regard to wages, the association didn't bargain. It merely
confirmed the rates set by management.
The Industrial Representation Plan of the
2
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company 
This plan was born in the aftermath of one of the 
bloodiest strikes for union representation in the history of 
labor movements. The men involved referred to it not as a 
strike but as a gory civil war. In one incident eleven children 
and two women were killed in an attack on a tent colony of 
miners. Could anyone blame the residents for giving each 
encounter a typical war name such as Attack on Chandler or the
^Ibid., p. 327.
2
Ben M. Selekman and Mary Van Kleeck, Employees' 
Representation in Coal Mines, Industrial Relations Series 
(New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 19 24).
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Battle of Hogback Hill?^
Even though the strike for union representation 
failed, it convinced John D. Rockefeller, Jr. of the need for 
some type of employee representation in the Colorado Fuel and 
Iron Company. At his request Mackenzie King prepared a plan:
One of the results of the Colorado coal war was the 
Rockefeller Employee Representation Plan, prepared by 
Mackenzie King, later Premier of Canada, for the govern­
ing of industrial relations in the Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Company. Club houses, bathhouses, and dispensaries were 
built at different mining camps. The plan was a substi­
tute for collective bargaining with regular labor organ­
izations . 2
In 1915 the plan was put to a vote of the miners. It was 
approved by an eighty-four percent majority.^
Plainly, the Representation Plan was a response to the 
drive for unionization. Accordingly, union members never 
favored it. They felt that any improvements in working 
conditions were directly attributable to the 1913-1914 strike. 
Workers also pointed out that the Plan provided no resources 
for strikes and virtually no opportunity for wage bargaining.^
^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
2
John R. Commons, gen. ed., History of Labor in the 
United States, 1896-1932, 4 vols. (New York: MacMillan Company, 
1935), vol. 4: Labor Movements, by Selig Perlman and Philip
Taft, p. 351.
^Selekman and Van Kleeck, p. 27.
'^Ibid., pp. 292-297.
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In relation to this Selekman and Van Kleeck state, "Experience 
seems to show that a representation plan cannot hold the confi­
dence or interest of employees if it is confined to the 
purveying of grievances to management."^
While it is true that the plan provided little in the 
way of collective bargaining, it cannot be denied that, for 
its day, it was quite revolutionary. Don D. Lescohier states:
At the time of its installation . . . the Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Plan stood out like a mountain peak. It 
covered far more employees than any other plan of the 
pre-war period; and it was installed by the powerful 
Rockefeller interests. It was studied more intensively 
and perhaps copied more frequently than any other plan.
It was a full fledged "company union" and set an 
important example for industrialists seeking a substitute 
for unions.2
The plan lasted until 19 33.
Other Plans
There were a number of other plans launched during the 
early 1900's deserving mention. The plan at the Nernst Lamp 
Company was begun in 1904. The vice-president, H.F. Porter, 
proposed a "factory committee" with representatives from all 
phases of the business to confer with management. Like other
^Ibid., p. 398.
2
Lescohier, p. 341.
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plans of this period, its function was purely advisory.
Similar organizations were formed in the American Rolling
Mill Company in 1904, and in the Nelson Valve Company in 1907.^
The years 1911, 1912, and 1913 were also important.
According to Don D. Lescohier:
The Co-operative Welfare Association of the Philadelphia 
Rapid Transit Company, started in 1911, and the Employees' 
Mutual Benefit Association of the Milwaukee Electric 
Railway and Light Company 1912, laid the foundations for 
what labor now terms Company Unions.^
Another notable movement was begun in 1913. This was
the "industrial democracy movement."^ An interesting example
of this movement was the plan installed at the Packard Piano
Company after an unsuccessful strike:
. . . it called the attention of labor to the fact that 
this so-called Industrial Democracy might be a fancy 
name for a new method of driving out unions. Experience 
with the Leitch plan (Industrial Democracy) as used by 
other companies confirmed the suspicion.4
These plans were obviously viewed by management as favorable
alternatives to the trade union movement.
^Lescohier, p. 338.
^Ibid.
^U.S., Department of Labor, p. 7.
4
Lescohier, p. 339.
One final representation plan should be addressed. It
was the Industrial Representation Plan of the Minnequa Steel
Works of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.^ It was put into
operation three months after the representation plan in the
coal mines of the same company was adopted. One large
difference, however, was that there was no violence or strikes
involved in the initiation of this plan. It was approved by
a vote of the workers in which approximately seventy-three
2
percent voted for the plan. In other ways the plan was 
similar to that of the coal mines. It concerned itself primar­
ily with adjusting grievances and provided very little in the 
way of wage bargaining.^
Developments Under the War Labor Board
Labor conditions during World War I were as to be
expected. The draft removed men from the work force, and the
large demand for war goods increased the demand for labor.
This would seem to be a perfect position for unions:
Labor difficulties had arisen in direct consequence 
of the sudden enormous demand for labor in various war
Ben M. Selekman, Employees' Representation in Steel 
Works, Industrial Relations Series (New York: Russel Sage 
Foundation, 1924).
^Ibid., pp. 37-44.
^Ibid., pp. 90-139.
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industries in the face of a labor supply decreased by 
the draft and reduced immigration. With no centralized 
machinery available for directing the labor supply or 
enforcing a balanced wage policy, an unrestrained 
competitive bidding for labor had set in, leading to 
great inequality and instability of wage rates . . . 
Moreover, rapidly rising living costs led workers to 
demand higher wages. With a scarcity of labor, trade- 
unions found it feasible to strike in order to get wage 
increases.1
Undoubtedly this was an ideal situation for unions, but not 
an ideal situation under which to fight a war.
As a result the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board 
was established in 1917, and the National War Labor Board was 
begun in 1918. The goal of the War Labor Board was to keep 
labor-management relations problems from interfering with the 
war effort. Millis and Brown in referring to the War Labor 
Board state:
Its agreed-upon statement of principles and policies 
provided that there should be no strikes or lockouts 
and that the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively was not to be denied or interfered with. 
Employers were not to engage in discrimination, nor 
were unions to engage in coercion of workers or employers 
in efforts to increase their membership.^
The solution reached by the Board was inspired by the British
"Whitley Councils" and the United States' past experiences
with employee representation plans. The Board brought forth
^U.S., Department of Labor, p. 11.
2
Millis and Brown, p. 16.
^U.S., Department of Labor, p. 12. See also Perlman
and Taft, p. 409.
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a model employee representation plan and installed it in a 
number of plants. The Pittsfield, Massachusetts plant of 
the General Electric Company was the first to have a repre­
sentation plan inaugurated by the Board. In all, one 
hundred and twenty-five plans were launched directly by the 
Board.^ Nonetheless, a number of voluntary plans were also 
started during this period. Some of the companies with 
voluntary plans were the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, 
the International Harvester Company, the Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber Company, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the
Standard Oil Company of Indiana, the Procter and Gamble
2
Company, and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
The attitudes of both workers and management toward
policies of the Board were unsure at best. Management's views
were as follows, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics:
Some employers regarded works councils as a "revolu­
tionary step"; some were simply annoyed by them; some 
thought them superfluous; others found them satisfactory 
as long as trade-unions did not get control over them; 
the majority discovered this type of workers' represen­
tation more or less helpful in improving the morale and 
efficiency of their labor force.3
Workers' attitudes were positive or negative according to
the situation that existed in the company prior to the
^Perlman and Taft, p. 409.
2
Ibid. See also U.S., Department of Labor, p. 15. 
^U.S., Department of Labor, p. 17.
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establishment of the representation plan. If the company had 
successfully resisted unionization in the past, the new plan 
was viewed favorably. If, on the other hand, the new plan 
was used as a weapon against unionization; condemnation was 
the result.^
Without question the policies of the War Labor Board
fostered the development of company unions. Inevitably, the
end of the War terminated the Board's influence, and, as a
result, a number of representation plans disappeared;
After the Armistice the Board's power to improve labor 
standards vanished, but the legacy of its work for 
collective dealing between employer and employees 
remained to plague the labor movement. Many of the 
"converted employers" . . . hastened to readjust the
plan to their own satisfaction.2
Thus, World War I served more as an impetus to company
unionism than as a windfall for the trade-union movement.
Post War Labor Board - Pre NIRA Developments 
The time period immediately following the War was 
prosperous, but this prosperity was short-lived. After the 
Armistice, government contracts were cancelled and returning 
soldiers were dumped on the labor market. The economy made a 
slight recovery in 1919 and 19 20, but before mid-19 20 the
^Ibid.
2
Perlman and Taft, p. 409.
17
recovery lagged. By 19 21, the country was in the grips of
a severe economic depression. However, the economy bounced
back quickly and continued expanding until 19 29.^
The fortunes of the labor movement waned during this
period. Union membership dropped from a high of five million
2
immediately following the Armistice to 3.6 million in 1923.
The reasons for this were many, but the most important was
the carryover of the company union idea from the war period.
Joseph Rayback pointed out that the most important factor in
the decline of unionism after 19 24 was, " . . .  the adoption
by large portions of industry of 'welfare capitalism.'"^
Rayback takes a moderate view of company unions during this
time. While he refers to them as, "organizations of workers
created or inspired by the employer in order to provide a
docile labor supply."^ he also states;
After the war industrial managers quickly recognized 
that these plans could be used to bring management and
^Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, An Economic History 
of the United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1973), pp. 484-506.
2
Millis and Brown, p. 17.
^Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor (New 
York: MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 304.
^Ibid.
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labor into closer relationship . . . When all the ideas
were assembled and put into effect, industry produced 
a highly adequate substitute for union-management con- 
tractural relations.1
Company unions, it seems, were just a small part of
a much larger ploy, the "American Plan." The "American Plan"
surfaced during a period of intense nationalism manifesting
itself in restrictive immigration laws and a rejection of
the League of Nations. Perhaps more important than these two
events was the fact that Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
was spending a great deal of effort ridding the United
2
States of dangerous radicals. Given this kind of atmosphere
it comes as no surprise that employers hit upon the idea of
identifying unions with un-American activity:
In such an environment, an obviously effective tactic 
would be that of identifying unions as un-American 
groups. This was the purpose of the "American Plan." 
Employer Associations led this successful drive to sell 
the open shop . . .  In mass production industries, such 
as automobiles and electrical manufacturing, enthusiasm 
for "scientific management" and "welfare capitalism" was 
at a high point. These devices together with the flower­
ing of company unions and other aggressive anti_-union 
tactics were successful in warding off such weak thrusts 
as the unions managed to make relative to organizing the 
factories.3
^Ibid., p. 305.
2
Sanford Cohen, Labor in the United States (Columbus, 
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1960), p. 112.
^Ibid.
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In addition, employers made liberal use of yellow-dog 
contracts and strikebreakers.^
The American Plan turned out to be a powerful weapon 
against trade-unionism. Predictably, this alarmed unionists 
and they responded by condemning the Plan. Nevertheless, 
their position was so weak that they decided to adopt a har­
monious attitude toward management. According to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics:
Union-management cooperation became the new goal 
of trade-union policy, the implication being that the 
spirit of industrial cooperation was welcomed by trade- 
union leaders. They held, however, that the workers 
should cooperate through the medium of the trade-unions 
rather than through company unions.
All was not rosy in the trade-union movement. Two
meaningful revolts were initiated against company unions
during this period. The first v/as a strike in 1926, against
the Interborough Rapid Transit Company of New York. The
second was a 1927 strike against the renowned Industrial
Representation Plan of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company
(the Rockefeller Plan).^
The strike against the Interborough Rapid Transit
Company ended in the courts. Significantly, the outcome was
^Millis and Brown, p. 18.
2
U.S., Department of Labor, p. 26 
^Perlman and Taft, p. 590.
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in the union's favor. Perhaps of more consequence was that 
this became the first instance in which the courts showed any 
signs of changing their opinions on "yellow-dog" contracts.^
The more important of the two strikes was probably the 
strike against the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. The Repre­
sentation Plan had lasted over 12 years. However, the workers 
had never been satisfied with the plan and when Sacco and 
Vanzetti were executed, the I.W.W. recognized an opportunity. 
In 1927, the I.W.W. called a brief strike against all Colorado
mines and six thousand of the twelve thousand miners in Colo-
2
rado answered the call.
At first the mine owners were not concerned about the 
intrusion of the I.W.W. Management felt that having both the 
United Mine Workers and the I.W.W. trying to organize the
miners would work in their favor. In the end they hoped that
unionism would be eliminated from Colorado entirely.^
Events did not work out as the owners had hoped. The
I.W.W. managed to work cooperatively with the remnants of
the United Mine Workers and a strike was ordered. Demands 
were for restoration of previous wages, recognition of mine 
committees, opening the mining camps to union organizers, and
^Ibid., p. 593. 
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 594.
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enforcement of current mining laws.^
Eventually, ten thousand of the twelve thousand 
Colorado miners participated in the strike. It turned out 
to be a bloody one:
On November 21, the bloodiest encounter of the 
strike occurred, at the entrance of a mine owned by the 
Rocky Mountain Fuel Company, between the State police 
and the strikers. The miners had held meetings on the 
property of that Company without molestation. This time, 
contrary to the wishes of the management, which did not 
share in the belligerent attitude of the other operators, 
the State police after a warning opened fire on unarmed 
miners, killing six and wounding 20.2
This was not the only encounter. On January 12, 19 2 8 the
Walsenburg police along with the State police opened fire on
a parade of miners. One miner was killed and two were wounded.
The strike resulted in a great deal of bitterness
between the mine owners and the workers. The Rockefeller
Plan was never favored by the miners, but the strike made
feelings against the plan run even higher. According to
Perlman, the events leading up to and during the strike
resulted in, ". . . exposure of the hollowness of the claims
4
of the Rockefeller Plan."
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
"^Ibid. , p . 595 .
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At the height of the strike, the second largest 
mining company in Colorado, the Rocky Mountain Fuel Company, 
came under control of Josephine Roche.^ She proposed a 
democratic plan for representation of workers in the Rocky 
Mountain Fuel Company coupled with recognition of the United 
Mine Workers. This agreement with the United Mine Workers 
functioned so well that in 1931, when the company was endan­
gered by wholesale price-cutting, the miners volunteered to 
loan half their wages for two and a half months without 
interest and with no fixed pay-back date to the company. The 
company offered to pay interest, but the miners refused to 
accept it. Interestingly, the operators in competition with 
Rocky Mountain protested that this was unfair competition. 
Eventually the loan was repaid.
Another absorbing view of this period is put forth 
by Joseph Rayback:
Although the Interborough and Colorado conflicts 
revealed that Welfare Capitalism was not always accepted, 
for the most part it was successful. The appeal of 
organized labor had always been based on the fact that 
it was the only force capable of fighting exploitive and 
calloused employers. When the exploiting employer was 
replaced by a benevolent gentleman eager to take care of 
his labor force, unionism was greatly weakened.^
For an excellent discussion of Josephine Roche and 
the Rocky Mountain Fuel Company see Mary Van Kleeck, Miners 
and Management, Industrial Relations Series (New York; Russel 
Sage Foundation, 1934).
2
Rayback, p. 306.
23
In any case, the result during this period was an increase in
company unionism and a decrease in trade-unionism.
An additional development occurred in the craft
unions of the railroads. The railroads had followed a policy
of refusing to recognize trade-unions■ and of substituting
company unions. The upshot was massive strikes.^ Subse-
2
quently. Congress passed in 19 26 the Railway Labor Act 
which forbade company interference with unions in the rail­
road industry. In less than ten years, the Wagner Act would 
do the same thing for all industry.
Near the end of this era, the depression occurred. 
Unemployment rose to intolerably high levels, and union member­
ship plunged to new lows. In 19 33, unemployment reached its 
highest point— twenty-five percent, while, concurrently, union 
membership reached its low— 2.7 million.^ Company unions 
fared no better. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics:
Many company unions were . . . abandoned and rela­
tively few new ones established during the depression. 
Company unionism, along with personnel management and 
welfare programs, was on the retreat with every indication 
of further curtailment.'*
^U.S., Department of Labor, p. 20. 
^44 Stat. 577 (1926).
^Fite and Reese, pp. 471-475. 
^U.S., Department of Labor, p. 27.
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From the NIRA to the Wagner Act
The onset of the depression changed many views of
the American economy. The standard of living declined not
only for blue collar workers but for white collar workers as
well. The result was wholesale loss of confidence in the
American economic system and its ability to maintain full
employment. Accordingly, Millis and Brown state:
It came to be rather commonly believed, also, that an 
increase in mass purchasing power was necessary to 
sustain full production and employment under conditions 
of modern mass production; and if this was so, then 
support for unionism and collective bargaining was 
desirable, to balance the unrestrained power of the 
great corporations.^
The atmosphere was ripe for a change in law.
The National Industrial Recovery Act was passed in
June of 1933. Section 7(a) encouraged collective bargaining.
It stated:
Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license 
approved, prescribed, or issued under this title shall 
contain the following conditions: (1) that employees
shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall 
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion 
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation 
of such representatives or in self-organization or in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (2) that no 
employee and no one seeking employment shall be required 
as a condition of employment to join any company union or
^Millis and Brown, pp. 19-20.
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to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor 
organization of his own choosing; and (3) that employers 
shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum 
rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved 
or prescribed by the President.
The meaning of section 7 (a) was clear to workers and
unions alike— the government was encouraging collective
bargaining. A wave of organizational campaigns sprung up in
such industries as coal, clothing, textile, and iron and steel.
Employers were faced with a brief dilemma. They didn't want
to deal with unions, but the law mandated collective bargaining.
History provided an easy answer, company unions. Employers in
automobile, rubber, steel, meat packing, and other industries
2
began a counterattack in the form of company unions.
The battle lines were drawn in a war that both sides 
were determined to win. The result was a rapid increase in 
strike activity. This increase was so great that it threat-
3
ened the recovery program and made further action necessary.
On August 5, 19 33 President Roosevelt created the National 
Labor Board:
^48 Stat. 195 (1933).
2
James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor 
Relations Board, vol. 1 (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1974), pp. 14-24. See also Millis and Brown, p. 22. and 
Alvin L. Goldman, The Supreme Court and Labor-Management 
Relations Law (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company,,
1976), p. 27.
^Gross, pp. 14-15 See also Millis and Brown, p. 22.
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. . . on August 5, 1933, on the recommendation of the 
Labor and Industrial Advisory Boards of the National 
Recovery Administration, the President established a 
National Labor Board . . . The Board's functions were 
then, -broadly, to settle by mediation, conciliation, or 
arbitration any controversies between employers and 
employees which tended to impede the purposes of the 
NIRA.l
The problems that the National Labor Board faced were
tremendous, and it had very little ammunition with which to
attack them. In many cases, companies refused to comply with
the law and ignored the NLB. In these instances the case was
turned over to the Compliance Division, but all it could do
was remove the Blue Eagle— symbol of compliance v/ith the NIRA--
from the company's store window and letterheads. This,
obviously, had little effect. The only other possibility was
to turn the case over to the Attorney General for prosecution,
2
and this device did not work much better.
The NLB's lack of effectiveness prompted the formation 
of the National Labor Relations Board in 1934. Unfortunately, 
it did not function any more effectively than its predecessor. 
In the first six months of its existence, twenty-four Blue 
Eagles were removed, but after this period removal became 
more difficult. Furthermore, the Blue Eagle had lost most of 
its impact for the public. Millis and Brown state, "Attempts
^Millis and Brown, p. 22. 
^Ibid., p. 23.
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to obtain enforcement by the Department of Justice failed."^ 
Thus, there was little that the National Labor Relations 
Board could do.
The surge of company unionism prompted several major 
studies of their nature; the most prominent was conducted by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The first part of the study
consisted of a questionnaire sent to 43,000 establishments,
2
producing 14,725 usable replies. Several provocative 
results were obtained from this questionnaire. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics found that approximately twenty percent of 
all workers were covered by company unions. However, in very 
large firms almost fifty percent of the workers were covered 
by company unions. Perhaps the most interesting finding was 
that two-thirds of all company unions were formed under the 
National Industrial Recover • Act.^ Quite clearly the Act had 
fostered company unionism.
In addition to the questionnaire, the Bureau's staff 
personally visited 125 firms with company unions. They inter­
viewed workers, employers, and local citizens.^ This survey 
proved even more informative than the questionnaire.
^Ibid., p . 26.
2
U.S., Department of Labor, p. 31. 
^Ibid., pp. 32-50.
^Ibid., p. 77.
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One issue the study addressed was the question of
how and why the company unions were started. The purpose of
formation was very clear. In fifty-two cases (forty-two
percent) the company union was started due to trade union
activity. The NIRA's influence was responsible in thirty-
one cases (twenty-five percent). Initiation of twenty-eight
company unions (twenty-two percent) was attributed to
strike activity, and in fourteen cases (eleven percent) the
desire for improved personnel relations was accountable.^
The Bureau of Labor Statistics concludes:
Over the period of 20 years, the threat of unionism, 
frequently evidenced by strikes, was the most impelling 
force in the establishment of two-thirds of the company 
unions. While the passage of such legislation as the 
NIRA gave impetus to company-union formation, it was 
the actual presence of trade-union agitation which  ^
encouraged most of the swing toward company unionism.
One interviewed employee stated, "The plan is not now in
operation. It was started to prevent the trade-union getting
strength and to do our own bargaining."^
Invariably, when both a trade-union and a company
union tried to organize the same plant, management preferred
the company union. Consequently, employers used several
tactics to thwart trade-unions. They praised company unions
^ibid., p. 81. 
^Ibid., p. 84. 
^Ibid., p. 156.
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and bitterly attacked the trade-unions. In some cases 
workers were threatened with dismissal, and in others 
management threatened to close down the plant if the company 
union was rejected.^
As to be expected under these circumstances, company 
unions were almost always initiated by management. According
to the Bureau, "The great majority of company unions were
2set up entirely by management." Probably more important was 
the fact that, although trade-union activity was an important 
factor in the formation of sixty-four percent of the company 
unions, it was shown as an alternative on the ballot in only 
two cases. Moreover, five company unions were established after 
negative votes in secret ballot elections.^ "The existence 
of a company union," according to the Bureau, "was almost 
never the result of a choice by the employees in a secret 
election in which both a trade-union and a company union 
appeared on the ballot."^
Most company unions were totally financed by the 
employer. Approximately two-thirds of the total relied
^Ibid., pp. 88-196 
^Ibid., p. 199. 
^Ibid., pp. 93-96. 
^Ibid., p. 200.
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entirely on the company for financial support. Only ten 
percent of all company unions were self supporting. In 
addition employers used the concomitant lack of union dues 
as an argument in favor of company unions and against trade- 
unions.^ True collective bargaining could scarcely take 
place in a situation where a company union was totally 
financed by an employer.
Company unions failed their members in many respects.
A large number of company unions were formed in establishments 
with several plants. The unions in these plants had almost 
no contact with each other; furthermore, these businesses were 
members of industrial, regional, and national associations.
A company union with its restriction to one isolated plant 
could hardly hope to deal effectively with such associations. 
It should also be pointed out that company unions paid little 
attention to legislation affecting them, did very little wage 
bargaining, and in only twenty-seven percent of the unions 
studied did monthly meetings occur. The biggest failing was 
in adjustment of grievances, supposedly a company union 
specialty. One-third of the unions surveyed handled no 
grievances. Of the remaining two-thirds, one-third handled 
grievances effectively, one-third handled them with limited
^Ibid., pp. 114-119.
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effectiveness, and the remaining one-third handled them
ineffectively.^
In describing the period of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, Joseph Rosenfarb offers a fitting conclusion:
Their formation and establishment have been initiated 
by employers, owing to their realization that individual 
bargaining— a misnomer, to be sure— would not meet the 
situation created by the NRA. But instead of accepting 
collective bargaining as a method of labor relations 
they decided to frustrate genuine collective bargaining « 
by granting the semblance and withholding its substance.
From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 
In 19 35, the Supreme Court in the Schechter Poultry 
case^ declared section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act unconstitutional. While the Court did not rule on 
section 7 (a) its enforcement relied on the codes established 
under section 3. Thus, the Schechter decision effectively 
eliminated section 7(a).
However, in less than six weeks Congress had passed 
the National Labor Relations Act--commonly referred to as 
the Wagner Act.^ The Wagner Act affected company dominated
^Ibid., pp. 143-201.
2
Joseph Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How 
It Works (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1940),
p. 105.
^295 U.S. 495 (1935).
^49 U.S. Stat. 449 (1935).
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unions in two ways. First, it outlawed them under section
8(2), and secondly it established the National Labor Relations
Board^ which was empowered to remedy unfair labor practices
committed by employers. Section 8(2) stated:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-—
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization or contribute 
financial or other support to it: Provided, that subject
to rules and regulations made and published by the Board 
pursuant to section 6(a), an employer shall not be 
prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him 
during working hours without loss of time or pay.
Clearly, section 8(2) intended the elimination of company
domination or interference with unions.
Fittingly, the first case decided by the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) involved
2
an 8(2) charge. The Pennsylvania Greyhound case was a typical 
example of a company dominated union. The employer was 
completely responsible for formation of the union, and even 
conducted union elections itself. The Board issued a cease 
and desist order against the company, but more importantly, 
it disestablished the union.
The Pennsylvania Greyhound case was eventually appealed 
to the Supreme Court.^ In this case along with another case
^This is a different board from that of the same name 
established under the NIRA.
^1 NLRB 1 (193 ).
^303 U.S. 261 (1938).
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decided the same year,^ the Supreme Court upheld the Board.
Therefore, disestablishment became an acceptable legal remedy
2
for company domination of unions. A later study by the
Board found, as to be expected, that disestablishment was
a highly effective remedy.^
Another question addressed frequently by the Board
was what constitutes employer interference and support of a
union. According to the Seventh Annual Report of the Board;
An employer is not permitted to participate in the 
establishment of a labor organization or in its admin­
istration, nor to contribute any support to it. He is 
held responsible for any interference or attempted 
promotion of the organization by his agents. It is an 
unfair labor practice, for example, for employers or 
their agents to take part in the formation of the 
organization, to aid in drafting the constitution, to 
circulate petitions in its support, to disparage to 
employees a rival organization, to encourage membership 
by any means, or to aid the organization by supplying 
financial aid or the use of company facilities such as 
bulletin boards, mailing lists, or office space.4
^NLRB V. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 272 (1938).
2
National Labor Relations Board, Third Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 233-234. See also 
Millis and Brown, pp. 105-106.
^National Labor Relations Board, Eighth Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board, (Washington, B.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 70-71.
4
National Labor Relations Board, Seventh Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, B.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 45.
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Evidently the Board intended that labor unions be established
and run independently of employers.
Prior to the Jones and Laughlin Steel case^ in which
the Supreme Court ruled the Wagner Act constitutional, company
interference with unions continued to be quite open. After it
appeared that the Act would stand, employers became more 
2
careful. "Early in the Act's administration," according to 
the Board's Fifth Annual Report, "the typical company union 
showed its illegality upon its face. Now, more subtle methods 
of control are used . . ."^ Banning company domination spawned 
the reformation of most of the old NIRA employee representation 
plans, supposedly to bring them within the terms of the Wagner 
Act. The Board was, therefore, faced with deciding if the 
change was in name only or if the union was truly unassisted.
To solve this particular problem, the Board developed 
what was later called the "fracture doctrine." Millis and 
Brown state;
^NLRB V. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
2
National Labor Relations Board, Fourth Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 71.
^National Labor Relations Board, Fifth Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 95-96.
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In later cases the Board continued to apply this test 
of "cleavage" or what came to be known as the "fracture 
doctrine". Where it found identity of officers between 
the old company-dominated union and the new independent, 
similarity of structure, transfer of assets between the 
organizations, or evidence of favoritism by the employer, 
among other factors which indicated that there had not 
been a sharp break with the past, it continued to order 
disestablishment.^
Of course a labor organization that was found to have broken
2
with the past would be left alone.
An unanticipated and very difficult problem also arose 
under this section of the Act. It turned out that in a number 
of cases the employer would interfere with the organizational 
attempts of one of two affiliated unions. Specifically, an 
AFL affiliate would compete with a CIO affiliate for recogni­
tion, and the employer would typically prefer the older more 
"conservative" AFL union.^ In these cases instead of disesta­
blishing the offending union, the Board would set aside the 
contract and issue a cease and desist order to the employer. 
Thus, the employer was prevented from interfering or showing 
any favoritism until a union had been certified.^
^Millis and Brown, p. 107.
2
National Labor Relations Board, Fourth Annual Report,
p. 73.
^Electric Products Corporation, 3 NLRB 475 (1937) .
^For a good discussion of this problem see Millis and 
Brown, pp. 20 4-205.
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The above solution led to a great deal of criticism 
toward the Board. It was claimed that the Board discrimi­
nated against "independent" unions because it disestablished 
them while it only issued cease and desist orders in cases 
involving affiliated unions.^ Regardless, the Board's stated 
policy did not involve discrimination;
The Board has distinguished this kind of case from the 
usual case of domination and support of a labor organ­
ization, in which the illegally dominated or supported 
organization is ordered disestablished, and has held 
simply that such assistance by an employer constitutes 
interference, restraint, and coercion with the meaning 
of Section 8(1) of the A c t . 2
Under this policy it didn't matter if the offending union was
affiliated or independent. If the union was found illegally
assisted but not dominated, a cease and desist order was
issued. However, it was highly unlikely that an affiliated
union would be dominated. Consequently, appearances were
somewhat deceiving. Millis and Brown state:
. . . the Board disestablished "independents" only when 
there was clear evidence that there had been such 
interference by the management with the right of employees 
to an unimpeded free choice, that in its judgment the 
organization was "company-dominated" and incapable of 
acting as the independent representative of employees; 
and the courts upheld the theory of the Board on this 
point. Every case was decided on its own facts. The
^Ibid., p . 109.
2
National Labor Relations Board, Eighth Annual Report,
p. 30.
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record shows that many independents were accepted as 
bona fide and given the use of the Board's machinery 
of elections.
Nevertheless, this was a reproach that the Board could not 
seem to shake.
A related policy was established in the Midwest Piping
2
and Supply Co., Inc. case. In this case the company executed
a closed-shop contract with one of two competing unions. At
the time both unions had filed representation petitions with
the Board that were still pending. The Beard ruled that the
signing of a contract under these circumstances constituted
illegal interference on the part of the employer. This
decision resulted in a long lasting policy termed the Midwest
Piping doctrine. This policy and the justification for it
are stated in the Tenth Annual Report of the Board:
. . . Congress has clothed the Board with the exclusive 
power to investigate and determine bargaining represen­
tatives. Consequently, an employer may not disregard the 
jurisdiction of the Board and preclude the holding of an 
election under Board auspices, by resolving the conflict­
ing representation claims on the basis of proof which the 
employer deems sufficient but which is not necessarily 
conclusive. Moreover, the effect of such conduct is to 
accord unwarranted prestige and advantage to one of two 
competing labor organizations and thereby prevent a free 
choice by the employees.
^Millis and Brown, p. 109.
^63 NLRB 1060 (1945).
^National Labor Relations Board, Tenth Annual Report of 
the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1946), p. 39.
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Despite the above problems, the Wagner Act was rela­
tively well accepted until after the end of World War II. At 
this time strike activity increased rapidly. Opposing factions 
recognized the opportunity and began a campaign to amend it.
A hostile press aided in these efforts making a change inevita­
ble. The Wagner Act was thought responsible for three dif­
ficulties which most people believed justified a change:
1. Labor had come to a dominant position in the American 
economy, 2. Unions had not developed a sense of responsibility 
to their members, their employers, or the public, 3. Equiva­
lent limitations should be put on both unions and employers.^ 
Sanford Cohen describes this period well:
The frequency of jurisdictional disputes, the occasional 
examples of coercive picketing, the well publicized work 
stoppages during the war, irregularities in the internal 
affairs of some unions, and the failure of the CIO and 
the AFL to accommodate their differences are examples of 
factors that destroyed some part of the general sympathy 
for unionism.2
He further states:
The collective bargaining turbulence of the 1945-1946 
period . . . was annoying to a nation anxious to resume
its peacetime ways. Probably more than anything else, 
the post-war strike wave was responsible for the growth
^Millis and Brown.- pp. 271-315.
2
Cohen, p. 504.
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of a feeling that "something ought to be done about 
labor unions.
Given the prevailing attitude, significant alteration of the 
Act was almost a certainty.
It cannot be denied that the Wagner Act had a major
2
effect on company unionism. In the first three years of 
the Wagner Act, fully twenty percent of all unfair labor 
practice charges fell under Section 8(2). By fiscal year 
1938, over one thousand 8(2) charges were filed, and in 
fiscal year 1939, 8(2) charges made up thirty percent of all 
unfair labor practice charges filed with the board. However, 
after 1939, the percentage and the absolute numbers began 
to decline. In the last full year of the Wagner Act deci­
sions (1947), only 311 8(2) charges were filed making up
7.3 percent of all unfair labor practice charges (See Ta­
ble 1) .
Developments Following Taft-Hartley
In 1947, the Labor Management Relations Act (the Taft- 
Hartley Act) was passed.3 Section 8(2) of the Wagner Act was 
adopted in identical form as Section 8(a)(2) of the Taft-
^Ibid., p. 505.
2
Millis and Brown, p. 104.
^61 U.S. Stat. 136 (1947).
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TABLE 1
TOTAL 8(2) CHARGES PILED WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD EXPRESSED IN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS 
AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICE CASES, FISCAL YEARS 1936-1948
Fiscal Year
Total Unfair 
Labor Practice 
Cases
Total 8(2) 
Charges 
Filed
8(2) charges as 
a % of Total 
Unfair Labor 
Practice Cases
1936 865 197 22.8
1937 3,124 616 19.7
1938 6,807 1,327 19.5
1939 2,514 755 30.0
1940 2,902 708 24.4
1941 4,817 688 14.3
1942 4,967 613 12.3
1943 3,403 337 9.9
1944 2,573 187 7.3
1945 2,427 199 8.2
1946 3, 815 315 8.3
1947 4,232 311 7.3
1948* 296 11 3.7
SOURCE: Compiled from National Labor Relations Board,
First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936). to 
Thirteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations 
Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949).
Fiscal year 19 4 8 is not a complete year due to 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
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Hartley Act. However, several changes in the law affected 
Board policies regarding domination of and interference with 
unions.
Section 9(c)(2) reads:
In determining whether or not a question of representation 
affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules 
of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of 
the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief 
sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organ­
ization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with 
respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not 
issued in conformity with section 10(c).
Section 10(c) reads in part:
. . . That in determining whether a complaint shall issue
alleging a violation of section 8(a)(1) or section 8(a)(2), 
and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules 
of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the 
labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor 
organization national or international in scope.
The effect of section 9(c)(2) was to prohibit the 
Board from denying a place on a ballot, " . . .  by reason of 
an order which had discriminated against an unaffiliated 
union.Consequently, the way was opened for an increase in 
the number of "independent" unions on ballots in representation 
elections. Mention should be made that during the latter years 
of the Wagner Act large numbers of independent unions had 
already appeared on ballots. It should, therefore, come as no 
surprise that the end result of this alteration was not relax­
ation of the treatment of independent unions, but stricter
^Millis and Brown, p. 521.
4 2
treatment of affiliated unions.^
Section 10(c) effected a threefold policy modification 
by the Board. First of all, if the Board found domination 
of a union, it would be disestablished whether or not it was 
affiliated. Secondly, where the board found simple inter­
ference with no domination, it would issue a cease and desist 
order with no disestablishment regardless of affiliation.
The third point was that the same standards would be applied 
to both affiliated and unaffiliated unions in determining if
a new union is a dominated "successor" to an older disestab-
2lished company union. Put simply, there would be no 
difference in the treatment of affiliated or unaffiliated 
unions.
In relation to this policy, it was thought that 
"Possibly the facts would never sustain a charge that an 
affiliated union is 'company dominated' to an extent requir­
ing disestablishment."^ This proved not to be the case. In 
1951, the Board disestablished an affiliated union for the
4
first time. The union was a Teamsters affiliate of the
^Ibid., p. 427.
2
National Labor Relations Board, Thirteenth Annual 
Report of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 51.
^Millis and Brown, p. 428.
^Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 94 NLRB 210 (1951).
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American Federation of Labor. The company president and 
branch manager had solicited members for the union, the 
company had paid all dues, and the contract was signed while 
another union was attempting to organize the plant.
In accordance with the above policies, the Board 
developed guidelines as to what constituted company domination 
of a union. These guidelines consist of employer establish­
ment and maintenance of the union, employer use of an agent 
to control the union, active supervisory personnel in the 
union, and internal union laws which give effective control 
of the union to management. If none of these conditions are 
present or unless an unusual circumstance prevails, the Board 
determines that the union has been interfered with but not 
dominated.^
Section 14(a) of the Act which allowed supervisors to
become members of a union raised some questions regarding the
use of their membership as an indication of domination or
interference. However, the Board pointed out that while the
law allowed supervisors to join unions it did not prohibit
the Board from considering their active participation as an
2
indication of employer interference.
National Labor Relations Board, Fourteenth Annual 
Report of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 57.
2
National Labor Relations Board, Thirteenth Annual 
Report, p. 54.
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Another change occurred when the Board modified its 
Midwest Piping doctrine in 1951. It was felt that this 
modification was necessary to facilitate the continuity of 
bargaining:
A majority of the Board held that an employer may con­
tinue bargaining with a union which has been the established 
majority representative, even in the face of a rival 
union's petition, if the petition raises no valid question 
of representation, either because it proposes an inappro­
priate unit or for other reasons. However, the Board 
made it clear that an employer and a union do so at their 
own risk, subject to unfair labor practice charges if the 
Board later finds that the petition did raise a valid 
question of representation.Ï
After the Wagner Act was passed, it was thought that 
charges involving company unionism would eventually disappear.^ 
Indeed, as was seen in the previous subsection, 8(2) charges 
did decrease during the latter years of the Wagner Act. Further­
more, after passage of Taft-Hartley the number of 8(a)(2) 
charges declined until 1958. From 1958 on, the number of 
8(a)(2) charges have generally increased reaching a high of
1,003 in 197 6. It is true, however, that expressed as a per­
centage of all unfair labor practice charges filed, there has 
been a general decrease (See Table 2).
National Labor Relations Board, Sixteenth Annual 
Report of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 160.
2
Rosenfarb, p. 135.
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TABLE 2
TOTAL 8(a)(2) CHARGES FILED WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD EXPRESSED IN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS 
AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICE CASES, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1977
Fiscal Year
Total Unfair 
Labor Practice 
Cases
Total 8(a)(2) 
Charges 
Filed
8(a)(2) Charges 
as a % of Total 
Unfair Labor 
Practice Cases
1948* 2,553 197 7.7
1949 4,154 534 12.9
1950 4,472 570 12.7
1951 4,164 489 11.7
1952 4,306 406 9.4
1953 4,409 421 9.5
1954 4,373 445 10. 2
1955 4,362 403 9.2
1956 3,522 383 10.9
1957 3,655 367 10.0
1958 6,608 706 11.6
1959 8,266 724 8.8
1960 7,723 820 10.6
1961 8,136 653 8.0
1962 9,231 691 7.5
1963 9,550 729 7.6
1964 10,695 667 6.2
1965 10,931 669 6.1
1966 10,902 748 6.9
1967 11,259 738 6.6
1968 11,892 841 7.1
1969 12,022 622 5.2
1970 13,601 592 4.5
1971 15,467 670 4.3
1972 17,733 766 4.3
1973 17,361 716 4.1
1974 17,978 934 5.2
1975 20,311 905 4.5
1976 23,496 1,003 4.3
1977 26,105 954 3.7
SOURCE: Compiled from National Labor Relations Board,
Thirteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949). to Forty- 
Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).
Fiscal year 1948 is not a complete year due to passage 
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
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Conclusion
Company unionism as an idea began in the late 18 00's, 
but did not reach full flower until World War I and the War 
Labor Board. During the 1920's the concept was kept alive 
under such terms as the American Plan and Welfare Capitalism. 
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recover Act truly gave 
company unionism the impetus it needed to encompass twenty 
percent of the surveyed work force. Company unionism was in 
full swing when the Wagner Act was passed in 19 35. In the 
early years of the Wagner Act, the number of 8(2) charges 
filed were quite high, 1,327 in 1938, but the number dwindled 
in later years. After the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, the 
number of 8(a)(2) charges filed continued to decline until 
1957. Then began an increase in the absolute number of 
8(a)(2) charges filed. However, throughout the entire period 
the number of filed 8(a)(2) charges expressed as a percentage 
of total unfair labor practice charges declined.
CHAPTER III
EMPLOYER DOMINATION
The Taft-Hartley Act substantially changed decisions 
in 8(a) (2) cases by requiring in Section 10(c) that . .in 
deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision 
shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organiza­
tion affected is affiliated with a labor organization national 
or international in scope." Prior to the Taft-Hartley amend­
ments, the Board ordered all illegal nonaffiliated unions 
disestablished whereas employers usually were ordered simply 
to cease and desist from dominating or interfering with illegal 
affiliated unions. The reason for treating affiliated and 
unaffiliated unions differently was that the Board felt the 
parent organizations could reorganize the illegal union once 
the enf^loyer domination stopped. The rationale for the Taft- 
Hartley change was given in the Legislative History of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947;
If it is an independent union, not affiliated with a 
national or international organization, the Board usually 
annihilates it by requiring the employer to "disestablish" 
it, by denying to it a place on the Board's ballots, or by 
punishing an employer that deals with it. By its ingenious 
and discriminatory application of this section and of its 
powers under section 10, the Board has liquidated many 
unions that workers wished as their bargaining agents. In 
a few instances, the Board has used the section against 
affiliated unions, and particularly those connected with
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the A.F. of L. But in these cases, it has discriminated 
again, imposing a penalty less than the death sentence 
that would have been forthcoming had the union been an 
independent.1
In order to accomodate itself to changes required by
10(c)', the Board now provides different remedies for 8(a) (2)
violations depending on the degree of union assistance
involved in each case. The Fourteenth Annual Report of the
National Labor Relations Board states;
. . . when the employer's conduct amounts to domination, 
he is ordered to disestablish the organization, whether 
or not it is affiliated, and to cease dealing with it 
as a labor organization. On the other hand, if the 
conduct amounts only to unlawful support, he is ordered 
to refrain from recognizing or otherwise dealing with 
the organization unless and until it shall have been 
certified by the Board in a subsequent election as the2 
collective bargaining representative of the employees.
Hence, the distinction between a finding of domination and a
finding of unlawful support is a crucial one.
This chapter will deal with 271 cases which involved 
employer actions the Board has deemed partially indicative of
3
domination of a union. It should be emphasized that these
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, p. 320.
2
National Labor Relations Board, Fourteenth Annual 
Report of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 57.
^National Labor Relations Board, Fifteenth Annual 
Report of the National Labor Relations Board, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 101.
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tactics used singly, without evidence of additional assistance, 
would severely curtail the likelihood of a Board finding of 
domination.^ Nevertheless, each category of employer action 
will be examined separately. Such analysis is necessary to 
clarify the issues involved in each classification.
The first topic addressed will be that of employer 
formation or initiation of a union. Then, in order, attention 
will be directed toward the following types of employer 
interference: supervisory personnel actively involved in a
union, lack of clear cleavage from a previous company domina­
ted union, agents of the employer involved with the formation 
or administration of a union, pervasive company control of a 
union, charges filed six months after the violation, employer 
use of a lockout to force membership in a favored union, and 
disagreement regarding a finding of domination.
Employer Formation or Initiation of a Union
Employer formation or initiation of a union was an 
issue in 152 cases during the 1950-1974 period (see Table 3). 
Ultimately, the company was found guilty of an 8(a)(2) viola^ 
tion in 147 (96.7%) of these cases. In only five cases 
(3.3% of the total) did the outcome result in a no violation 
finding.
^Ibid.
TABLE 3
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Employer Formation or Initiation of a Union 
Heard Before the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 10 9 90.0 1963 5 5 100.0
1951 6 6 100.0 1964 11 11 100.0
1952 13 13 100.0 1965 11 11 100.0
1953 6 6 100.0 1966 6 6 100.0
1954 6 6 100.0 1967 7 7 100.0
1955 2 2 100.0 1968 6 5 83.3
1956 0 0 • ■ ■ 1969 6 5 83.3
1957 3 2 66.7 1970 4 4 100.0
1958 4 4 100.0 1971 6 6 100.0
1959 2 2 100.0 1972 5 5 100.0
1960 8 8 100.0 1973 6 6 100.0
1961 6 6 100.0 1974 5 4 80.0
1962 8 8 100.0 Total 152 147 96.7
o
SOURCE: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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Eventually, fifty-two of these cases were appealed to 
the appropriate circuit court. Board orders involving 8(a)(2) 
violations were enforced in forty-five (86.5% of the total 
appealed) instances. Only on seven occasions did a circuit 
court reverse a violation finding by the Board.
Several interesting issues make themselves apparent in
this group of cases. In Ed Taussig, Inc.  ^ the company
initiated, formed, sponsored, and promoted the Employees'
Management Committee. Although the company engaged in no
other unfair labor practices, the Board found an 8(a)(2)
violation because the respondent had invaded a field of
activity exclusively reserved to employees. In a later rela- 
2ted decision, the Board pointed out that slight suggestions 
by an employer, regarding a choice between unions, can have a 
potent effect on employees. Furthermore, company formation 
or initiation of a union significantly surpasses the effects of 
mere suggestion. Therefore, a clear violation of 8(a)(2) 
had resulted.
Employer formation, as opposed to initiation, of a 
union was an issue in Harrison Sheet Steel.^  Here there was 
some question as to whether or not the company had initiated
^108 NLRB 470 (1954).
^Alarm Device Manufacturing Co., 175 NLRB 6 59 (19 69) 
^94 NLRB 81 (1951), 194 F. 2d 407 (CA-7, 1952).
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the union. However, the company had formed the labor organ­
ization, and, therefore, was found to have violated section
8(a)(2). Similar rulings were issued in Hankins Container^
2
and Ferguson-Lander Box Company . In both of these cases, 
employees initiated the labor organizations in question, but 
the company formed and structured them. The Board once again 
found this clearly in violation of 8(a)(2).
San Leandro Imports  ^ provides a fascinating variation 
on employer formation of unions. The owner of San Leandro 
Imports instructed a supervisor named Holsten to form a 
company union entitled the Automobile Salesmen's Association. 
After the Association was formed and the employer realized 
that he had violated Taft-Hartley, Holsten was fired for 
creating the union. As a defense the employer then claimed 
he had purged the Association of all company interference. 
Ruling that the firing of Holsten revealed domination rather 
than a lack of it, the Board found San Leandro guilty of 
violating 8(a)(2).
The Hertzka and Knowles case^ furnishes an important
^145 NLRB 640 (1963).
^151 NLRB 1615 (1965).
^173 NLRB 629 (1968).
^206 NLRB 191 (1973), 503 F. 2d 625 (CA-9, 1974), 
cert. den. 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
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final topic for consideration in this section. Formation of 
a committee system was suggested by the company. Management 
representatives presided at, attended, and voted in the 
meetings that formed the committee system. The committees 
were structured such that management attended, voted, and 
observed the votes of others at each meeting. The company 
claimed that this involvement was simple cooperation. How­
ever, the Board found the employer's actions to be in viola­
tion of 8(a)(2). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not agree. It pointed out that there was no 
evidence of employee dissatisfaction with the committees and 
that only a purely adversarial model of labor relations would 
find such employer conduct unlawful. Thus, the true desires 
of employees must be considered of paramount importance in 
any Board decision.
Supervisory Personnel Actively Involved 
In a Union
Active involvement of supervisory personnel within 
unions was a question in 107 cases during the twenty-five year 
period under study (see Table 4). In eighty-six cases (80% 
of the total) the Board found companies guilty of violating 
8(a)(2). Not guilty verdicts accounted for the remaining 
twenty-one rulings (20%).
Thirty-seven of these cases were pursued through the 
legal system to the appropriate circuit courts of appeals.
TABLE 4
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Active Supervisory Participation in Union 
Affairs Heard Before the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 1 1 100 1963 2 2 100
1951 3 3 100 1964 4 4 100
1952 2 2 100 1965 8 7 88
1953 5 5 100 1966 4 4 100
1954 1 0 0 1967 1 1 100
1955 0 0 • • • 1968 10 8 80
1956 0 0 ■ • • 1969 11 7 64
1957 2 2 100 1970 4 3 75
1958 3 2 67 1971 5 4 80
1959 1 1 100 1972 9 6 67
1960 7 7 100 1973 4 4 100
1961 7 6 86 1974 1 1 100
1962 12 6 50 Total 107 86 80
U1
SOURCE: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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On twenty-nine occasions (78% of the cases appealed) circuit 
courts enforced Board rulings regarding Section 8(a)(2). 
However, 8(a) (2) violation findings by the Board were reversed 
in eight instances (22%).
Section 14(a) of Taft-Hartley, which permits super­
visors to join and remain union participants, provides for 
interesting analysis when considered conjunctively with 
Section 8(a)(2). Immediately after Taft-Hartley was passed, 
the Board was faced with resolving the conflict inherent in 
these two sections. This difficulty was partially unraveled 
in the Kresge Department Store case.^ The Board held, in 
this decision, that Section 14(a) did not prohibit con­
sideration of supervisory membership in unions as a factor 
in finding employer domination or interference with a labor 
organization.
2
The Valentine Sugars case provides an enlightening 
example of the Board's application of the above doctrine.
The Board, on this occasion, considered the involvement of 
supervisors in the company's independent union as partially 
indicative of an 8(a)(2) violation. The Fifth Circuit Court
^77 NLRB 212 (1948).
^102 NLRB 313 (1953), 211 F. 2d 317 (CA-5, 1954)
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of Appeals, reversing this ruling, held that union membership 
of low level supervisors does not violate 8(a)(2). A corres­
ponding set of decisions was issued in Wayside Press.^  Par­
ticipation by foremen in the Employees' Independent Union 
was cited by the Board as the primary reason for its ruling—  
an 8(a)(2) violation. The Ninth Circuit Court held that the 
acts of such supervisory personnel, as the foremen in this 
example, must be examined within their overall setting. The 
foremen, according to the circuit court, were minor super­
visors who spent no more than twenty to twenty-four percent of
their time in supervisory capacity. Therefore, their union
2
involvement was not a violation of the Act.
Further clarification of these issues was provided in 
the significant Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Association 
case^ where a distinction was drawn between supervisors inside 
the bargaining unit (low level supervisors) and supervisors not 
in the unit (high level supervisors).^ Active participation in
^103 NLRB 11 (1953), 206 F. 2d 862 (CA-9, 1953).
2
See also Ace Wholesale Electric Supply Company, 133 
NLRB 480 (1961), 310 F. 2d 539 (CA-9, 1962); Coca-Cola Company 
of Sacramento, 146 NLRB 1045 (1964), 346 F. 2d 625 (CA-9, 1965); 
and Beach Electric Company, 174 NLRB 210 (1969).
^118 NLRB 174 (1957).
^The distinction between high level and low level super­
visors was further emphasized in A. L. Hechling Barge Lines, 
Inc., 197 NLRB 592 (1972).
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union affairs by executives or high level supervisors was found, 
due to the possible effects on the union's internal balance of 
power, to be a clear violation of 8(a) (2).^ Low level super­
visors within the bargaining unit were ruled free to participa­
tion in all union activities with two exceptions. (1) Even
2
minor supervisors may not serve on negotiating committees.
This would obviously result in management sitting on both sides 
of the negotiating table, a situation the Board has always 
tried to prevent. (2) Minor supervisors whose conduct has been 
ratified by management or whose actions are believed by employ­
ees to be on behalf of management may not participate freely in 
union affairs.^ Their free participation under these circum­
stances would, obviously, give management control over the labor 
organization.
Active involvement of supervisory personnel in a labor 
organization was also at issue in Anchorage Businessmen's 
Association.^ Supervisors of this company participated regularly
^See Bottfield-Refractories, 127 NLRB 188 (1960), 292 
F. 2d 627 (CA-3, 1961).
2
See also The Bassick Company, 127 NLRB 1552 (1960); Powers 
Regulator Company, 149 NLRB 1185 (1964), 355 F . 2d 506 (CA-7,
1966); Jansen Electronics Manufacturing, Inc., 153 NLRB 1555 (1965); 
and Russell Motors 198 NLRB 351 (1972), 481 F. 2d 996 (CA-2, 1973).
^See also Banner Yarn Dyeing Corporation, 139 NLRB 1018 
(1962); and International Typographical Union, 185 NLRB 496 
(1970), 452 F. 2d 976 (CA-10, 1971).
^124 NLRB 662 (1959), 289 F. 2d 619 (CA-9, 1961).
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in meetings of the Anchorage Professional Pharmacy Association, 
an independent union. They voted in these meetings, thereby 
affecting the internal administration of the union, and they 
served on the negotiating committee. On this basis, the trial 
examiner held the union to be dominated and ruled it disesta­
blished. However, the Board ruled that active participation 
of supervisors in union affairs does not per se constitute 
evidence of domination. Thus, the company was held guilty, 
merely, of unlawful support. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld this ruling. In two related cases, Bisso Towboat Company^
2
and U.M.W. Welfare and Retirement Fund , the Board reduced 
findings of domination to unlawful support on the same basic 
premise.
Kugler's Restaurant  ^ provides further clarification of 
this issue. Supervisors were also members of the independent 
union in this case, but their involvement was much more exten­
sive. Not only were supervisors members, but they also signed 
the union contract. One of these who signed was a former union 
president. Evidence further indicated that this supervisor 
forced the secretary-treasurer to sign the contract. Another
^192 NLRB 885 (1971). 
^192 NLRB 1022 (1971) . 
^151 NLRB 1566 (1965).
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supervisor took an active role in removing an employee, whose 
ideas ran counter to those of management, from the independent's 
presidency. The resultant vacancy was filled with an employee 
of the supervisor's own choosing. The Board, on this occasion, 
reversed the trial examiner's finding of simple unlawful 
support, and, instead, ruled that the union was dominated. The 
degree of supervisory interference, therefore, is the key in 
determining whether or not a union has been dominated.
Another problem involving participation by supervisors 
in union activity has been to correctly define the terra super­
visor. Section 2(11) of Taft-Hartley provides the following 
definition :
The term "supervisor” means any individual having authority, 
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, 
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, 
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend 
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise 
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
The above definition was somewhat illuminated in the Ohio Power
case.^ Ruling on this case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that section 2(11) was to be interpreted in the disjunctive.
Thus, the possession by an employee of any one of the authorities
listed, places that employee in the supervisory class. For the
^Ohio Power Company v. NLRB, 176 F. 2d 385 (CA-6, 1949), 
cert. den. 338 U.S. 899 (1949).
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most part, then, the Board's job is one of going through the
categories listed in section 2(11) and determining on a case
by case basis if an employee possesses one of the authorities.^
Additionally, the Board has ruled, with the District of
Columbia Circuit Court affirming, that infrequent exercise of
supervisory authority is no defense. The ability of a super-
2
visor to exercise control is the only valid test.
The one difficulty with this definition has involved the 
requirement that an employee exercise independent judgment to 
be considered a supervisor. In Arduini Manufacturing Company  ^
the Board considered the ratio of supervisors to workers as an 
indication of opportunity to employ independent judgement. The 
respondent company had claimed, in this instance, that there was 
only one supervisor for ninety employees. The Board found this 
highly unlikely and ruled that the ten leadmen in question were 
supervisors. The fact that they organized the shop committee 
was, therefore, a violation of 8(a)(2).^
The final issue to be addressed on this category is
See Matthews Drivurself Service, 133 NLRB 1513 (1961); 
National Gypsum Company, 139 NLRB 916 (1962); Riker Video 
Industries, 171 NLRB 3 (1968); E.E.E. Company, 171 NLRB 982 
(1968); Hesston Corp., 175 NLRB 96 (1969); Marinette Marine Corp., 
179 NLRB 627 (1969); and Big T Food Store, 200 NLRB 409 (1972).
2
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company, 151 NLRB 67 6 
(1965), 353 F. 2d 904 (CA D of C, 1965).
^153 NLRB 887 (1965).
4
See also American Coach Company, 169 NLRB 1065 (1968).
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involvement of supervisors in the formation of independent
unions. Supervisors helped form a shop committee in Webb
Manufacturing Company  ^and an Employees' Association in 
2C. Randall. Both times the supervisors met the section 2(11) 
definition. The Board, significantly, ruled their formation 
of independent unions to be in violation of 8(a)(2).
Lack of Clear Cleavage 
Lack of clear cleavage from a previous company domina­
ted union was an issue in only eight cases during the 1950-1974 
period, with the last case occurring in 1967. The Board found 
the respondent companies violated 8(a)(2) in all eight instances. 
Four of these cases were pursued to Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Two Board rulings were enforced, but two were reversed.
To determine if a new union is truly an independent one 
or just a successor to a former company union, the Board has 
historically made use of the "fracture doctrine." This doctrine 
requires that the company make a clearly defined break with the 
prior, dominated union. Factors which tend to mitigate against 
a Board finding of clear cleavage are (1) carry-over of officers, 
(2) similarity of structure, (3) carry-over of assets, and (4)
^154 NLRB 827 (1965).
^88 NLRB 140 (1950).
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anything which indicates that the new organization is a mere 
successor and not a "new" union.^ This group of cases tends
to confirm continued Board application of these policies.
2 3In Majestic Metal Specialties and Huberta Coal Company
officers of previous, dominated unions were carried over to new,
successor organizations. The Board cited this carry-over as a
factor in both decisions and ruled a violation of 8(a)(2). The
Majestic Metal ruling went unchallenged, but Huberta Coal was
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court where the Board's decision
was affirmed.
I\vo other issues were cited by the Board within this 
group of cases as indicative of successorship. In Lawson Milk
4
Company management had failed to completely disestablish a 
dominated union. A guilty finding was the result with the 
verdict being upheld in the appeals court. Lack of clear clea­
vage disavowel of former illegal conduct was the cause of viola-
^Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner 
Act to Taft-Hartley, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950),
p. 107.
^92 NLRB 1854 (1951) .
^168 NLRB 122 (1967), 408 F. 2d 793 (CA-6, 1969).
^136 NLRB 538 (1962), 317 F. 2d 756 (CA-6, 1963).
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tion findings by the Board in three other cases.^
The two cases which were reversed by appeals courts
were interesting in their simplicity. In Coca-Cola Bottling 
» 2of Indianapolis the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
evidence did not support the Board's finding. Lack of sub­
stantial evidence was also cited by the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in its reversal of the Board's guilty finding in 
National Cash Register Company.^ Therefore, neither company was 
found in violation of the Act.
Agents of the Employer Involved With the
Formation or Administration of a Union
Interference with a union by agents of an employer was 
an issue in seven cases during the 1950-1974 period. The Board 
found respondent companies guilty of 8(a)(2) violations in all 
seven instances. However, four cases were appealed out of which 
three Board rulings were upheld and one was reversed.
Rinker Materials Corporation  ^ supplied a typical illus­
tration of employer use of an agent to assist a favored union.
Farrington Manufacturing Company, 93 NLRB 1416 (1951) ; 
Meyer and Welch Company, 96 NLRB 236 (1951); and Lenscraft 
Optical Company, 128 NLRB 836 (I960).
^142 NLRB 1030 (1963), 333 F. 2d 185 (CA-7, 1964).
^167 NLRB 1047 (1967), 405 F. 2d 497 (CA-6, 1969).
^162 NLRB 1670 (1967).
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On this occasion the respondent company selected an employee 
(an agent) to solicit memberships in the Laborers Union. The 
company paid him while he was organizing and allowed him to 
use the plant manager's office. The obvious purpose of all 
this was to keep the Teamsters from organizing the plant. In 
this respect the company succeeded, but the Board found it 
guilty of interference with the union. Similar decisions were
issued in Department Store Food Corporation of Pennsylvania ,^
2 3Mears Coal Company, et. al. and Harrawoods, Inc.
An interesting variation on this theme is found in 
Fiore Brothers Oil Company.^  Anthony Bartholdi, the son-in- 
law of the company's president, acted as an agent for the company, 
He solicited membership cards for the favored union, told 
employees that the company was going union, and precipitously 
signed a contract after he had gotten a majority of workers 
to sign membership cards. Bartholdi also reneged on a promise 
to sign a card for the competing union. The Board, ruled that 
without Bartholdi's efforts a majority of workers would not have 
signed and found Fiore Brothers guilty of an 8(a)(2) violation.
^172 NLRB 1203 (1968), 415 F. 2d 74 (CA-3, 1969). 
^175 NLRB 837 (1969), 437 F, 2d 502 (CA-3, 1970). 
^193 NLRB 1136 (1971) .
^137 NLRB 191 (1962), 317 F. 2d 710 (CA-2, 1963).
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An additional significant ruling on this subject was 
made in Niagara Frontier Services.^ Although not a super­
visor, Johnson, an employee of Niagara, was used in important 
managerial functions. She watched various stores' receipts, 
and, in general, had the run of all the stores. Her freedom 
according to the Board was such that employees of the company 
would naturally believe her acts to be on behalf of management. 
The Board found her efforts in assisting the Retail Clerks 
and opposing the Amalgamated Meat Cutters to be illegal inter­
ference under Section 8(a)(2). The most notable factor in 
this case was that Johnson was not acting on the approval of 
her employer. Nevertheless, the Board, referring to Inter- 
national Association of Machinists v. NLRB , pointed out that 
an employer may be held guilty of illegal assistance even 
though the actions of his agents are not expressly authorized 
by him.
The only decision in this group to be reversed was 
Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company.^  The United Mine Workers 
complained, in this instance, that an organizer for the Southern 
Labor Union, Campbell, acted as an agent for the company by 
soliciting workers for Tennessee Consolidated at the same time
^186 NLRB 769 (1970).
^311 U.S. 72 (1940).
^131 NLRB 536 (1961), 307 F. 2d 374 (CA-6, 1962).
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that he solicited memberships in the Southern Labor Union.
The company claimed that Campbell was acting on his own 
as opposed to acting on behalf of Tennessee Consolidated.
The Sixth Circuit Court agreed with the company, and, 
therefore, reversed the Board's ruling.
Pervasive Company Control 
Pervasive company control of a union was addressed 
in Ace Wholesale Electrical Supply Company .^ A number of 
supervisors, on this occasion, helped to form and administer 
the Brown Employees Association. Coupled with this was 
limited collective bargaining on the part of the Association 
as evidenced on two fronts; (1) wages and hours were not 
considered bargaining issues by the Association, and (2) the 
Association formally renounced all strike activity and instead 
stated its intention to rely on friendly negotiation and arbi­
tration to settle all disputes. The Board ordered the 
Association disestablished and cited these two issues as evi­
dence of pervasive company control of the union. However, the 
Ninth Circuit court ruled that supervisory influence in this
case was minor, and, therefore, no violation had occurred. A
2
similar decision was issued in the Leslie Metal Arts case
^133 NLRB 480 (1961), 310 F. 2d 539 (CA-9, 1962). 
^194 NLRB 20 (1971), 472 F. 2d 583 (CA-6, 1972).
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where the Sixth Circuit Court ruled that while the company's 
illegal activities violated 8(a)(2), they were not of such a 
pervasive nature to justify the Board's disestablishment 
order.
Reiser Aviation Corporation  ^ and Prince Macaroni 
2
Manufacturing Company were two related cases in which the 
Board reversed unlawful support findings by trial examiners 
and ruled instead that the unions were dominated. In the 
former the Board stated that the complete context of the case 
must be considered, and on that basis found the Beiser 
Employees Association dominated. In the latter case, the 
Board took under consideration the weakness of an employees' 
committee as a bargaining agent. The result was a Board 
finding of domination which was substantially enforced by the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Board in Ben Carson Manufacturing Company  ^
emphasized union independence as an indicator of company domi­
nation. This case involved company use of a shop committee to
^135 NLRB 399 (1962).
^138 NLRB 979 (1962), 329 F. 2d 803 (CA-1, 1964).
^112 NLRB 323 (1955).
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keep out a competing affiliated union. The labor organization's
ability to stand on an independent footing was cited by the
Board as the practical distinction between unlawful support and
domination. Thus, the shop committee was disestablished.^
Union independence was also a factor in three additional cases
in which Board decisions were either partially or totally
2
reversed by circuit courts of appeal. The fact that each union 
was capable of standing on its own led to these three reversals.
Charges Filed Six Months After the Violation 
Inclusion of this division stems directly from section 
10 (b) of Taft-Hartley which requires all unfair labor practice
charges to be filed within six months of their alleged occurrence, 
In Edmont, Inc.^  and Herrin Transportation,^ the Board reduced 
trial examiner findings of domination to unlawful support 
because domination had not occurred within six months prior to 
the filing of charges. Domination was found in Distribution 
Centers of Detroit^ to have occurred both six months prior to
^See also Han-Dee Manufacturing Co. 132 NLRB 1542 (1961).
^Coca-Cola (Stockton), 102 NLRB 586 (1953), 212 F. 2d 465 
(CA-9, 1954); Hotpoint Division, General Electric, 128 NLRB 788 
(I960), 289 F. 2d 683 (CA-7, 1961); Coppus Engineering Corp., 115 
NLRB 1387 (1956), 240 F. 2d 564 (CA-1, 1967).
^139 NLRB 1528 (1962).
^151 NLRB 108 (1965).
^197 NLRB 1 (1972) .
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filing of the charge and inside the six month period. Conse­
quently, in a split decision the Board ruled that Distribution 
Centers had dominated its independent union. The key, there­
fore, to a finding of domination in this class of cases is 
occurrence of illegal activity during the six month period.
Employer Use of a Lockout 
Employer use of a lockout to force employee membership 
in a favored union is not one of the traditional methods of 
achieving domination. However, this methodology was an issue 
twice during the period in question. The Board found 8(a)(2) 
violations in both cases. These decisions were both upheld in 
appeals courts.
In Seven Up Bottling Company (Sacramento) ,^ the 
Sacramento Seven Up Employees Union had formerly bargained on 
a regular basis. No agreement could be reached in its last 
negotiations. Further, the company used a lockout against the 
union, and then conditioned reemployment on the signing of an 
agreement. The Board held that this placed the union in a 
helpless, subservient position and, thus, violated 8(a)(2).
The Ninth Circuit Court enforced most of the Board's original 
ruling, but on the lockout issue, it remanded the case to the 
Board for further hearing. The Board reaffirmed its previous
^147 NLRB 401 (1965), 352 F. 2d 509 (CA-9, 1965),
158 NLRB 1223 (1966).
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verdict. The Perry Coal Company case^ was very similar in 
nature to Seven Up of Sacramento. Perry Coal Company used a 
lockout to encourage United Mine Worker membership. On this 
basis the Board found an 8(a)(2) violation, and the Seventh 
Circuit Court concurred. Lockouts for this purpose are 
clearly not to be allowed.
Disagreement Regarding a Finding of Domination
Conflict over what determines domination occurred in a 
total of thirty-one cases (see Table 5). Tiventy involved 
disagreements between a trial examiner (or an administrative 
lav; judge) and the Board. Of these twenty, the Board reversed 
twelve, substituting rulings of unlawful support for domination. 
In the residual eight cases of the twenty, this process was 
inverted with the Board finding domination in lieu of unlawful 
support. Three of the latter were affirmed by a circuit court 
of appeals, and one was reversed on domination but affirmed on 
unlawful support.
The eleven remaining cases involved either a disagree­
ment between the Board and circuit courts or differences within 
the Board itself. There were eight occurences of dissension 
between the Board and a circuit court of appeals. The Board 
found domination and a circuit court reversed their findings in 
all eight instances. Five domination rulings were reduced to
^125 NLRB 1256 (1959), 284 P. 2d 910 (CA-7, 1961).
TABLE 5
Number of Final Decisions Involving Controversy Over Company Domination Heard Before 
the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Board Reversal of a Trial Disagreement within Circuit Court
Examiner (or an Admini- the Board Reversal of the
strative Law Judqe) BoardDecision
Trial Examiner Board Malority Minority Board Circuit Court
Decision Decision Decision Opinion Decision Decision
Domination 12
Unlawful
Support
Not Guilty
12
0
SOURCE: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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simple interference, but, interestingly, three rulings of 
domination were completely overturned with a circuit court 
ruling that no violation of the Act had occurred. The last 
three cases involved disagreements within the Board as to 
what constituted domination.
Summary and Conclusions 
Five of the eight topics discussed in this chapter have 
analyzed types of employer interference with union activity 
which the National Labor Relations Board has traditionally 
considered partially indicative of union domination. Employer 
formation or initiation of unions was the most numerous 
category occurring in 129 cases, but it was followed closely 
by active involvement of supervisory personnel in unions which 
occurred in a total of 107 cases. By virtue of such high levels 
of occurrence, these two methods of employer interference 
continue to present difficulties to the Board. The three other 
topics--lack of clear cleavage, agency problems, and pervasive 
company control--were much less numerous (less than ten cases 
each). The final three topics discussed in this chapter 
consisted of charges filed six months after the violation (a 
technical difficulty which occurred in only a few cases) , 
employer use of a lockout (a non-traditicnal method of employer 
interference which occurred in only two cases) , and disagreement 
regarding a finding of domination (thirty-one cases).
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At the time Taft-Hartley was passed, it was feared that 
the equal treatment modifications continued in Section 10(c) 
would provide government protection for company-dominated 
unions.^ However, this proved not to be the case. Faced with 
a choice of treating nonaffiliated unions more leniently or
2
affiliated unions more severely, the Board chose the latter.
Some confusion over what constituted domination 
resulted in 31 cases in which there was disagreement between 
trial examiners (later called administrative law judges), the 
Board, and the circuit courts. On this basis an argument 
could be made that decisions were simpler before the 10(c) 
changes.
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Legislative History, p. 38 3.
2National Labor Relations Board, Thirteenth Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1949) , p. 51. See also Millis and Brown, 
p. 427.
CHAPTER IV
DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES OR THREATS THEREOF
This chapter explores 254 8(a)(2) cases which involved 
discriminatory treatment of employees or threats of such treat­
ment. The first section of this chapter investigates free 
speech issues and their significant relationships to the 
remaining topics. Since a number of these topics involve 
employer threats, an analysis of the free speech issue and its 
relationship to Section 8(a)(2) is necessary. Then, in order 
of relative frequency, the following topics will be discussed: 
employer threat of discharge or disciplinary action, employer 
promise of concessions, employer threat of plant shutdown, 
employer threat to withdraw benefits, employer interrogation 
of employees, employer control of transfers, and employer use 
of discretionary seniority clauses.
Free Speech
Due to the nature of the violations discussed in this
chapter, the issue of free speech arises in a substantial number
of cases. The Labor Management Relations Act specifically
addresses this difficulty in Section 8(c) where it states:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or 
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, 
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi­
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the 
provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
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Thus, the Board is left with the difficult task of determining
if certain employer statements are mere expression of views
of coercive in nature.
In its 1940 ruling in International Association of
Machinists v. NLRB ,^ the Supreme Court set the tone for rules
regarding free speech and section 8(a)(2). It stated, "Known
hostility to one union and clear discrimination against it
may indeed make seemingly trivial intimations of preference for
2
another union powerful assistance for it." In other words, 
the total set of circumstances surrounding the speeches or 
statements in question must be considered when determining if 
the employer has violated the Act. The Supreme Court continued, 
"Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions 
may have a telling effect among men who know the consequences 
of incurring that employer's strong displeasure."^
The Board has continued to follow the above doctrine in 
determining if statements by employers have violated the Act.
In Irving Air Chute Company ,^ workers were threatened with 
discharge. Furthermore, the company suggested organization of 
the Elected Committee and gave support and assistance to it.
^311 U.S. 72 (1940).
^Ibid., p. 78.
^Ibid.
"^149 NLRB 627 (1964), 350 F. 2d 176 (CA-2, 1965).
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The Board ruled that Irving Air Chute had violated section
8(a)(2). In affirming the Board's ruling, the Second Circuit
Court held that the company's free speech defense was invalid
in light of the surrounding circumstances. Specifically,
Irving Air Chute, and not the employees, was the driving force
behind the Elected Committee. In Guard Services, Inc.^  a
company representative gave a speech to the guards and in it
stated, "It would be my suggestion, and we would be most happy
to have all you Guards to set up a small committee . , . Many
small companies each year are finding it increasingly desirable
to set up their own independent union. This has many advan- 
2
tages." The trial examiner ruled this to be legal free speech. 
However, the Board found it to be a violation because it (1) 
suggested the formation of an independent union, (2) assured 
employees that such an organization would be favorably 
received by Guard Services, and (3) offered benefits to employ-
3
ees if an independent union was formed.
Of course distinct threats or promises or benefits are 
clearly violative of the Act. This was the Board's ruling in
^134 NLRB 1753 (1961)
^Ibid.
See also Alarm Device Manufacturing Company, 175 NLRB 
659 (1969); Sportspal, Inc., 214 NLRB 917 (1974); and Sweater- 
masters Company, 176 NLRB 301 (1969).
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Wagner Iron W o r k s a case in which the employer made flagrant 
use of threats and promises of disparate treatment. The 
Seventh Circuit Court enforced this ruling. The Board issued 
a similar ruling in Stainless Steel Products .^
A further point in this line of reasoning is that an 
employer is not allowed to make damaging and unqualified 
assertions unless he can show a reasonable basis for such 
assertions. This was the issue at hand in Miller-Charles and 
Company^. The General Manager of Miller-Charles made a speech 
to relevant employees in which he portrayed the dire conse­
quences of bringing in an outside union. He asserted that the 
shop would have to cut down production and eventually shut down 
completely. The Board found these statements in violation of 
the Act. The Second Circuit Court concurred with this analysis 
and pointed out that the General Manager's statements were not 
in good faith.
On the other hand, employer statements favoring one 
union over another which are devoid of threats or promises of 
benefit are legal free speech. The Corning Glass case^
^104 NLRB 445 (1953), 220 F. 2d 422 (CA-7, 1955).
^157 NLRB 232 (1966).
^146 NLRB 405 (1964), 341 F. 2d 870 (CA-2, 1965).
^100 NLRB 444 (1952), 204 F. 2d 422 (CA-1, 1953).
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illuminates this point. A few of Coming's supervisors en­
couraged workers to join the A.F.L. union favored by Corning 
over the opposing C.I.O. union. The trial examiner and the 
Board agreed that while the supervisor's statements contained 
no overt promises or threats they went further than section 
8(c) permits. The First Circuit Court reversed this decision 
on grounds that section 8(c) allows the company to give 
verbal encouragement to one union over another. Since C o m ­
ing's supervisors used no threat of reprisal or promise of 
benefit, no violation of the Act had occurred.^
In conclusion, it is generally legal for employers to 
make good faith statements to workers that favor one union over 
another. However, if the statement contains any threat or 
promise of benefit, it is not legal free speech. Also, it is 
permissable for the Board to consider all circumstances 
surrounding employer statements. If noncoercive statements 
are made in a coercive atmosphere, they are not legal free 
speech.
^See also Bernhardt Brothers Tugboat Service, 142 NLRB 
851 (1963), 328 F. 2d 757 (CA-7, 1964); Missouri Heel Company, 
209 NLRB 481 (1974); Continental Distilling Sales Company v. 
NLRB, 348 F . 2d 246 (CA-7, 1965); Lake City Foundry Company v. 
NLRB, 432 F. 2d 1162 (CA-7, 1960); Coppus Engineering Corpora- 
tion V. NLRB, 240 F. 2d 564 (CA-1, 1957); and Greyhound Airport 
Service, 204 NLRB 900 (1973).
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Discharge or Disciplinary Action
Employer threats to discharge or take disciplinary
actions against workers who chose to join "unfavored" unions
were a factor in 129 cases during the period of study (see
Table 6). This was the largest number of cases pertaining to
any one issue in this chapter. Of these 129 cases, the Board
ruled that companies were guilty of violating section 8(a) (2)
in 120 instances (ninety-three percent of the total). Forty-
nine Board rulings were appealed to circuit courts which upheld
forty-one of them.
The Clement Brothers Company case^ and the Kent Corpor- 
2ation case yield unexceptional examples of Board rulings re­
garding employer discharge or threats to discharge workers. In
the former case, the Operating Engineers and District 50 of
the United Mine Workers were competing with each other to 
represent the Clement Brothers employees. The company favored 
District 50 over the Operating Engineers, and, in support of 
this position, threatened workers with economic reprisals such 
as discharge for refusal to join the United Mine Workers. Both 
the Board and the trial examiner agreed that this violated 
8(a)(2). However, the trial examiner found no violation in the 
signing of a contract after the above occurrences. According
^165 NLRB 698 (1967), 407 F. 2d 1027 (CA-5, 1969). 
^212 NLRB 595 (1974).
TABLE 6
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Employer Threat of Discharge or Disciplinary 
Action Heard Before the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 0 0 • ■ • 1963 6 6 100
1951 6 5 83 1964 7 7 100
1952 3 3 100 1965 6 6 100
1953 6 6 100 1966 6 6 100
1954 2 1 50 1967 3 3 100
1955 1 0 0 1968 5 5 100
1956 0 0 ■ • • 1969 6 5 83
1957 4 4 100 1970 10 8 80
1958 2 2 100 1971 4 4 100
1959 5 5 100 1972 2 1 50
1960 11 10 91 1973 7 7 100
1961 9 9 100 1974 11 10 91
1962 7 6 86 Total 129 119 92
00o
SOURCE: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
81
to the trial examiner only seven of 129 signed authorization 
cards were tainted, leaving a clear majority in favor of 
District 50. The Board disagreed that the signing of this 
contract was legal. The simple mathematical formula used by 
the trial examiner, according to the Board, was not realistic 
in determining the pervasive effects of company threats. On 
eighteen separate occasions after the signing of the contract, 
threats were made, and three workers were fired for supporting 
the Operating Engineers. Accordingly, the Board ruled, with 
the Fifth Circuit Court affirming, that the Clement Brothers 
illegally assisted District 50 in violation of 8(a)(2). Simi­
larly, in Kent Corporation the Boilermakers were competing with 
an employee's association to represent Kent's workers. The 
company fired workers for filing unfair labor practice charges 
and for supporting the Boilermakers. An 8(a)(2) violation 
ruling by the Board was the result.
Further enlightenment regarding this issue is furnished
in Mid-States Metal Products  ^ and Fender Electric Instrument 
2
Company . In both of these cases, incumbent unions prevailed 
on employers to assist them in maintaining their membership 
in the face of opposition. In the former case, the Chemical
^156 NLRB 872 (1966) .
^133 NLRB 676 (1961).
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Workers arranged an employee's dismissal for aiding attempts 
at decertification, and in the latter, the Fender Employees 
Association had four employees fired for considering member­
ship in another union. Section 8(a)(2), according to the Board, 
was violated on both occasion.
In the Continental Can case^, the trial examiner and 
the Board significantly disagreed over their rulings. Conti­
nental Can had just opened a plant in New Jersey and had made 
a pay offer to the United Papermakers and Paper Workers (the 
union representing this plant) of $1.78 per hour. However, 
Continental also had a plant in Tonawanda where the workers were 
being paid $1.91 per hour. Realizing that $1.78 was unacceptable 
to the New Jersey employees, management upped its offer to $1.81, 
and then, because the workers threatened to strike, the company 
increased its offer to $1.86. While the bargaining agent for 
the union was conducting a vote to see if the workers would 
accept $1.86, a melee occurred. Afterwards, the bargaining agent 
gave the company names of eight workers who then were dismissed. 
The trial examiner, ruling that expressing dissatisfaction with 
union affairs is protected activity, found the firings to be 
unlawfully supportive of the Paper Workers; and, therefore, in 
violation of 8(a)(2). The Board in reversing the Trial Examiner,
^136 NLRB 1135 (1962).
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pointed out that the Act does not protect violence and that 
fighting is not a protected activity. Furthermore, the 
company was unaware that opposition to the bargaining agent 
was the cause of the fracas, and when they discovered this 
fact they reinstated with no loss of pay those workers who 
could prove they were not involved in any fighting. Thus, the 
Board found that no violation of the Act had occurred.
The Wagner Iron Works case^ involved a representation 
struggle between the CIO's United Auto Workers, the AFL's 
Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, and an inde­
pendent union called the Temporary Committee. The Auto Workers 
filed unfair labor practice charges against the company on the 
grounds that employees favoring the Auto Workers were threatened 
with reprisals. The Board agreed and ruled that 8(a)(2) had 
been violated. The Seventh Circuit Court enforced the Board's 
ruling and stated that the company's efforts in support of the
AFL affiliate went far beyond free speech.
2
Klein's Golden Manor is a recent case in which the Board 
found insufficient evidence to support a ruling that the 
dismissals in question were discriminatory in nature and in 
violation of 8(a)(2). Local 1115 of the Joint Board, Nursing
^104 NLRB 445 (1953), 220 F. 2d 126 (CA-7, 1955). 
^214 NLRB 807 (1974).
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Home and Hospital Employees Division had competed with Local 4 
of the Medical and Health Employees Union to represent Klein's 
employees. Local 1115 claimed that workers were threatened 
with bodily injury if they testified against Klein's. They 
also claimed that two employees were fired for joining Local 
1115. The Board pointed out that the general counsel must 
bear the burden of proof. In this case the general counsel 
failed in this endeavor and a not guilty ruling was 'e result.
Of the forty-nine cases in this group which ' re 
appealed to circuit courts, seven Board decisions re>_ . rding 
discriminatory discharge were reversed (one was remanded).
The most common ground for reversal was insubstantial evidence
to support a charge of disriminatory discharge. This was the
1 2 basic difficulty in Shen-Valley Meat Packers , Farmbest, Inc. ,
Stewart-Warner^, and A. 0. Smith Company .^ The three remaining
reversals were for an assortment of reasons. The Cabot Carbon
Company Employee Committee was not, according to the Fifth
Circuit Court, a labor organization under the law. Thus, an
8(a)(2) violation could not be found (this particular finding
^105 NLRB 491 (1953), 211 F. 2d 289 (CA-9, 1954). 
^154 NLRB 1421 (1965), 370 F. 2d 1015 (CA-8, 1967). 
^94 NLRB 607 (1951), 194 F. 2d 207 (CA-4, 1952). 
"132 NLRB 339 (1962), 343 F. 2d 103 (CA-7, 1965).
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was later overruled by the Supreme Court).^ Although an
employee thought he had been fired in Ace Wholesale Electri-
2
cal Supply Company , the individual who fired him did not have 
the authority to do so. The fact that the employee subse­
quently failed to show up for work meant that he had actually 
quit. Finally, discharges in Wah Chang Corp.^  were for 
soliciting union members during working hours— an activity 
prohibited by contract--and were not in violation of 8(a) (2) .
Concessions
Offering of concessions from employers to employees to 
inhibit organization by an external union, was an issue in 
eighty-four cases heard before the National Labor Relations 
Board between 1950 and 1974 (see Table 7). The Board found the 
company guilty of violating section 8(a)(2) in all eighty-four 
cases. Thirty-eight of these decisions (forty-five percent of 
the total) were appealed. Circuit courts of appeal affirmed 
8(a)(2) violations in thirty-four cases (eighty-nine percent), 
ruled no violation had occurred in three cases (eight percent), 
and remanded one case to the Board for further study regarding 
jurisdiction.
^Cabot Carbon Company, 117 NLRB 1633 (1957), 256 F. 2d 
281 (CA-5, 1958), 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
^133 NLRB 480 (1961), 310 F. 2d 539 (CA-9, 1962).
^124 NLRB 1170 (1959), 305 F. 2d 15 (CA-9, 1962).
TABLE 7
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Employer Promise of Concessions Heard Before
the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974 , According to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 3 3 100 1963 1 1 100
1951 5 5 100 1964 8 8 100
1952 3 3 100 1965 3 3 100
1953 6 6 100 1966 2 2 100
1954 0 0 • o • 1967 6 6 100
1955 3 3 100 1968 2 2 100
1956 0 0 • • • 1969 3 3 100
1957 1 1 100 1970 4 4 100
1958 1 1 100 1971 2 2 100
1959 2 2 100 1972 3 3 100
1960 4 4 100 1973 2 2 100
1961 9 9 100 1974 7 7 100
1952 4 4 100 Total 84 84 100
00
en
Source: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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A typical and recent example of this type of employer
action is provided in the Hydro-Dredge Accessory Co. case.^
Hydro-Dredge was being organized by an outside union, the
International Association of Machinists, and was resisting this
organization attempt by supporting formation of an Employee's
Association. Consequently, employees of Hydro-Dredge were
given raises for not joining the Machinists. The Board held
this to be in violation of section 8(a) (2). Similar rulings
2
on wage concessions were issued in Gaynor News Company ,
Philamon Laboratories ,^ and Dove Manufacturing^. In all three 
of these cases, circuit courts affirmed 8(a)(2) violations.
Pacific Electricord  ^ furnishes further enlightenment 
in the area of wage concessions. An Employee Committee, which 
had represented Pacific Electricord's workers for several years, 
was being challenged by the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers. Prior to the election, management told 
workers that a ten cent wage increase would be granted regard­
less of v/ho won the election. The Board ruled that this action
^215 NLRB 138 (1974).
^93 NLRB 299 (1951), 197 F. 2d 719 (CA-2, 1952). 
^131 NLRB 30 (1961), 298 F. 2d 176 (CA-2, 1962). 
^145 NLRB 1379 (1964), 355 F. 2d 727 (CA-9, 1966). 
^153 NLRB 521 (1965).
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demonstrated to employees that the Employee Committee would
obtain as much as an outside union. Therefore, the company
assisted the Committee in violation of 8(a)(2).
Several other types of concessions were also uncovered.
In Standard Transformer  ^employees were offered additional
vacations and vacation pay in order to discourage an outside
union. Further examples of employer concessions include
2
offering Blue Cross and Blue Shield benefits, promising pro­
motions,^ promising advantageous transfers,^ guaranteeing full 
time work,^ and, finally, in the Coal Creek Coal case^ offering
a free chicken dinner and beer if the workers voted to retain 
their present independent union.
Three cases concerning employer concessions were 
reversed by circuit courts. Because the promise of a fifteen 
dollar bonus for voting against the Holder's Union was not made
^97 NLRB 669 (1951), 202 F. 2d 846 (CA-6, 1953).
^Howard Creations, Inc., 212 NLRB 179 (1974).
^Hibbard Dowel Company, 119 NLRB 176 3 (1958), 273 F. 2d 
565 (CA-7, 1960) .
^Nathan's Famous of Yonkers, Inc., 186 NLRB 131 (1970).
^Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 139 NLRB 748 (1962), 
323 F. 2d 956 (CA-2, 1963).
^97 NLRB 14 (1951), 204 F. 2d 579 (CA-10, 1963).
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by a company representative, Lake City Foundry  ^was reversed.
No reason was stated by the circuit court for reversal of
2 3Multi-Color Company, while Boyles Famous Corned Beef was
reversed because the alleged company promise of benefit was
not substantiated by evidence.
Employer Threat of Shutdown 
Employer threats to shutdown operations were involved 
in forty-three cases during the period under study (1950 to 
1974). The Board found 8(a)(2) violations in forty-two of 
these cases (ninety-eight percent of the total). Seventeen of 
these were appealed to appropriate circuit courts. Of these 
seventeen, sixteen shutdown threats were upheld as 8(a)(2) 
violations, and one was reversed.
Sportspal, Inc.  ^ provides a typical example of company 
use of shutdown threat. The United Steelworkers had organized 
the employees at Sportspal. A majority of the workers had 
signed authorization cards, and, on that basis, the Steel­
workers had filed a representation petition. After the request 
for recognition, management threatened to shutdown the plant if
^173 NLRB 1081 (1968), 432 F. 2d 1162 (CA-7, 1970).
^114 NLRB 1129 (1955), 250 F. 2d 573 (CA-6, 1957).
^168 NLRB 299 (1968), 400 F. 2d 154 (CA-8, 1968).
^214 NLRB 917 (1974).
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they were forced to deal with the Steelworkers. The company 
vice-president wrote a statement and gave a speech against 
the Steelworkers. Eventually, Sportspal helped to form and 
support the rival Company Union. This resulted in an elec­
tion victory for the Company Union over Steelworkers. It 
also resulted in an 8(a)(2) violation ruling by the Board.
A large number of decisions along these lines have, in the 
past, been issued by the Board.^
2
The case of Fotochrome, Inc. presented interesting 
difficulties to the Board. The International Jewelry Workers
had represented employees of Fotochrome for many years. They 
were contemplating a strike. To combat this difficulty, the 
company decided to bring in the International Production 
Service and Sales Employees Union. A number of supervisors 
aided this effort by telling workers the plant might close if 
the Jewelry Workers were successful. The trial examiner for 
this case ruled that Fotochrome had not violated the Act 
because the company president had effectively disavowed the 
acts of his supervisors. The Board reversed the trial examine:
^See, for example Hydro-Dredge Accessory Co., 215 NLRB 
138 (1974); Croscill Curtain Co., 130 NLRB 1465 (1961), 297 
F. 2d 294 (CA-4, 1961); Hibbard Dowel Co., 119 NLRB 1763 (1958), 
273 F. 2d 565 (CA-7, 1960); and Standard Transformer, 97 NLRB 
669 (1951), 202 F. 2d 846 (CA-6, 1953).
^146 NLRB 1010 (1964), 343 F. 2d 631 (CA-2, 1965).
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on the grounds that the president had contacted only three of 
his 180 workers. The Second Circuit Court concurred with the 
Board's findings of an 8(a)(2) violation.
Not guilty rulings were the eventual result in the 
two final cases discussed in this section. In Greyhound Air­
port Service ,^ a supervisor was overheard telling a third 
party that he thought if the American Transit Union was success­
ful in replacing Greyhound's current independent union, Grey­
hound might close down. The Board ruled this a permissible
2
expression of views. Armco Drainage and Metal Products 
presented further complications. A third party with a minor 
connection to Armco attempted to coerce employees by telling 
them that if they joined the United Auto Workers the plant 
would shut down. The Board found this to be a violation of 
8(a)(2). However, the Sixth Circuit Court held that Armco was 
not responsible for the third party's actions, and had not, 
therefore, violated the Act in this respect.
Withdrawal of Benefits 
In the period from 1950 to 1974, twenty cases involved 
issues relating to employer withdrawal of benefits or threats 
of withdrawal. The Board decided that Section 8(a) (2) had been
^204 NLRB 900 (1973) .
^106 NLRB 725 (1953), 220 F. 2d 573 (CA-6, 1955).
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violated in eighteen of these cases (ninety percent) and that 
no violation had occurred in the remaining two. Six cases were 
pursued to circuit courts of appeal. Board decisions regard­
ing 8(a)(2) were enforced in four cases, but they were reversed 
in two cases.
The most common benefit withdrawn was wages. This 
type of case was exemplified in Mastelotto Enterprises .^ 
Mastelotto was being organized by both the Operating Engineers 
and the Cement Workers. Management favored the Cement Workers 
by soliciting signatures for them and by paying lower wages to 
members of the Operating Engineers. The Board found this to
be in violation of 8(a)(2) and issued similar rulings in
2 8 Salant and Salant, Inc. and Spitzer Motor Sales .
Many other types of benefits were also withdrawn in
attempts to favor one union over another. Some examples include
withdrawal of vacation benefits^, withdrawal of stock options^.
^181 NLRB 243 (1970).
^92 NLRB 343 (1950) .
^102 NLRB 437 (1953).
4
Dove Manufacturing Company, 149 NLRB 1408 (1964). 
^Coal Creek Coal Company, 97 NLRB 14 (1951), 204 F. 2d
579 (CA-10, 1953).
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1 2 withdrawal of parking privileges , and withdrawal of overtime .
The two circuit court decisions which reversed Board 
rulings were very straightforward. In Stewart-Warner an 
election was challenged due to alleged threats and refusal of 
the company to allow one of two competing unions to use a 
bulletin board. These actions favored the International Brother­
hood of Electrical Workers. The Fourth Circuit Court, contrary 
to the Board's illegal interference ruling, found neither 
Stewart-Warner nor the Electrical Workers in violation of the 
Act. This decision was based on two factors. (1) The opposing 
union in this case had not filed the required non--Communist 
affadavits. (2) The facts of the case supported both Stewart- 
Warner' s and the Electrical Workers' arguments that they had 
not violated the Act. In Armco Drainage  ^ the Board also ruled 
that 8(a)(2) had been violated. This decision was partially 
based on a company threat of loss of back pay for any worker who 
joined the United Auto Workers Union, which was attempting to 
organize the plant. The Sixth Circuit Court ruled that the
^Kiekhaefer Corporation, 127 NLRB 1381 (1960), 292 F. 2d 
130 (CA-7, 1961).
^A&S Electronic Die Corporation, 172 NLRB 1478 (1968), 
423 F. 2d 218 (CA-2, 1970) .
^94 NLRB 607 (1951), 194 F. 2d 207 (CA-4, 1952).
^106 NLRB 725 (1953), 220 F. 2d 573 (CA-6, 1955).
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facts of the case did not support the finding, and while it 
agreed other violations had occurred, it reversed that portion 
of the Board's order involving the loss of back pay.
Interrogation
There were nineteen cases during the twenty-five year 
period under study in which interrogation of employees by manage­
ment or management's representatives was a significant issue.
The Board found companies guilty of 8(a)(2) violations in 
seventeen of these cases (eighty-nine percent of the total). A 
total of seven Board decisions were appealed to circuit courts 
which affirmed all seven rulings.
A significant issue involving interrogation and Section 
8(a) (2) was brought up in the Powers Regulator Company case^.
The United Steel Workers were attempting to organize Powers, 
and thus, were competing with the Powers Employees Shop Union. 
The company favored its own independent union over the Steel 
Workers. This was evidenced by the fact that the company 
interrogated and gave the impression of surveillance to employ­
ees who favored the Steel Workers. The company also threatened 
to close the plant. On these issues the trial examiner ruled 
that 8(a)(1) had been violated, but 8(a)(2) had not. The Board 
disagreed with the trial examiner on grounds that the above 
actions took place during the Steel Workers organization
^149 NLRB 1185 (1964), 355 F. 2d 505 (CA-7, 1966).
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campaign, therefore, inevitably resulting in company assis­
tance to the independent union. The Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals concurred with the Board on these issues, and upheld
the Board's 8(a) (2) violation ruling. The Board has issued
1 2 similar rulings in Home Dairies , and Filtron Company ,
Aristocrat Inns of America ,^ and Goshen Litho .^
Syracuse Color Press'^ represents an informative quali­
fication to the above rulings. In this case the International 
Mailers were competing with the International Bookbinders to 
represent employees at Syracuse Color Press. The company 
favored the Bookbinders because they were a member of the 
Allied Trade Council which allowed the company to use the 
union label on their products (comic books). Syracuse Color 
Press felt the use of this label was economically advantageous. 
Consequently, on one occasion high level company officials 
interviewed five employees in the company office about their 
feelings toward the Mailers. As a result, the Mailers filed
^105 NLRB 323 (1953).
^134 NLRB 1691 (1961), 309 F. 2d 184 (CA-2, 1962)
^146 NLRB 1599 (1964).
^196 NLRB 977 (1972), 476 F. 2d 662 (CA-2, 1973).
^103 NLRB 377 (1951), 209 F. 2d 596 (CA-2, 1954).
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8(a)(2) and 8(a)(1) charges against Syracuse Color Press. The 
Board ruled that this interview session was a single incident 
which was insubstantial and insufficient to support an 8(a)(2) 
violation ruling. However, due to the implied threats conveyed 
during the interview, the Board found Syracuse in violation of 
section 8(a)(1). The Second Circuit Court agreed with these 
rulings and enforced the Board's order.
Two salient points arise from these cases. (1) For 
interrogation to be violative of the Act it must be coercive 
in nature^. (2) If coercive interrogation takes place during 
an organization campaign, and if it favors one union over 
another, the interrogation violates section 8(a) (2).
Control of Transfers 
Discriminatory treatment of employees through company 
control of personnel transfers was a significant issue in 
fifteen cases heard before the National Labor Relations Board 
from 1950 to 1974. The Board found companies guilty of 
violating section 8(a)(2) in all fifteen cases. Nine of these 
decisions were appealed to Circuit Courts (sixty percent of 
the total). Of these nine, five Board rulings regarding 
8(a)(2) were affirmed and four were reversed.
^See for example Wayside Press v. NLRB, 206 F. 2d 862 
(CA-9, 1953) .
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The four cases in this group which were reversed by 
circuit courts were very similar in nature. Federal Mogul 
Corporation^ exemplifies these decisions. The charges in 
this case resulted from an organizational campaign conducted 
by the Teamsters in opposition to the Coldwater Distribution 
Center Employee Representative Committee. The Board ruled 
that on the totality of the evidence Federal Mogul had 
interfered with and dominated the Employee Representative 
Committee. A disestablishment order was the result. One of 
the specific issues the Board considered in this ruling was 
that Federal Mogul had the ability to control the Employee 
Representative Committee through personnel transfers. The 
Sixth Circuit Court took issue with this viewpoint and stated, 
"Any employer has the potential power through promotion, trans­
fer and discharge, to affect the status of an employee for 
organizational purposes. However, in the absence of specific 
evidence that an employer has so used these powers, this 
factor is of little weight in determining whether an employer 
has violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act."^ Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit Court ruled that Federal Mogul had not violated the 
Act. In fact it concluded that, "The relationship between
^164 NLRB 131 (1967), 394 F. 2d 915 (CA-6, 1968) 
^Ibid. , p. 919.
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Coldwater and the committee, in this case, presents an
excellent example of cooperative efforts between labor and
1 2 management." Hotpoint Division, General Electric , Coppus
Engineering Corporation^ , and Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing 
Company^ are all cases in which circuit courts reversed the 
Board on the same basic issues discussed above.
While the ability to control the composition of union 
committees is not violative of the Act, employer use of this 
ability is. Clapper's Manufacturing  ^ illustrates this 
point. Clapper's employees were represented by an Employees 
Committee, the composition of which was controlled by the 
company through transfer, promotion, and discharge of members. 
The Board took this into consideration in finding that 
Clapper's had violated Section 8(a)(2). The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals enforced the Board's ruling. Similar deci­
sions on this issue were rendered in Tuscarora Plastics^,
^Ibid., p. 921.
^128 NLRB 788 (1960), 289 F. 2d 683 (CA-7, 1961). 
^115 NLRB 1387 (1956), 240 F. 2d 564 (CA-1, 1957). 
^105 NLRB 727 (1953), 221 F. 2d 165 (CA-7, 1955). 
^186 NLRB 324 (1970), 458 F. 2d 414 (CA-3, 1972). 
®167 NLRB 1059 (1967).
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H & H Plastics Manufacturing Company ,^ and General Shoe Corpor- 
2
ation .
Discriminatory Seniority Clauses 
Seniority clauses and their use to assist one union 
over another were at issue in fourteen cases during this study. 
The Board found companies guilty of violating section 8(a)(2) 
in ten of these cases (seventy-one percent). Five Board 
rulings were pursued to appropriate circuit courts where two 
Board decisions were enforced and three were reversed.
The Board has consistently ruled that an agreement 
which gives a union the final authority to determine seniority 
of employees and to enforce such a provision violates section 
8(a)(2). This was the Board's ruling in the Minneapolis Star 
case^ in which the Teamster's Union caused the respondent 
company to discriminate against a Carpenter by dropping him to 
the bottom of the regular seniority list. A similar decision 
was issued in Gibbs Corporation .^ In this case the contract 
with Gibbs gave the union control over seniority and prompted
^158 NLRB 1395 (1966), 389 F. 2d 678 (CA-6, 1968).
^90 NLRB 1330 (1950), 192 F. 2d 504 (CA-6, 1951), cert, 
den. 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
^109 NLRB 727 (1954).
^120 NLRB 1079 (1958).
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the Board to rule that 8(a)(2) had been violated. The Board's 
reasoning was that such seniority clauses tend to encourage 
membership in the incumbent union at the expense of a competing 
union.^
It should be pointed out that the above rule applies
only where the union has final authority to determine seniority
and where the union applies these seniority rules in a discrim-
2inatory manner. In the St. Johnsburg Trucking Company case, 
the seniority clause in question directed the company to 
create a seniority list to be approved by the union (Teamsters). 
However, the union was not given final authority to settle 
disputes over seniority. Instead, if there was a dispute, 
arbitration was to be used. Consequently, St. Johnsburg was 
found not guilty of violating the Act. The Second Circuit Court 
reversed the Board's 8(a)(2) violation ruling in the Meenan Oil 
Company case^ on these same basic premises/*
See also Progressive Kitchen Equipment Company, 123 
NLRB 992 (1959); Marcus Trucking Company, 126 NLRB 1080 (1960),
286 F. 2d 583 (CA-3, 1961); St. Louis Harbor Service Company,
150 NLRB 636 (1964); and Rath Packing Company, 153 NLRB 125 (1965)
^120 NLRB 636 (1958).
^121 NLRB 580 (1958), 266 F. 2d 552 (CA-2, 1959).
4
See alsr ..’lorida Power and Light Company, 126 NLRB 
967 (1960).
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The Wheland Company case^ provides an important caveat 
to the above decisions. Wheland, due to existing business 
conditions, decided to consolidate the two separate plants it 
had been operating. The International Association of Machinists 
and the United Steelworkers represented employees at the 
Manufacturing Division plant, and the Allied Industrial Workers 
represented employees at the Ordinance Division plant. Allied 
obtained a majority of signed authorization cards, and, on 
this basis, Wheland recognized this union as the exclusive 
representative of the company's workers. In bargaining with 
Allied, the company agreed to establish a new seniority roster 
which gave preferential seniority to the former Allied members 
(the Ordinance Division employees). The Board found this 
seniority clause to be in violation of 8(a)(2). However, the 
Sixth Circuit Court did not agree with this decision. It 
pointed out that, "Seniority arises only out of contract or 
statute." and further stated, "The National Labor Relations 
Act does not compel a bargaining representative to limit sen­
iority clauses solely to the relative length of employment of
2
the respective employees." Thus, Wheland had simply bargained 
with the employees' legal representative on the issue of
^120 NLRB 814 (1958), 271 F. 2d 122 (CA-6, 1959). 
^Ibid., pp. 124-125.
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seniority, and had, therefore, not violated the Act.^
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has examined several types of actual or 
threatened discriminatory treatment of employees by employers. 
An important aspect of these actions is the employer's right 
to free speech. Basically, it was found that an employer 
cannot make statements that, on their face value, contain any 
threat or promise of benefit. Neither is it legal for 
employers to make what would otherwise be considered legal 
free speech statements in a coercive atmosphere. With this in 
mind, discriminatory discharge or disciplinary action was 
analyzed. The fact that this charge occurred in 129 cases 
and that several Board rulings were overturned in circuit 
courts indicates the continuing difficulty associated with 
this topic. Concessions offered by employers in order to 
assist a favored union also occurred in a large number of cases 
(eighty-four). However, adjudication of this charge was much 
less complicated. The Board ruled that companies had viola­
ted 8(a)(2) in all of these cases, and circuit courts reversed 
only three of these decisions. Likewise, of forty-two cases 
involving shutdown threats— seventeen of which were appealed—
^See also Central States Petroleum Union, 127 NLRB 
223 (1960), 288 F. 2d 166 (CA of DofC, 1961).
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only one Board ruling was reversed. Employer threats to 
withdraw benefits was also a very straightforward section.
Only two Board decisions relating to this difficulty were 
reversed, and they were both reversed due to insubstantial 
evidence to support the charge. While interrogation was a 
significant issue in only nineteen cases, two important points 
were brought out. First, coercive interrogation violates the 
Act, and second, if coercive interrogation takes place during 
an organizational campaign, and if it favors one union over 
another, the interrogation violates 8(a)(2). The analysis of 
employer control over transfers made the important point that 
an employer's mere ability to control transfers does not in 
itself violate the Act. A violation does occur if the employer 
makes discriminatory use of this ability. Charges involving 
discriminatory seniority clauses were the least frequent in 
this group (fourteen cases). It was found that seniority 
clauses which give unions the final authority in seniority 
determination are violative of the Act. The point was also 
made that seniority need not just relate to length of employ­
ment. Instead, seniority arises out of contract and is, 
therefore, a bargainable issue.
CHAPTER V
FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT
This chapter will deal with 228 cases in which an
employer was charged with providing a union with some type
of financial or material support. The first and most numerous 
of the charges to be discussed in this chapter is that of employ­
er provision of financial assistance to a union. Then, in order 
of relative frequency, the following types of assistance will 
be discussed: employer provision of premises, employer provi­
sion of materials or services, and employer use of discrimina­
tory no solicitation rules.
Financial Assistance 
Employers were accused of giving financial assistance to 
unions in 150 cases during the twenty-five year period under 
study (see Table 8). Thus, financial assistance was an issue 
in eighteen percent of all 8(a)(2) cases heard by the National 
Labor Relations Board from 1950 to 1974. Of these 150 decisions, 
the Board held employers guilty of violating 8(a)(2) in 134 
instances. Fifty-one of these rulings were appealed to circuit 
courts which upheld thirty-nine Board rulings and reversed 
twelve.
While Section 8(a)(2) of the Act clearly forbids employers 
to give financial assistance to a labor organization, the proviso
104
TABLE 8
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Financial Assistance of a Union Heard Before the 
National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 4 4 100.0 1963 6 6 100.0
1951 9 9 100.0 1964 6 6 100.0
1952 6 6 100.0 1965 5 5 100.0
1953 11 10 90.9 1966 8 8 100.0
1954 3 3 100.0 1967 10 10 100.0
1955 2 2 100.0 1968 5 4 80.0
1956 1 1 100.0 1969 8 5 62.5
1957 2 1 50.0 1970 5 4 80.0
1958 3 3 100.0 1971 4 3 75.0
1959 3 3 100.0 1972 4 4 100.0
1960 10 10 100.0 1973 5 3 60 . 0
1961 12 12 100.0 1974 4 3 75.0
1962 14 9 64. 3 Total 150 134 89.3
SOURCE: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Orders
of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
O
Ln
ment Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
106
to this section creates some difficulties. It states, "an 
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees 
to confer with him during working hours without loss of time 
of pay." Accordingly, employers are allowed to pay union 
members for time spent "conferring" with management. Questions 
obviously arise as to what constitutes conferring with an 
employer. This inevitably complicates the financial assis­
tance issue.
The complicated question of employee receipt of pay 
for time spent during union meetings was addressed in Aerovox 
Corporation. ^  In this case workers were paid for time spent 
at meetings of the Employer Committee (an inside union). In 
regard to this issue the Board stated, "An employer may with­
out violating the law meet with its employees on its property 
to negotiate agreements and to settle grievances and . . .  it 
may compensate employees for time spent on these matters . . . "  
In this instance, however, the Board held that the meetings in 
question surpassed these conditions due to discussions of inter­
nal committee management. The resulting illegal financial 
assistance ruling was upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit
^102 NLRB 1526 (1953), 211 F.2d 640 (CA DofC, 1954), 
cert. den. 347 U.S. 968 (1954).
^Ibid.
Court
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1
2
The Farmbest, Inc. case also helps unravel some of
the difficulties which arise from interpretation of the 
proviso. The trial examiner in this case ruled that Farmbest 
had illegally provided financial assistance to a union by 
compensating employees for attendance at union meetings. The 
trial examiner emphasized that this occurred in the context of 
other acts of assistance, and, therefore, violated 8(a)(2).
The Board, in reversing the trial examiner on this issue, 
pointed out that grievances were not discussed at these 
meetings. In fact they were held to discuss the company's 
future plans and to discuss daily problems of production and 
procedure. These meetings were, consequently, covered by the 
proviso and were perfectly legal. Other 8(a)(2) violations were 
found which were sustained by the Eighth Circuit Court.
In the Coastal State Petrochemical Company case^ the 
Board once again struggled with this issue. Coastal State had 
compensated employees for attending union meetings. However, 
there was no evidence of any other type of interference on the
^See also Firedoor Corporation of America, 127 NLRB 1123 
(1960), 291 F.2d 328 (CA-2, 1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 921 (1961); 
Steel Industries, Inc., 138 NLRB 1235 (1962), 325 F.2d 173 (CA-7, 
1963); Wean Manufacturing Company, 147 NLRB 112 (1964); and 
Pacific Electricord 153 NLRB 520 (1965) .
^154 NLRB 1421 (1965), 370 F.2d 1015 (CA-8, 1967).
^175 NLRB 555 (1969).
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part of Coastal State. The Board ruled that this type of 
payment alone could not be considered unlawful support, and 
was, therefore, not violative of the Act.
A related category of issues is that of company pay to 
workers during speeches given by union organizers. In Ridge­
wood Art Woodcraft  ^workers were paid overtime wages to listen 
to a Carpenter's Union organizer. This was found by the Board
to be an illegal act in support of the Carpenters. Similar
2rulings were issued in Palette Sample Card Company and
3
Knickerbocker Plastic Company.
Another coiranon form of financial support is employer 
payment of union fees or dues. In ABC Machine and Welding 
Service  ^ the International Association of Machinist lodged just 
such a complaint. In fact, ABC had paid the employees' initiation 
fees and first month's dues to enable them to join the Boiler­
makers. The trial examiner for this case found no violation in 
these payments, but the Board found them to be illegal.^ An
^181 NLRB 756 (1970).
^134 NLRB 70 (1961).
^96 NLRB 586 (1951).
*122 NLRB 944 (1959).
^See also Superior Derrick Corporation, 126 NLRB 188 
(I960); Western Auto Associate Store, 143 NLRB 703 (1963); 
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 197 NLRB 805 (1972), 486 F.2d 1395 
(CA-2, 1973); and Freeman G. Gaffney, 205 NLRB 1012 (1973), 506 
F.2d 1052 (CA-3, 1974).
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interesting variation on this type of complaint is found in
Rinker Materials Corporation.^ Instead of directly paying
employees' dues, Rinker raised wages just enough to cover them.
This type of action was also ruled illegal by the Board.
Financial assistance to unions has taken many other
2
forms. In Meyer and Welch assistance consisted of an illegal 
$1,500 cash payment to the Teamsters. Payment of legal fees 
for an Employee Committee was found in violation of the Act in 
the Bev Gal Optical Company case.^ In several instances, 
vending machine money has been used to assist favored union.
4
In the Connor Foundry Company case both vending machine money
and flower fund money was used to illegally support an inside
5 6union. Koehler's Wholesale Restaurant Supply furnishes a
good summary of various types of illegal financial support
given to unions. Koehler's provided financial support to its
^162 NLRB 1670 (1966).
^91 NLRB 1102 (1950) .
^157 NLRB 1287 (1966).
^100 NLRB 146 (1952) .
^See also Beaver Machine and Tool, 97 NLRB 33 (1951); 
Globe Products, 102 NLRB 278 (1953); Tuscarora Plastics, 167 
NLRB 1059 (1967); and Triggs-Miner Corporation, 180 NLRB 206 
(1969).
^139 NLRB 945 (1962), 328 F.2d 770 (CA-7, 1964).
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inside union by giving (1) direct payments to the union, (2) 
vending machine money to the union, (3) free use of the 
premises to the union, and (4) free legal aid to the union.
The fact that these were all violations of 8(a)(2) was clearly 
upheld in the Seventh Circuit Court.
The final but very important type of financial assis­
tance to be discussed in this section is that of company pro­
vision of union elections. The Board ruled this type of assis­
tance illegal in the Prince Macaroni case.^ Prince Macaroni 
was found to have paid for union elections by (1) fabricating 
the ballot boxes, (2) making the ballots, (3) paying part-time 
clerical help to count the ballots, and (4) paying employees 
for time spent during the election. The First Circuit Court
of Appeals enforced the Board's order with respect to these 
2
payments.
Twelve Board decisions regarding financial assistance 
issues were reversed. Of these twelve, six were reversed on 
grounds that the assistance in question was merely cooperative 
in nature. In the Post Publishing case^, for example, union 
use of cafeteria and vending machine profits was found to be.
^138 NLRB 979 (1962), 329 F.2d 803 (CA-1, 1964). 
^See also McCullough Motors, 201 NLRB 1709 (1973). 
^136 NLRB 272 (1962), 311 F.2d 565 (CA-7, 1962).
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. . a  permissible form of friendly cooperation . . . not 
the form of 'support' designed to interfere with, restrain 
or coerce employees in the free exercise of their right to 
choose or change their bargaining representative."^ Reversals 
on similar grounds were made in Coca-Cola Bottling-Indianapolis , 
Federal Mogul Corporation^, Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Com­
pany  ^, Wayside Press ,^ and Hertzka and Knowles.  ^ Both Coppus 
Engineering Corporation  ^and Hotpoint Division, General
g
Electric were reversed because the payments in question were
9
minimal. In Lake City Foundry payments to workers for time
spent at union meetings were permissible because the opposing 
union had not made a request for similar treatment. Payments
^Ibid., p. 571.
^142 NLRB 1030 (1963), 333 F.2d 185 (CA-5, 1964).
^163 NLRB 927 (1967), 394 F.2d 915 (CA-6, 1968).
^105 NLRB 727 (1953), 221 F.2d 164 (CA-7, 1955).
^103 NLRB 11 (1953), 206 F.2d 862 (CA-9, 1953).
^206 NLRB 191 (1973), 503 F.2d 625 (CA-9, 1974), cert,
den. 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
^115 NLRB 1387 (1956), 240 F.2d 564 (CA-1, 1957).
®128 NLRB 788 (1960), 289 F.2d 683 (CA-7, 1961).
^173 NLRB 1081 (1968), 432 F.2d 1162 (CA-7, 1970).
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for attendance at union meetings in Essex Wire  ^were found
legal because they were for time spent conferring with the
employer and were, therefore, covered by the proviso. Payments
for workers to travel to the NLRB regional office were ques-
2
tioned in the Valentine Sugars case . The Fifth Circuit Court 
found them to be legal because they showed no demands by the 
company on the union, and they showed no concessions by the 
company to the union. Thus, these payments did not constitute 
illegal interference. Finally, no reasons for reversal were 
given in the Multi-Color Company case.^
In conclusion, payments by an employer to his employees 
for time spent at union meetings are legal as long as they are 
strictly confined to conferences with the employer. However, 
if these meetings involve such things as discussions of internal 
union affairs, payment for worker attendance would be considered 
illegal financial support to the union in question. Accordingly, 
employer payment to employees for listening to speeches given 
by union organizers are also illegal. Other types of financial 
assistance such as employer payment of legal fees, employer 
payment of union dues, direct payments to the union, and vending 
machine money turned over to a union are also generally illegal.
^107 NLRB 1153 (1954), 219 F.2d 433 (CA-6, 1955). 
^102 NLRB 313 (1953), 211 F.2d 317 (CA-5, 1954). 
^114 NLRB 1129 (1955), 250 F.2d 573 (CA-6, 1957).
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Mitigating against these conclusions are the possibilities 
that such financial assistance is only cooperative in nature, 
or of such a minimal amount as to be irrelevant.
Employer Provision of Premises
From 1950 to 1974 the National Labor Relations Board 
heard 136 cases involving 8(a)(2) charges in which union use 
of company premises was a significant issue (see Table 9). 
Companies were found guilty of violating 8(a)(2) in 125 of these 
cases. Fifty-nine cases were pursued through the legal system 
to appropriate courts of appeal where forty-four Board 
decisions regarding employer provision of premises were upheld 
and fifteen were reversed.
The major problem addressed in these cases was that of 
union use of company premises to conduct union meetings, usually 
during organizational campaigns. The Justus Company case^ 
provides a good example of just such a situation. The Teamsters 
were attempting to organize Justus when the company suggested 
formation of an employee committee. The employee committee was 
allowed to meet on company property, but the Teamsters were not. 
The fact that this conduct discriminated against the Teamsters 
and that it occurred in the context of other violations led the
^199 NLRB 422 (1972).
TABLE 9
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Union Use of an Employer's Premises Heard 
Before the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Year Total # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 6 6 100.0 1963 3 2 66.7
1951 7 7 100.0 1964 6 5 83.3
1952 5 5 100.0 1965 6 6 100.0
1953 17 17 100.0 1966 8 8 100.0
1954 4 3 75.0 1967 8 8 100.0
1955 6 6 100.0 1968 3 3 100.0
1956 1 1 100.0 1969 3 2 66.7
1957 2 1 50.0 1970 4 4 100.0
1958 1 1 100.0 1971 3 2 66.7
1959 2 2 100.0 1972 4 4 100 . 0
1960 9 7 77.8 1973 3 2 66.7
1961 9 8 88.9 1974 5 4 80.0
1962 11 11 100.0 Total 136 125 91.9
SOURCE; Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Order:
of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 8 8 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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Board to issuing an 8(a) (2) violation ruling.^ In Wemyss v.
2
NLRB the Ninth Circuit Court emphasized the above position. 
Similarly, this case involved a company which discriminatorily 
allowed union use of its premises. The court stated, "The 
preference given organizers of the Association over organizers 
of Local 439 in assistance and in the use of respondent's
3
premises constituted employer interference . . ."
While these rulings may seem clear and straight forward, 
other decisions regarding union use of company premises have 
muddied the waters considerably. In a case involving seven 
mining companies^, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
an authorization given by the Peles Brothers mine to the Southern 
Labor Union for them to meet on company property was not 
sufficient evidence on which to base an unlawful support ruling. 
Specifically, the court pointed out that this action was not in 
itself, . . enough to establish that the SLU was chosen by the 
employees as a result of management assistance or domination."^
See also Clapper's Manufacturing, 186 NLRB 324 (1970), 
458 F.2d 414 (CA-3, 1972); Milco Undergarment Company, 106 NLRB 
767 (1953), 212 F.2d 801 (CA-3, 1954); and Marathon Electric, 
106 NLRB 1171 (1953).
^212 F.2d 465 (CA-9, 1954).
^Ibid., p. 473.
'^NLRB V. Hears, 437 F.2d 502 (CA-3, 1970).
^Ibid., p. 509.
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Clearly, use of company property by a union does not necessarily 
constitute a violation of the act. Some clarification of these 
points is provided in Coamo Knitting Mills .^ The trial examiner 
in this case had found Coamo guilty of assisting the Inter­
national Ladies Garment Workers Union partially because Coamo 
had allowed the union to use company premises for union meetings. 
The Board reversed this finding while pointing out that use of 
company property does not per se establish unlawful support.
Instead, unlawful support rulings must be based on the totality
2
of facts. All relevant circumstances must be considered.
The holding of union elections on company property is 
also an issue which arose in several cases. Rulings on this 
topic have been very similar to those discussed above. In 
both McCullough Motors  ^and Monolith Portland Cement  ^ the 
fact that union elections were held on company property was 
considered supportive evidence in Board findings of unlawful 
support. However, in Hesston Corporation  ^ holding union elections
^150 NLRB 579 (1964) .
2
See also Manuela Manufacturing Company, 14 3 NLRB 379
(1963).
^201 NLRB 1709 (1973).
^94 NLRB 1358 (1951).
^175 NLRB 96 (1969).
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on company premises was not found to be illegal. In this case, 
once again, the Board emphasized that consideration of all the 
circumstances of a case must be made in order to find illegal 
support.
Of the fifteen Board decisions regarding union use of
company premises which were reversed by circuit courts, seven
were on grounds that employer cooperation with unions is legal
provided no other unlawful support is found.^ The minimal
nature of the assistance in question was the cause of two other 
2
reversals. Two additional Board decisions were overturned 
because the involved companies had not discriminated in regard 
to union use of their premises^. Scarcity of meeting places 
in rural areas was cited by the Fifth Circuit Court as its 
basis for reversing the Board on the issue of union use of 
company property. Since meeting places in such areas are diff-
^Hertzka and Knowles, 206 NLRB 191 (1973), 503 F.2d 625 
(CA-9, 1974), cert. den. 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Hotpoint Division, 
General Electric, 128 NLRB 788 (1960), 289 F.2d 683 (CA-7, 1961); 
Federal Mogul Corporation, 163 NLRB 927 (1967), 394 F.2d 915 (CA- 
6, 1968), Magic Slacks, Inc., 136 NLRB 607 (1962), 314 F.2d 844 
(CA-7, 1963); Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Company, 105 NLRB 727 
(1953), 221 F.2d 165 (CA-7, 1955); Ne\fman-Green, 161 NLRB 1071 
(1966), 401 F .2d 1 (CA-7, 1968); and Armco Drainage, 106 NLRB 725 
(1953), 220 F.2d 573 (CA-6, 1955).
2
Gulfcoast Transit Company, 135 NLRB 185 (1962), 332 F.2d 
28 (CA-5, 1964); and Coppus Engineering Corporation, 115 NLRB 1387 
(1956), 240 F.2d 564 (CA-1, 1957).
^Lake City Foundry, 173 NLRB 1081 (1968), 432 F.2d 1162 
(CA-7, 1970); and Wayside Press, 103 NLRB 11 (1953), 206 NLRB 
862 (CA-9, 1953).
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cult to find, the court reasoned, union use of company property
under these circumstances is permissible.^ In overturning the
2
Board's ruling in Boyle's Famous Corned Beef the Eighth Circuit 
Court emphasized that union use of company premises is not per 
se a violation of the Act. Further, in Modern Plastics Corp­
oration  ^ the Sixth Circuit Court cited a lack of employee 
dissatisfaction with the favored union and the absence of 
attempts by the employer to control the union in setting aside 
the Board's original order. No reason for reversal was reported 
in the final case.^
Employer Provision of Materials 
or Services
In the twenty-five year period between 1950 and 1974 the 
National Labor Relations Board heard 116 cases which involved 
charges of employer provision of materials or services to a 
favored union (see Table 10). The Board found 8(a)(2) violations 
in 108 of these cases. Forty-four Board rulings were pursued to 
the appropriate circuit courts where thirty-five decisions
^Valentine Sugars, 102 NLRB 313 (1953), 211 F.2d 317 
(CA-5, 1954).
^168 NLRB 299 (1967), 400 F.2d 154 (CA-8, 1968).
^155 NLRB 1126 (1965), 379 F.2d 201 (CA-6, 1967).
^Multi-Color Company, 114 NLRB 1129 (1955), 250 F.2d
573 (CA-6, 1957).
TABLE 10
Total Number of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Employer Provision of Services or Materials 
to a Union Heard Before the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According 
to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 2 2 100.0 1963 2 1 50.0
1951 6 6 100.0 1964 4 4 100.0
1952 5 5 100.0 1965 , 9 8 88.9
1953 12 12 100.0 1966 5 5 100.0
1954 3 2 66.7 1967 7 7 100.0
1955 3 3 100.0 1968 4 4 100 .0
1956 1 1 100.0 1969 6 4 66.7
1957 2 2 100.0 1970 3 3 100.0
1958 0 0 • • • 1971 4 3 75.0
1959 1 1 100.0 1972 2 2 100.0
1960 9 8 88.9 1973 2 2 100.0
1961 7 6 85. 7 1974 4 4 100.0
1962 13 13 100.0 Total 116 108 93.1
SOURCE: Data compiled from Nationa 1 Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Order
of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 8 8 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
kO
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regarding employer provision of materials or services were 
upheld and nine were overturned.
Use of company bulletin boards by a favored union is 
an important type of material support because it allows a fav­
ored union easy access to publicity and puts an outside union 
at a severe disadvantage. This principle was clearly detailed 
in a very early circuit court case. Western Union Telegraph Co.
V. National Labor Relations Board.^ Down through the years
2
the Board has continued to apply this doctrine. However, in 
the A. O. Smith Company case^ the Seventh Circuit Court rejected 
the Board's unlawful support ruling based on one union's use of 
company bulletin boards. The circuit court held such use lawful 
in this instance because the opposing union had not requested 
use of the boards. This lack of discrmination led the court to 
conclude, "It is our view that the Company remained passive and 
did not lend assistance to either group . . Thus, for
bulletin board use to be unlawful it must be discriminatory.
^113 F.2d 992 (CA-2, 1940).
2
See for example Ephraim Haspel, 109 NLRB 37 (1954), 228 
F.2d 155 (CA-2, 1955); Air Control Products, 139 NLRB 607 (1962), 
344 F.2d 902 (CA-5, 1965); and Hi-Temp, Inc., 204 NLRB 1098 (1973), 
503 F.2d 583 (CA-7, 1974).
^132 NLRB 339 (1961), 343 F.2d 103 (CA-7, 1965).
^Ibid., p. 114.
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Most other cases in this group involve support through 
employer provision of either secretarial or clerical services 
or office materials. Ultrad Corporation  ^ is a recent case in 
which company provision of supplies and materials was considered 
unlawful support. This ruling was affirmed by the Seventh 
Circuit Court. Other types of support which fall under this 
general heading are company preparation and distribution of 
union minutes^, and in Distribution Centers of Detroit^, company 
assistance in the composition of grievances. Nevertheless, 
all assistance of this type is not illegal. In NLRB v. Newman- 
Green, Inc.  ^ the Seventh Circuit Court reversed the Board's 
ruling on this type of support. It stated, ". . . assistance
under 8(a)(2) does not . . . mean all and every assistance."^
The only type of assistance which is prohibited, according to 
this court, is that which interferes with the employees' section
^185 NLRB 434 (1970), 454 F. 2d 520 (CA-7, 1971).
^See also Sportspal, Inc., 214 NLRB 917 (1974); Master 
Engineering Corporation, 215 NLRB 376 (1974); and A&P Iron Works, 
179 NLRB 291 (1969).
^See Reed Rolled Thread Die Company, 179 NLRB 56 (1969), 
432 F. 2d 70 (CA-1, 1970); and Clapper's Manufacturing, 186 NLRB 
324 (1970), 458 F. 2d 414 (CA-3, 1972).
^197 NLRB 1 (1972).
^401 F. 2d 1 (CA-7, 1968).
^Ibic., p. 4.
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7 right to unfettered self-organization.
In Howard Creations, Inc.^  material assistance took 
the form of an interpreter provided by the company. Most of 
the workers at Howard Creations spoke Spanish which created 
difficulties for unions attempting to organize the plant.
Company provision of a Spanish interpreter for use by the 
favored union (Workers of America and Canada International 
Union in this case), therefore, contributed to the unlawful
support ruling issued by the Board.
2 3Crowley's Milk Company and Milco Undergarment Company
furnish two additional types of material support for discussion.
In the former, Crowley's allowed a favored union to keep union
funds in a company safe, and in the latter, Milco provided a
company car for use by a favored union. This assistance was
partially responsible for the unlawful support rulings issued
by the Board in both cases. Circuit courts upheld both decisions
in regard to unlawful support.
The nine reversals in this group follow the pattern set
by other reversals described in this paper and can be divided
into three basic groups. Circuit courts reversed five 8(a)(2)
^212 NLRB 179 (1974).
^88 NLRB 1049 (1950), 208 F.2d 444 (CA-3, 1953). 
^106 NLRB 767 (1953), 212 F.2d 801 (CA-3, 1954).
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violation rulings by the Board on grounds that the assistance 
involved in those cases constituted only legal forms of coop­
eration.^ Additionally, in two cases reversals were handed 
down because the assistance was of such a minimal nature.
Reasons for the final two reversals were similar in that cir­
cuit courts found no anti union bias on the part of the two
companies. Additionally, they found no employee protest against
the existing unions, and, generally, no insidious attempt on
the part of the employers at company control of the unions in 
question.^
Discriminatory Use of No Solicitation Rules 
The final type of material support to be discussed in 
this chapter is that of company use of discriminatory no 
solicitation rules. This charge occurred in forty-five cases 
heard by the National Labor Relations Board between 1950 and 
1974. The Board found companies guilty of violating 8(a)(2)
Wayside Press, 103 NLRB 11 (1953), 206 F.2d 862 (CA-9, 
1953); Chicago Rawhide, 105 NLRB 727 (1953), 221 F.2d 165 (CA-7, 
1955); Magic Slacks, Inc., 136 NLRB 607 (1962), 314 F.2d 844 
(CA-7, 1963); Federal Mogul Corporation, 163 NLRB 927 (1967), 394 
F.2d 915 (CA-6, 1968); and Lake City Foundry, 173 NLRB 1081 
(1968), 432 F.2d 1162 (CA-7, 1970).
2
Coppus Engineering Corporation, 115 NLRB 1337 (1956) ,
240 F.2d 564 (CA-1, 1957); and Gulfcoast Transit Company, 135
NLRB 185 (1962), 332 F.2d 28 (CA-5, 1964).
^Valentine Sugars, 102 NLRB 313 (1953), 211 F.2d 317 
(CA-5, 1954); and Modern Plastics, 155 NLRB 1126 (1965), 379 
F.2d 201 (CA-6, 1967).
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in thirty-nine of these cases. A total of twenty Board deci­
sions regarding solicitation rules were appealed of which 
fifteen were enforced and five were reversed. One reversal 
was overturned by the Supreme Court.
In a very early case. International Association of
Machinists v. NLRB ,^ the Supreme Court made it clear that 
company use of discriminatory no solicitation rules could lead 
to illegal interference rulings under section 8(a)(2). Clearly
this doctrine has been followed closely by the lower courts
2
and the Board. Northern Metal Products Company provides a 
good example. In this case the International Association of 
Machinists were attempting to organize Northern Metal and were 
being opposed by an independent union favored by the company. 
Northern Metal had a rule which prohibited oral solicitation 
during nonworking time in working areas. The company disparately 
applied this rule in favor of the independent union and in
violation of the Act. Additionally, the rule as stated viola­
ted the Act because it covered nonworking time.^ Interestingly, 
in American Coach Company  ^ the Board overlooked a similar rule
^311 U.S. 72 (1940).
^171 NLRB 98 (1968).
3
See also Campco Plastics Company, 142 NLRB 1272 (1963); 
Stainless Steel Products, 157 NLRB 232 (1966); G&H Towing Company, 
168 NLRB 589 (1967); and Dolores, Inc., 98 NLRB 550 (1952).
"^ 169 NLRB 1065 (1968) .
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for two reasons. (1) The company v;as not enforcing the rule 
(which obviously eliminated the possibility of discrimination) . 
(2) The company had no knowledge that the independent union 
they supposedly favored was doing any soliciting at all. As 
a result, the Board found that American Coach Company had not 
violated 8(a)(2).
Generally, circuit courts have also adopted discrimin­
atory treatment as an 8(a)(2) violation. In the Bernhardt 
Brothers Tugboat Service, Inc. case^ the Seafarers Interna­
tional Union was competing with the National Maritime Union 
to represent Bernhardt's employees. Organizers for the National 
Maritime Union were allowed aboard the tugboat to solicit 
membership, but organizers for the Seafarers International
Union were not. The Seventh Circuit Court concurred with the
2
Board in its finding that Bernhardt had violated the Act.
The four circuit court reversals of Board decisions on 
no solicitation rules which were not appealed to the Supreme 
Court furnish important modifications to the above analysis.
^142 NLRB 851 (1963), 328 F.2d 757 (CA-7, 1964).
^See also Komatz Construction, 191 NLRB 846 (1971),
458 F.2d 317 (CA-8, 1972); Aaron Convalescent Home, 194 NLRB 
750 (1971), 479 F.2d 736 (CA-6, 1973); Hunter Outdoor Products, 
176 NLRB 449 (1969), 440 F.2d 876 (CA-1, 1971); and Kiekhaefer 
Corporation, 127 NLRB 1381 (1960), 292 F.2d 130 (CA-7, 1961).
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The earliest reversal occurred in Stewart-Warner Corporation^
and was justified, according to the Fourth Circuit Court,
because a valid election had already been held. Thus, the court
stated, "The company . . . was under no obligation to permit
adherents of the UE [loser of the election] to use its premises
2
to foment discord and dissatisfaction. . ." The Ninth Circuit 
Court reversed the Board’s decision in Wah Chang Corporation  ^
because even though the no solicitation rule in question was 
too broad, the legal portion of the rule was all that Wah Chang 
ever enforced. The fact that the opposing union had not 
requested permission to solicit was, according to the Eighth
Circuit Court, grounds for reversal in the Gem International,
4 5Inc. case . Topps Kermill, Inc. was reversed by the First
Circuit Court because the company had no knowledge of the
existence of a rival union. According to the courts " . . .
one cannot 'discriminate' against someone not known to exist."®
^94 NLRB 607 (1951), 194 F.2d 207 (CA-4, 1952). 
^Ibid., p. 210.
^124 NLRB 1170 (1959), 305 F.2d 15 (CA-9, 1962). 
*137 NLRB 1343 (1962), 321 F.2d 626 (CA-8, 1963). 
^143 NLRB 694 (1963), 325 F.2d 293 (CA-1, 1963). 
®Ibid., p. 294.
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Undoubtedly, the most important case in this group is 
the Supreme Court decision in Nutone, Inc.  ^ The Board held 
in this case that the no solicitation rule in effect at 
Nutone was legal even though it was somewhat broad. The fact 
that the company solicited against unions on its property while 
barring the United Steelworkers from soliciting on company 
property was cited by the Circuit Court in the District of 
Columbia as cause for reversal on this issue. The Supreme 
Court disagreed. It pointed out first of all that there was no 
question about the legality of the no solicitation rule. The 
only valid question was whether or not the company had used the 
rule in a discriminatory manner. According to the court, Nutone 
had used the rule legally for two reasons. (1) The Steelworkers 
had not asked Nutone to make an exception to the rule. If the 
Steelworkers had requested solicitation privileges and been 
turned down, a violation would have resulted. (2) There was no 
evidence showing that the no solicitation rule kept the union 
from communicating freely with Nutone's employees in other ways. 
Therefore, the rule had not been applied discriminatorily, and 
Nutone had not violated the Act in this respect.
Summary and Conclusions 
A cursory examination of the four preceding topics reveals
^112 NLRB 1153 (1955), 243 F. 2d 593 (CA DofC, 1956), 
357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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a rather large number of Board decisions in each category 
which were reversed by circuit courts. Furthermore, the 
primary difficulty in these decisions seems to be one of 
determining whether or not a given type of support is either 
illegal interference or merely cooperative assistance.^ This 
paper has emphasized the courts' and the Board's position that 
some cooperative assistance to a favored union is perfectly 
legal. However, the question of where the courts draw the 
line between illegal support and lawful assistance is a diffi­
cult one to answer.
One basic question the courts ask in determining the 
legality of an employers financial or material support of a 
union is whether or not the assistance in question violates the
employees' section 7 rights to a free and unfettered choice of
2
their own representative. The Fifth Circuit Court in Keller
3
Ladders Southern, Inc. stated, "So long as the acts of coop­
eration do not interfere with the freedom of choice of the 
employees, there is no violation of the Act." Interestingly,
^See for example Sherman Division, St. Regis Paper 
Company, 191 NLRB 818 (1971); and Longchamps, Inc., 205 NLRB 
1025 (1973).
2
Wean Manufacturing Company, 147 NLRB 112 (1964) . 
^161 NLRB 21 (1966), 405 F.2d 663, 667 (CA-5, 1968).
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the Board in its decision on this case pointed to the fact that
the assisted union went first to the employer to ask for his
help in organizing the plant and then, only after receiving
the employer's assistance, approached the workers. The Fifth
Circuit Court concurred with this line of reasoning and further
stated, "The vice in the cooperative relationship . . . was one
of joining hands to the exclusion of the employees."^ Thus,
employer cooperation with a union which interferes with the
workers' rights to a free choice of their own representative
clearly surpasses the legal level of assistance and violates
Section 8(a)(2). At least two other relevant considerations
are brought into play by the courts and the Board in making
decisions of this type. (1) Clearly, total support of a union by
2
an employer is illegal under the Act. (2) Whether or not a 
particular kind or amount of support is illegal depends a great 
deal on the context in which it occurred. If the assistance 
in question occurred singly and had little effect, it would 
probably not be considered illegal. However, if financial or 
material assistance occurs in the context of widespread support, 
an 8(a)(2) violation would, undoubtedly, result.^
(1968) .
^Ibid.
2
See for example St. Joseph Lead Company, 171 NLRB 541
^See for example Wyco Metal Products, 183 NLRB 901 (1970)
CHAPTER VI
CONTRACT DIFFICULTIES
Significantly, over half of all the 8(a)(2) cases heard 
by the Board from 1950 to 19 74 involved issues relating to 
contracts with and recognition of unions (see Table 11). This 
paper will explore these issues on three fronts. The first 
section will deal with perhaps the most complicated doctrine to 
arise from Section 8(a)(2)--the Midwest Piping doctrine. Then, 
union majority problems and union security issues will be 
examined.
The Midwest Piping Doctrine^
In its earliest and simplest form the Board's Midwest 
Piping doctrine held, ". . . as a general rule that the execu­
tion of a contract with one or two or more competing unions
while a petition for a representation election is pending with
2
the Board constitutes illegal assistance." In this form the 
Midwest Piping rule seems quite simple. However, during the
^The Midwest Piping doctrine takes its name from an 
early Board decision in Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 NLRB 
1060 (1945).
2
National Labor Relations Board, Sixteenth Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board (Washington, B.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 160.
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TABLE 11
Total Number of 8(a) (2) Cases Involving Contract Difficulties Heard Before the National 
Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974, According to Guilt
Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty Year Total # # Guilty % Guilty
1950 7 7 70.0 1963 19 17 89.5
1951 20 18 90.0 1964 16 13 81.3
1952 16 14 87.5 1965 17 15 88 . 2
1953 21 20 95.2 1966 16 13 81.3
1954 11 6 54.5 1967 28 26 92.9
1955 21 18 85. 7 1968 19 19 100.0
1956 2 2 100.0 1969 25 19 76.0
1957 13 13 100.0 1970 19 16 84.2
1958 14 13 92.9 1971 22 15 68.2
1959 20 19 95.0 1972 24 17 70.8
1960 25 19 76.0 1973 16 16 100.0
1961 25 18 72.0 1974 26 22 84.6
1962 23 20 87.0 Total 468 395 84 . 4
w
SOURCE: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Orders
of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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period under study this doctrine underwent several complicating 
changes which are described below.
The first line of modifications to be addressed involves
incumbent unions and their status under the Midwest Piping rule.
In William Penn Broadcasting Co.^ the Board altered its Midwest
Piping doctrine such that employers were given the option of
continuing the bargaining process with an incumbent union even
if a petition for a representation election was pending before
the Board. The Board stated, " . . .  the pendency of a petition
for certification imposes no duty upon an employer to refrain
from continuing exclusively to recognize and deal with an incum-
2
bent bargaining representative." However, the Board emphasized 
that this exemption applied only when the petition did not have, 
". . . a character and timeliness which create a real question 
concerning representation."^ Further, the Board stressed that 
for such a question to be real the petitioning union must base 
its claim on an appropriate unit of employees. The rationale for 
these modifications was to facilitate the bargaining process and 
to provide employees with "the benefits of an uninterrupted 
bargaining relationship whenever a clearly unsupportable or
^93 NLRB 1104 (1951). 
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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specious rival union claim is made upon an employer."^ It 
should also be emphasized that this ruling did not preclude 
the petitioning union from later filing an unfair labor prac­
tice charge against the company. If the petitioning union's 
claim was found to be real, the Board would rule that the 
company had violated section 8(a)(2).
Citing the need for stability and continuity in the
industrial relations process, the Board in its William D.
2
Gibson Co. decision further altered its Midwest Piping rule. 
This decision completely exempted companies which were bargain­
ing with active incumbent unions from the Midwest Piping 
doctrine. The Board felt that the decertification process 
could correct any errors the company might make in contracting 
with an incumbent union of questionable status. The Board 
stated, " . . .  any contract entered into by an incumbent union 
and an employer after a rival union has made a timely represen­
tation claim does not bar an election in the representation
3
proceeding."
Four years after the Gibson ruling the Board reversed 
itself, thus, restoring the William Penn interpretation of 
Midwest Piping. This action was taken in Shea Chemical Corp.
^Ibid.
^110 NLRB 660 (1954).
^Ibid.
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in which the Board stated, "We now hold that upon presentation 
of a rival or conflicting claim which raises a real question 
concerning representation, an employer may not go so far as to 
bargain collectively with the incumbent (or any other) union 
unless and until the question concerning representation has been 
settled by the B o a r d . T h e  Board further reinforced William 
Penn by making it clear that a rival union's claim must be a 
valid one in order to invoke Midwest Piping. The Board stated,
". . . the Midwest Piping doctrine does not apply in situations 
where, because of contract bar or certification year or inappro­
priate unit or any other established reason, the rival claim and
2
petition does not raise a real representation question. 
Alternatively put, in order to invoke the Midwest Piping rule, 
the petitioning union must be claiming to represent an appro­
priate unit of employees, and its claim must be timely.
The above ruling was found not to apply in G & H  Towing 
Co.,  ^ because G & H  and the incumbent union had merely extended 
their previous contract until an election and the time after the 
election during which the non-incumbent union was filing 
objections. The Board ruled that G & H  and the incumbent union
^121 NLRB 1027 (1958).
^Ibid.
^168 NLRB 589 (1967).
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had merely acted to preserve the status quo, and, therefore, 
no Midwest Piping violation could be found. However, in 
Midtown Service Co.^  the Board held, with the Second Circuit 
Court concurring, that Shea Chemical did apply because a new 
agreement containing various improvements was executed by the 
incumbent union and the employer. Thus, Shea Chemical will not 
be invoked when the parties to the contract are acting merely 
to preserve the status quo, but any further negotiations will 
violate Midwest Piping.
In the midst of these alterations of the Midwest
Piping doctrine, a subtle change in definitions occurred. The
2
Board in Novak Logging Co. restated the Midwest Piping rule 
such that a question of representation could exist whether 
or not a petition was actually pending before the Board. The 
Eighth Circuit Court in Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. NLRB  ^
explicitly agreed with this change in definition when it 
stated, " . . .  while pendency of one union's petition for 
Board certification may be a prime factor . . . it is not ipso 
facto determinative."^ Instead, the Court proposed that Midwest 
Piping would be violated, ". . . if, at the time of recognition.
^171 NLRB 1306 (1968), 425 F.2d 665 (CA-2, 1970). 
^119 NLRB 1573 (1958).
^331 F.2d 176 (CA-8, 1964).
^Ibid.
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the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that a real 
question concerning the representation of his employees 
existed.
An important point that both William Penn and Shea
Chemical emphasize is that for a recognition claim to be
valid it must be timely. Timeliness is not really a problem
in a situation where there is no present contract and no
incumbent union. However, once there is a current contract
with a incumbent union several important rules arise. In
general, a petition for recognition will not be considered
valid if it is filed within one year of a Board conducted
representation election. Additionally, the contract itself
may act as a bar to a representation election if it meets the
following criteria. ". . . the contract must be in writing,
properly executed, and binding on the parties; it must be of
definite duration and in effect for no more than 3 years; and
it must also contain substantive terms and conditions of
employment which in turn must be consistent with the policies
of the Act. Established Board policy requires that to serve
as a bar to an election a contract must be signed by all
2
parties before the rival petition is filed." Accordingly,
^Ibid.
2
National Labor Relations Board, Fortieth Annual Report 
of the National Labor Relations Board, (Washington, B.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 53.
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the time period during which a valid petition can be filed
is rather narrowly defined. The Deluxe Metal Furniture Co.
rule^ originally established a sixty day insulated period
immediately preceding the termination date of the contract.
Additionally, a petition would be considered premature if
filed more than 150 days prior to the termination date of the
2
contract. Later, in Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc. this time 
period was shortened to ninety days leaving a thirty day 
period for valid petitions to be filed.
The Board specifically applied these rules to the 
Midwest Piping doctrine in City Cab, Inc.^  City Cab was found 
not to have violated 8(a)(2) by executing a new contract with 
the incumbent union because the challenging union had not 
filed prior to the sixty day insulated period established in 
Deluxe Metal. On the other hand, the fact that a claim was 
established too early (sixteen months prior to the expiration 
date of the contract) was the reason the Board exempted 
Gaylord Printing Company  ^ from a Midwest Piping violation.
The Board emphasized that for a claim to be valid when no
^121 NLRB 995 (1958). 
^136 NLRB 1000 (1962).
^128 NLRB 493 (1960).
^135 NLRB 5l0 (1962).
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representation petition has been filed (as in this case) the
claim must be active and continuing.^
Two other pertinent timing issues also arose in this
2
group of cases. In Guy's Foods, Inc. an incumbent union had 
negotiated a contract which called for ratification by Guy's 
employees. After the contract was negotiated but prior to its 
ratification, a challenging union filed an election petition. 
The contract was then ratified and enforced by the company.
The Board, with the District of Columbia Circuit Court con­
curring, ruled that the petitioning union's claim was a valid 
one, and, therefore, the Midwest Piping rule had been violated. 
The second issue involved the execution of a contract with a 
victorious union in an election at a time when objections 
to the election were pending before the Board. The Board ruled 
that such conduct violated the Midwest Piping rule and the 
Second Circuit Court affirmed this decision.^
The decisions in Shea Chemical and William Penn also 
emphasized that for a challenging union's recognition claim to 
be valid it must be predicated on an appropriate unit. Thus, 
in many cases, prior to a Midwest Piping determination, the 
Board, as it is empowered to do, must decide a unit question.
^See also Novak Logging Co., 119 NLRB 1573 (1958).
^158 NLRB 936 (1966), 379 F. 2d 160 (CA DofC, 1967). 
^National Container Corp., 103 NLRB 1544 (1953) , 211
F. 2d 525 (CA-2, 1954}
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The various issues involved are discussed below
In a very early case, Roegelein Provision Co .^ , the 
Board was required to decide if a multiemployer or a single­
employer unit was proper. Roegelein had entered into a 
contract with the incumbent union which represented a multi­
employer unit while another union's petition for a single­
employer unit was pending. In relation to this issue the 
Board stated, " . . .  absent an affirmative showing of the 
appropriateness of the new unit sought, an employer does not
violate the law by continuing to recognize the incumbent 
2
union." On the contrary, in this case the Board found the 
appropriateness of the multiemployer unit to be affirmatively 
established. Accordingly, the challenging union's claim was 
not found to be a valid one, and, thus. Midwest Piping was 
held to be inapplicable. In Boy's Market, Inc.^ the Board 
held a two-employer unit which was part of a larger multi­
employer association to be an appropriate one for certain 
snackbar employees. These employees had not previously been 
included in the multiemployer unit. Therefore, the execution 
of a contract with the Hotel and Restaurant Employees which
^99 NLRB 830 (1952).
^Ibid.
^156 NLRB 105 (1965), 370 F.2d 205 (CA-9, 1966)
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were claiming to represent only the two-employer unit was 
not in violation of Midwest Piping. The Ninth Circuit 
Court agreed with this line of reasoning.
However, in Holyoke Food Mart  ^ the Board made it clear 
that if a contract was executed at a time when the appropriate 
unit was still in question, a violation would occur. In this 
case, the company walked out of a representation hearing and 
recognized the Meat Cutters on a card check. The Meat Cutters 
had claimed a fourteen store unit, but the Retail Clerks had 
claimed single units in three stores. The company maintained 
in this case that the Board should not make a decision on 
8(a)(2) until the appropriate unit was decided. If the appro­
priate unit turned out to be the fourteen store unit, Holyoke 
argued no violation could be found. Since a clear question of 
representation existed at the time recognition was granted, the
Board held that Holyoke had illegally assisted the Meat Cutters
2
In Belleville News Democrat the Board was once again 
called upon to decide a case involving multiemployer unit 
questions. In this case, the company had unequivocally with­
drawn from a multiemployer unit, but had imposed the multi­
employer contract on his employees at a time when Local 38 of
^191 NLRB 470 (1971).
^195 NLRB 431 (1972).
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the Printing Pressmen was requesting recognition. The union 
representing the multiemployer unit disclaimed any interest 
in contesting Local 38's claim. Under these circumstances 
the Board held that Belleville News Democrat had clearly 
violated Midwest Piping.
Board decisions regarding appropriate bargaining units 
quite often rely on determining whether or not extension of 
contract coverage can truly be considered an accretion. 
Generally, if the Board finds that extension of an incumbent 
union's contract to cover a previously uncovered group of 
employees is an accretion, then a challenging union's repre­
sentation claim would not be considered a valid one, and, 
therefore. Midwest Piping would not be applicable. However, 
if the Board ruled that no accretion had occurred, the chall­
enging union's claim would be valid and the Midwest Piping 
rule would be invoked. Factors which the Board considers in 
accretion cases are, " . . .  functional integration of business, 
centralized control of management, similarity of working condi­
tions, collective bargaining history, local power to hire and 
fire, lack of employee interchange, and geographical distance."^
Application of the above guidelines occurred in Hudson
^NLRB V. Sunset House, 415 P.2d 545, 546 (CA-9, 1969).
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Berlind Corporation.^ The respondent had acquired from diff­
erent companies two new warehouses represented by different 
unions. These two warehouses were to be merged and operated 
at a third facility. Hudson Berlind decided to recognize and 
negotiate with the union which represented the warehouse with 
the largest number of employees. A contract was executed with 
this union prior to transfer of operations, and without noti­
fication to the smaller union. The company claimed that there 
was no real question concerning representation due to the fact 
that the larger union (thirty-one members, ten of which 
resigned rather than transfer) was accreting the smaller union 
(ten members all of which remained after the transfer). The 
Second Circuit Court agreed with the Board that the new plant 
represented a separate unit and that no accretion had occurred. 
Additionally, the Court stated, " . . .  this numerical super­
iority was not sufficiently predominate to remove any real
2
question concerning representation." Thus Hudson Berlind had
3
violated Midwest Piping.
A similar question the Board is called upon to answer
^203 NLRB 421 (1973), 494 F.2d 1200 (CA-2, 1974). 
^Ibid., p. 1203.
^See also Newspaper Agency Corp., 201 NLRB 480 (1973) 
505 F.2d 335 (CA DofC, 1974); Airmatics System, 209 NLRB 71 
(1974); White Front Sacramento, 166 NLRB 44 (1957); and 
Schreiber Trucking, 148 NLRB 697 (1964).
143
is whether or not an employer which acquires a new company 
is a successor to the previous owner. If the Board finds a 
new owner to be a successor, the new owner is bound by the 
previous owner's contract. If, on the other hand, a new 
owner alters operations sufficiently to create a distinctly 
new unit, a real question concerning representation can be 
created, thus, invoking the Midwest Piping rule. Factors 
which the Board considers in determining whether or not a 
new employer is a successor are use of, " . . .  the same 
facilities and work force to produce the same basic products 
for essentially the same customers in the same geographic 
area.
The above principles were applied in Plant & Field 
2
Service Corp. The respondent in this case replaced another 
employer as the maintenance contractor at an oilfield operation 
and extended its contract with the Seafarers to cover its 
workers at the new facility. The Board found that the respon­
dent was not a successor and was not obligated to honor the 
former employer's contract with the Oilfield Maintenance 
Workers. Thus, Midwest Piping was found to be inapplicable
^Security-Columbian Banknote Company, 215 NLRB 450
(1974) .
^184 NLRB 849 (1970).
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because Plant & Field Service had a valid contract with the
Seafarers and no real question of representation existed.^
A similar difficulty occurs when an employer acquires
a new plant and begins to secure the necessary complement of
2
workers to operate the facility. In Fruehauf Trailer Co. 
two plants were being consolidated into a single new facility. 
One plant had been represented by the United Auto Workers and 
the other by the Allied Industrial Workers. At a time when 
only five employees were actually working at the new location 
(eventually 100 employees were to be hired) Fruehauf extended 
its contract with the Allied Industrial Workers to cover the 
new plant. Interestingly, Fruehauf had also continued to offer 
to negotiate with the United Auto Workers regarding any new 
operation the respondent might initiate within close proximity 
to that plant. The majority of the Board ruled on this basis 
that the Auto Workers had a valid claim, and, thus, Fruehauf's 
recognition of the Allied Industrial Workers constituted
3
prohibited assistance under the Act. Chairman McCulloch chose 
not to rely on this line of reasoning because a representative 
complement of workers was not employed at the time the contract
^See also N.L.R.B. v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 
541 F.2d 135 (CA-3, 1976).
^162 NLRB 195 (1966).
^See also A.O. Smith, Corp., 122 NLRB 321 (1958) .
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was extended. However, a unanimous Board agreed that the 
extension of the contract constituted premature recognition 
and, consequently, unlawful support under the Act. In a 
recent case of similar facts— Plastics Plant, Plumbing 
Fixtures Division^— an Administrative Law Judge concurred 
with Chairman McCulloch's views in Fruehauf. According to 
the Administrative Law Judge, "If, because of an insufficient 
complement of employees and substantial lack of normal pro­
duction, there could not be a "real question concerning
representation," then I fail to see how Midwest Piping Co.
2
. . . would be involved in this case." The Board concurred
with this rationale.
Recognition of a challenging union while the incumbent 
union is out on strike is another circumstance where the 
question of a valid claim arises. In Twin County Transit Mix, 
Inc.  ^ the respondent recognized a rival union while his employ­
ees were conducting an economic strike. All the strikers had 
been replaced before the respondent executed the new contract. 
However, the Board pointed out that the economic strikers were 
still employees under the Act, and, therefore, their claim was
^214 NLRB 629 (1974).
^Ibid., p. 633.
^137 NLRB 1708 (1962).
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a real and valid one. Hence, the signing of a contract under
these circumstances violated Midwest Piping.^
One point the Board has continually emphasized is that
a naked or specious claim of representation does not invoke the
2
Midwest Piping doctrine. In Robert Hall Gentilly Road Corp. 
the Retail Clerks were competing with the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers to represent the respondent's employees. The Retail 
Clerks requested a representation election, but it had only 
twenty-four authorization cards signed out of 155 employees.
The Regional Director asked the Retail Clerks to submit addi­
tional cards or withdraw its petition. The Retail Clerks with­
drew its petition but informed the Regional Director that it 
would like to participate in any representation election that 
might be held. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers on the same day 
that the Retail Clerks withdrew its petition informed the 
Regional Director that it did not wish to proceed to an election. 
The next day the Clothing Workers approached the respondent and 
asked for recognition on the basis of a third party card check 
which was completed six days later. The Clothing Workers had 
114 cards signed and on this basis the respondent recognized 
them. The Administrative Law Judge held the recognition to be
^See also Metropolitan Millwork Inc., 138 NLRB 1482 
(1962), 326 F. 2d 49 (CA-2, 1963); and Tri-W Construction Co., 
139 NLRB 1286 (1962).
^207 NLRB 692 (1973).
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in violation of the Midwest Piping rule. The Board reversed the 
Administrative Law Judge, holding that the Retail Clerks were 
not engaged in an active, ongoing organizational campaign. 
Consequently, the Retail Clerks' representation claim was a 
naked one which eliminated the application of Midwest Piping.^  
Fourteen Board decisions regarding the Midwest Piping 
doctrine were reversed by Circuit Courts of Appeal. Twelve of 
these decisions were founded on one basic premise which was 
clearly expressed by the Seventh Circuit Court in NLRB v. Indi­
anapolis Newspapers when it stated, " . . .  once indisputable 
proof of majority choice is presented to the employer, the Act
imposes on him a duty to award recognition to the agent so
2
chosen by his employees." Thus, indisputable evidence of maj­
ority status invalidates the Midwest Piping requirement of 
neutrality, and recognition may be granted by the employer.
^See also Coronet Manufacturing Co., 133 NLRB 641 (1961). 
^210 F. 2d 501, 504 (CA-7, 1954).
^See also Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 NLRB 193 (1955), 234 
F . 2d 565 (CA-4, 1956); Cleaver-Brooks Manufacturing Corp., 120 
NLRB 1135 (1958), 264 F. 2d 637 (CA-7, 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 
817 (1959); Swift and Co., 128 NLRB 732 (1960), 294 F. 2d 285 (CA- 
3, 1961); Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. 144 NLRB 615 (1963), 331 F. 2d 
176 (CA-8, 1964); Sturgeon Electric Co., Inc., 166 NLRB 210 (1967), 
419 F. 2d 51 (CA-10, 1969) ; American Bread Co., 170 NLRB 85 (1968) ,
411 F. 2d 147 (CA-6, 1969); Peter Paul, Inc., 185 NLRB 281 (1970),
467 F. 2d 700 (CA-9, 1972); Modine Manufacturing Co., 186 NLRB 629
(1970), 453 F. 2d 292 (CA-8, 1971); Playskool, Inc., 195 NLRB 560
(1972), 477 F. 2d 66 (CA-7, 1973); Kona Surf Hotel, 201 NLRB 139
(1973), 507 F. 2d 411 (CA-9, 1974); and Suburban Transit Corp., 203 
NLRB 465 (1973), 499 F. 2d 78 (CA-3, 1974).
148
Another important reversal occurred in the Air Master 
Corp. case.'*' During the negotiating process, an overwhelming 
majority of Air Master's employees signed cards disaffiliating 
themselves from the incumbent union and joining a challenging 
union. The fact that the challenging union was recognized by 
Air Master coupled with the fact that the former incumbent 
union's international still claimed representational status 
led the Board to ruling that Air Master had violated Midwest 
Piping. However, the Third Circuit Court held that the over­
whelming defection of employees from the former incumbent union, 
invalidated the international's representation claim and made
Midwest Piping inapplicable. The Board acceded to this line of
2
reasoning in cases following the Air Master reversal. An 
additional factor pointed to in the Air Master reversal is that 
a Board election is not necessarily required to establish the 
representational status of two or more competing unions. However, 
the Sixth Circuit Court had already established and emphasized 
that viewpoint in its denial of the Board's petition for enfor­
cement in Wh eland Comp any.  ^ The Court emphasized that employees
^142 NLRB 181 (1963), 339 F.2d 553 (CA-3, 1964).
2
Sinclair Manufacturing Co.; 178 NLRB 182 (1969), American 
Cystoscope Makers, 190 NLRB 590 (1971); and Environmental Control 
Systems, 190 NLRB 594 (1971).
^120 NLRB 814 (1958), 271 F.2d 122 (CA-6, 1959).
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have a right to representation prior to the holding of a
Board election, and that an employer is obligated to bargain
with a majority representative, . . unless the employer
has a good faith doubt as to its majority status."^ The final
2
reversal occurred in Traub's Market , but the Court provided 
no written opinion for analysis.
Majority Difficulties 
This section will deal with cases in which the question 
of company assistance to unions through contracts derives 
from alleged recognition of minority unions or unions with 
tainted majorities. The Board had consistently held that 
recognizing or contracting with minority unions provides them 
with assistance which violates Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. 
Similarly, recognizing or contracting with a union which has 
obtained a tainted majority also violates 8(a)(2).
The Board dealt with minority union problems in the
3
Harrison Sheet Steel Company case , an early decision which 
was upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court. Harrison Sheet Steel 
clearly favored the Teamsters over any other union. This was 
indicated in several ways, the most prominent of which was the
^Ibid., p. 124.
^205 NLRB 787 (1973), 505 F. 2d 730 (CA-3, 1974) 
^94 NLRB 81 (1951), 194 F. 2d 407 (CA-7, 1952).
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conduction of an election. The employees were assembled at 
various places and handed pieces of paper. They were told to 
vote yes if they wanted to be represented by the Teamsters, 
and no if they wanted the plant to close down. Interestingly, 
the majority voted no. Not to be discouraged, Harrison 
recognized the Teamsters anyway. The Board found such recog­
nition, without question, to be in violation of Section 
8(a)(2)
2
In a more recent case, Vernon Devices, Inc. , the 
Board dealt with the same basic difficulty. Vernon's employees 
had refused to sign authorization cards for Local 531 of the 
Teamsters. Local 531 requested recognition in spite of these 
refusals, and Vernon granted it and promptly executed a 
contract. At the time. Local 4 45 of the Teamsters had a valid 
majority of signed authorization cards. The Board ruled that 
Vernon had violated Section 8 (a) (2) by recognizing and con­
tracting with a minority union.^
In 1961, Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation^ an
^See also Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Company, 
110 NLRB 1963 (1954), 235 F. 2d 700 (CA-1, 1956).
^215 NLRB 475 (1974).
^See also Master Engineering Corporation, 215 NLRB 376
(1974); and Milco Undergarment Company, 106 NLRB 767 (1953), 212 
F. 2d 801 (CA-3, 1954).
4l22 NLRB 1289 (1959), 280 F. 2d 616 (CA DofC, 1960), 366 
U.S. 731 (1960).
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important case regarding recognition of minority unions 
reached the Supreme Court. The facts of this case began 
in 1956 when the International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union began an organization campaign in Bernhard-A1tmann's 
San Antonio plant. During the campaign a number of workers 
went on strike in protest of a wage reduction, and while on 
strike signed ILGWU authorization cards. During the strike 
(which was not organizational in nature), the ILGWU began 
negotiations with Bernhard-Altmann in New York City where both 
parties' home offices were located. The union claimed to have 
obtained a valid majority of signed authorization cards. This 
assertion was accepted by the company, recognition was granted, 
and a contract was executed. The General Counsel was able to 
prove conclusively that at the time recognition was granted 
the ILGWU did not represent a majority of workers. However, 
none of the parties disputed the fact that at the time the 
contract was formally executed the ILGWU represented a clear 
majority in the appropriate bargaining unit. The Board held 
that recognizing a minority union was illegal assistance in 
violation of Section 8(a)(2). It also found irrelevant the fact 
that between recognition and formal execution of a contract the 
ILGWU had obtained a majority. The Circuit Court of the District 
of Columbia affirmed this ruling and was later upheld by the 
Supreme Court. In enforcing the Board's order the Supreme 
Court stated, " . . .  such acquisition of majority status itself 
might indicate that the recognition secured by the August 30
152
agreement afforded petitioner a deceptive cloak of authority 
with which to persuasively elicit additional employee support. 
The fact that the employer had recognized the ILGWU in good
2
faith was also found to be irrelevant by the Supreme Court.
The Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc. decision^ was very 
closely related to Bernhard-A1tmann. In this case Keller 
Plastics recognized a union which had originally obtained a 
valid majority. In the interim between recognition and the 
execution of a contract, the union lost its majority. The 
company was unaware of this occurrence, and in good faith 
signed a three year contract with the union. Thus, the company 
was accused of contracting with a minority union, and on the 
basis of the above facts the General Counsel contended that the 
Bernhard-Altmann rule was controlling. However, the Board 
pointed out that in Bernhard-Altmann recognition had been 
invalidly granted while in this case recognition was perfectly 
proper. Under these circumstances, certification must be 
honored for a reasonable period— usually one year in the absence 
of unusual circumstances. Consequently, Keller Plastics was 
found not to have violated 8(a)(2).
^Ibid., p. 736.
^See also Clegg Machine Works, 129 NLRB 1243 (1961), 
304 F.2d 168 (CA-8, 1962); and Hi-Temp, Inc., 204 NLRB 1098
(1973), 503 F.2d 583 (CA-7, 1974).
^157 NLRB 583 (1966).
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Bowman Transportation Inc.,  ^ another important case 
which reached the Supreme Court, also involved company recog­
nition of a minority union. The Board, the Circuit Court, 
and the Supreme Court all agreed that Bowman had violated the 
Act by negotiating a contract with the United Mine Workers 
before any employees had actually authorized it as their 
representative. The point of contention was the Board's 
remedy for this violation. The Board had issued its standard 
cease-and-desist order directing the company to withdraw and 
withhold recognition from the Mine Workers unless and until 
it was certified by the Board as the employees' exclusive 
representative. The difficulty arose from the fact that the 
United Mine Workers was not in compliance with sections 9(f), 
(g) and (h) making it ineligible for Board certification.
Since the United Mine Workers could not be certified by the 
Board, the effect of the remedy was to disestablish the union—  
a remedy employed by the Board only in cases where a union is 
dominated by a company. However, the Board had found the Mine 
Workers to be an assisted union not a dominated union. The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court overturned this remedy 
leaving it to the offending employer and the assisted union to 
decide when the effects of the unfair labor practices had 
dissipated and, therefore, when to hold an election. The
^112 NLRB 387 (1955), 237 F.2d 585 (CA DofC, 1956), 
355 U.S. 453 (1958).
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Supreme Court agreed that the Board cannot, through the
requirement of a Board certification, make noncompliance a
reason for denying the employees the right to choose the
assisted union at an election . . . On the other hand,
the Supreme Court did not agree that the offending company
and union be allowed to choose when an election should be
held. Instead, the Court stated, "Nothing in the subsections
. . . is a barrier to the conduct by the Board of an election
2
not followed by a certification . . ." According to the 
Court, the Board could conduct an election and in the case of 
a noncomplying union certify only the arithmetical results 
after which the employer could grant exclusive recognition.
Another important question involving majority diffi­
culties is that of whether or not at the time of recognition a 
company is employing a representative complement of workers. 
Cen-Vi-Ro Pipe Corporation  ^ typifies Board decisions on this 
issue. The General Laborers Union had legitimately executed 
a contract to represent Cen-Vi-Ro's workers from 1964 to 1966. 
After the contract was executed, the plant was forced to close 
down because of insufficient work. However, in 19 6 8 the plant 
was reactivated and before any employees were hired a new
^Ibid., p. 462.
^Ibid., p. 461.
^180 NLRB 344 (1969), 457 F.2d 775 (CA-9, 1972).
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collective bargaining contract was entered into by the company 
and the General Laborers Union- The Board found this to be 
in violation of 8(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit Court concurred 
stating, "The Act guarantees to employees the right to an 
uncoerced selection of their bargaining representatives. By 
entering into a collective bargaining agreement containing 
a union security clause before the employees were hired . . .
the Company and the Union illegally interfered with that right.
2
In Hayes Coal Company the Board clearly specified the 
requisites to a finding of premature recognition. In this case 
Hayes Coal Company was newly purchased and at the time of con­
tract execution was operating one production line which inclu­
ded ten men. Six of these men had signed valid authorization 
cards. After six months another ten man shift was added. The 
complaining union claimed that premature recognition had been 
granted in the initial six month period because a representative 
complement of workers had not been employed at that time. The 
Board disagreed with this position and stated, "The correct 
test is whether, at the time of recognition, the jobs or job 
classifications designated for the operation involved are filled 
or substantially filled and the operation is in normal or
^Ibid., p. 776.
^197 NLRB 1162 (1972).
156
substantially normal production."^ Thus, as long as the above
conditions are satisfied it is perfectly proper for a company
2
and a union to execute a contract.
Illegal contracts in support of a union can also arise 
from company recognition of a union which has obtained a 
tainted majority of employees. Basically, any form of coercion 
which would bring into question the validity of signed authori­
zation cards or election results and which culminates in 
recognition of a thusly assisted union results in an 8(a)(2) 
violation finding by the Board. Predominantly, such coercion 
takes the general form of discriminatory treatment of employees 
or financial and material support of a favored union.^
Howard Creations, Inc.  ^ provides a good example of 
company recognition of a union on the basis of tainted authori­
zation cards. The president of Howard Creations disliked the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers and consequently when they began 
organizing his plant, he threatened to close down the plant and 
told his employees that he would not let the Amalgamated
^Ibid.
2
See also Fraser & Johnston Company, 189 NLRB 142 (1971) , 
469 F. 2d 1259 (CA-9, 1972); and W.L. Rives Company, 136 NLRB 
1050 (1962), 328 F. 2d 464 (CA-5, 1964),
^See Chapter Four and Chapter Five.
*212 NLRB 179 (1974).
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represent them. In support of this position, the company 
allowed rival unions to solicit on company property during 
company time while at the same time prohibiting the Amalga­
mated from doing the same. The company even provided an 
interpreter for the rival union organizers as most of Howard's 
employees spoke only Spanish. On the basis of authorization 
cards obtained in this manner, Howard executed a contract 
with the Amalgamated's rivals. On this point the Board 
referred to NLRB v. Midtown Service Company  ^where the Second 
Circuit Court stated, "Once majority status is tainted, to 
uphold a contract negotiated with it thereafter would be to 
reward the employer for its misconduct." Thus, contracting 
with a union which has not obtained an uncoerced majority is 
in violation of 8(a)(2).^
Of the Board decisions regarding majority difficul­
ties which were reversed by Circuit Courts the predominant rea­
son was insubstantial evidence to support a finding of coercion
^425 F. 2d 665, 669 (CA-2, 1970).
2
See also Malcolm Konner, Inc., 141 NLRB 541 (1963) ,
338 F. 2d 972 (CA-3, 1964); Bernhardt Brothers Tugboat Service, 
Inc., 142 NLRB 851 (1963), 328 F. 2d 757 (CA-7, 1964); and 
Clement Brothers Company, Inc., 165 NLRB 698 (1967), 407 F. 2d
1027 (CA-5, 1969) .
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on the company's part.^ In addition, one Board ruling was
overturned because the Board had based its decision on an
2
inappropriate unit. Finally, the Board's illegal recognition 
ruling in Stewart-Warner,  ^was rejected by the Fourth Circuit 
Court because evidence clearly established that Stewart- 
Warner had properly recognized the Electrical Workers even 
though the Board election which had established their majority 
was being challenged at the time. The Court held that Stewart- 
Warner had adequately ascertained the majority status of the 
Electrical Workers and thus the execution of a contract was 
perfectly proper.
Union Security 
Basically there are two sources of illegality connected 
with union security clauses. The first results from the 
signing of an illegal contract (discussed in the previous two 
sections) which includes what might otherwise be considered a
^See Lake City Foundry Co., 173 NLRB 1081 (1968), 432 
F.2d 1162 (CA-7, 1970); Majestic Weaving Co., 147 NLRB 859 
(1964), 355 F.2d 854 (CA-2, 1966); Englander Company, Inc., 118 
NLRB 707 (1957), 260 F.2d 67 (CA-9, 1959); Continental Distill- 
ing Sales Co., 145 NLRB 820 (1964), 348 F.2d 246 (CA-7, 1965); 
and Gulfcoast Transit Company, 135 NLRB 185 (1962), 332 F.2d 28 
(CA-5, 1964); Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Company, 105 NLRB 727 
(1953), 221 F .2d 165 (CA-7, 1955); Valentine Sugars, Inc., 102 
NLRB 313 (1953), 211 F.2d 317 (CA-5, 1954); and GEM International, 
Inc., 137 NLRB 1343 (1962), 321 F.2d 626 (CA-8, 1963).
2
Michigan Advertising Distributing Company, 134 NLRB 
1289 (1961), 316 F.2d 145 (CA-6, 1963).
^94 NLRB 607 (1951), 194 F.2d 207 (CA-4, 1952).
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legal union security clause. The second results from the 
inclusion of an illegal union security clause in a contract 
which in all other respects would be legal. Since other 
causes of illegal contracts were discussed in the previous 
two sections, this section will be devoted specifically to 
union security clauses which on their own merit provide 
illegal assistance to a union.
Essentially there are three sections which can make a 
union security clause illegal and in violation of section 8 (a) 
(2) . The first is to maintain an illegal closed shop. The 
second is to require union membership prior to the expiration 
of the thirty day grace period granted in section 8(a)(3).
The third involves difficulties with dues checkoff authoriza­
tions.
In American Dredging Company, the Board held that the 
maintenance of a closed shop provided illegal assistance to an 
incumbent union in violation of 8(a)(2). This decision was 
appealed to the Third Circuit Court where it was upheld. The 
Circuit Court emphatically held that American Dredging had 
violated 8(a)(2), ". . . b y  maintaining and giving effect to 
illegal closed shop hiring provisions in the collective bar­
gaining contract between respondent and the union . .
^123 NLRB 139 (1959), 276 F.2d 286, 287 (CA-3, 1960)
160
Failure to allow the required thirty day grace period
was the cause of charges being filed in Campbell Soup Company^
2and Western Building Maintenance Company . In each of these 
cases the Board ruled that failure to allow the thirty day 
grace period provided incumbent unions with unlawful support. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed both of these rulings.
Several difficulties have arisen from dues deduction 
actions taken by employers. In Seven-Up Bottling Company of 
Sacramento  ^ dues deductions were made without contractual 
support and were, therefore, illegal under section 8(a)(2). 
This ruling was confirmed in the Ninth Circuit Court. In Hope
d
Industries ~ the company decided to deduct union dues without 
voluntary authorization, an action which the Board found 
clearly in violation of 8(a)(2). The most difficult ruling 
involving dues authorization is contained in the Penn Cork & 
Closures, Inc. decision.^ In this case a union security
^152 NLRB 1645 (1965), 378 F.2d 259 (CA-9, 1967).
^162 NLRB 779 (1967), 402 F.2d 775 (CA-9, 1968).
^165 NLRB 607 (1967), 420 F.2d 495 (CA-9, 1969).
^198 NLRB 853 (1972).
^156 NLRB 411 (1965), 376 F.2d 52 (CA-2, 1967), cert,
den. 389 U.S. 843 (1967) .
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provision in the contract was overturned in a section 9(e)(1) 
election. Afterwards, the company continued to check off 
dues despite revocation requests on the part of a number of 
employees. However the Board, with the Second Circuit Court 
concurring, pointed out that the primary reason for rescinding 
a union security provision would be to avoid payment of dues, 
and that, ". . . recission of the union security clause would 
be of little benefit if it did not provide relief from contin­
ued payment of union dues . . Thus, such an action
provides illegal support to a union in violation of 8(a)(2).
The most important decision involving union security 
occurred in the Bryan Manufacturing Company case. In this 
case a contract containing a union security clause was signed 
with a minority union. Ten months after the contract was 
signed the unfair labor practice complaint was filed. The 
Board with the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirming 
ruled that Section 10(b)— the six month limitation statute—  
did not preclude the finding of an 8(a)(2) violation in the 
instant case. According to the Board's and the Circuit Court's 
rationale the enforcement of the union security provision in 
the contract constituted continuing violation of the Act
^Ibid., p. 55.
^119 NLRB 502 (1957), 264 F.2d 575 (CA DofC, 1959), 
362 U.S. 411 (1960) .
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within the six month limitation period. However, in 1960 the 
Supreme Court reversed this ruling. According to the major­
ity decision, ". . . a finding of violation which is inesca­
pably grounded on events predating the limitations period is 
directly at odds with the purposes of the Section 10(b) proviso."^ 
Simply put, the violation ruling in this case relied on events 
which occurred outside the six month limitation. Justice 
Whittaker and Frankfurter dissented from the majority on this 
issue. The flavor of their dissent is contained in the following 
statement by Justice Whittaker. "Surely, the continuing offense 
of enforcing a contract, made by an employer with a union which
was not of the employees' "own choosing," was not intended by
2
Congress to be left without a remedy."
In this group of cases there was another important 
reversal of a Board decision. This occurred in the Industrial 
Towel and Uniform Service case.  ^ A worker for the respondent 
company had executed a check off authorization and then quit 
work due to ill health. Three years later the worker was re­
hired and dues were checked off under the old signature. The 
Board ruled that the rehired worker was a new employee and.
^Ibid., p. 422.
^Ibid., p. 439.
^195 NLRB 1121 (1972), 473 F.2d 1258 (CA-6, 1973).
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consequently, the dues check off was in violation of 8(a) (2).
The Circuit Court reversed this ruling, and found instead that 
the rehired worker was not a new employee and had not taken the 
proper steps to revoke the check off authorization. Thus, the 
respondent company had not violated the Act.
Summary and Conclusions 
Of all the difficulties surrounding Section 8(a)(2) of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, those involving union contracts and recog­
nition have been the most numerous and the most complex. For 
example, in the twenty-five years under study, the Midwest 
Piping doctrine has undergone several significant changes 
resulting in a complicated rule of law for the Board to follow. 
Additionally, cases involving majority difficulties have presen­
ted continuing problems for the Board and the Courts. Finally, 
enforcement of a union security clause which illegally supports 
a union has been an ongoing issue in many cases and persists in 
being a troublesome matter.
CHAPTER VII
THE FOUR MAJOR GROUPS OF CASES AND 
THEIR RESULTING UNION MIXES
In each of the previous four chapters, case totals 
and percentage of 8(a)(2) violations found by the National 
Labor Relations Board were briefly discussed. This chapter 
will reexamine those totals according to the type of unions 
involved in each case. There are three possible union mixes 
included in each 8(a)(2) case. One mix consisted of an inde­
pendent union which competed against an affiliated union.
This was generally thought of as the traditional company union 
case. Another possibility was a case wherein two affiliated 
unions were competing against one another. The final alterna­
tive was a case in which an individual filed an 8(a)(2) charge 
against a single union.
Table 12 provides a breakdown of all cases involving 
those issues discussed in Chapter Three which related to com­
pany domination of a union. Of the total 271 cases, only 
twenty-six were the result of individually filed charges, 
which represented 9.6 percent of the total. Cases involving 
two affiliated unions were slightly more numerous occurring 
in fifty-four instances which represented twenty percent of the 
total. Not unexpectedly, the most numerous type of case found 
in this group was the standard company union case where an
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TABLE 12
Total Number and Percentages of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Issues Relating to Company
Domination of a Union Which Were Heard by the National Labor Relations Board,
1950-1974, According to the Mix of Unions Contained in Each Case
Year
2 affi liated 1 affi 
1 unaf
liated
filiated
Indivi
Ch
dual Filed 
arges Total
Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total
1950 2 18.2 9 81. 8 0 0.0 11
1951 2 22.2 7 77.8 0 0.0 9
1952 2 18.2 8 72.7 1 9.1 11
1953 2 11.1 16 88.9 0 0.0 18
1954 1 14 . 3 6 85. 7 0 0.0 7
1955 0 0.0 3 100. 0 0 0.0 3
1956 0 0 . 0 1 100 . 0 0 0.0 1
1957 1 16.7 4 66.7 1 16.7 6
1958 1 12.5 5 62.5 2 25.0 8
1959 2 40.0 3 60. 0 0 0.0 5
1960 3 20.0 8 53.3 4 26.7 15
1961 3 20.0 11 73.3 1 6.7 15
1962 1 5.3 13 68.4 5 26. 3 19
1963 0 0.0 6 100.0 0 0.0 6
1964 0 0.0 17 94.4 1 5.6 18
1965 4 20.0 16 80 . 0 0 0.0 20
1966 3 30.0 6 60.0 1 10.0 10
1967 2 14.3 10 71.4 2 14.3 14
1968 4 30.8 6 46.2 3 23.1 13
1969 4 25.0 10 62.5 2 12.5 16
1970 4 50.0 4 50.0 0 0.0 8
1971 4 28.6 9 65.3 1 7.1 14
1972 5 41.7 7 58.3 0 0.0 12
1973 2 28.6 4 57.1 1 14.3 7
1974 2 40.0 2 40.0 1 20.0 5
Total 54 20.0 191 70.5 26 9.6 271
U1
Source: Data Compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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independent union opposed an affiliated one. This union mix 
occurred in 70.5 percent of all cases in this group (191 of 
271). On a yearly basis, the highest percentage of cases 
involving independent unions occurred in 1955, 1956, and 1963—  
all years in which 100 percent of the cases consisted of this 
traditional mix. The lowest percentage (forty percent) took 
place in 197 4, a year in which only five of this type case 
materialized.
Chapter Four dealt with issues relating to discrimina­
tory treatment of employees. A breakdown of these cases can be 
found in Table 13 where it can be seen that these issues arose 
in a total of 2 54 cases. The traditional company union case 
(an affiliated union opposing an independent union) cropped up 
in 112 instances which accounted for 4 4.1 percent of the total. 
Interestingly, this was a much smaller percentage than that 
found in the domination issues table. Two opposing affiliated 
unions were involved in 111 cases or 4 3.7 percent of the total. 
Additionally, individually filed charges resulted in thirty-one 
cases which amounted to 12.2 percent of the total. Clearly, 
cases involving two affiliated unions were much more important 
in this group of cases than in the domination group.
On the other hand, examination of Table 14 reveals that 
the traditional company union case made up a substantial percen­
tage (65.8 percent) of all financial support cases. This was 
not to be unexpected due to the relatively similar nature of
TABLE 13
Total Number and Percentages of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Issues Relating to Discrimina­
tory Treatment of Employees Which Were Heard by the National Labor Relations Board,
1950-1974, According to the Mix of Unions Contained in Each Case
Year
2 affiliated 1 affiliated 
1 unaffiliated
Individual Filed 
Charges
Total
Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total
1950 4 66.7 2 33.3 0 0.0 6
1951 7 53.8 5 38.5 1 7.7 13
1952 1 16.7 4 66 . 7 1 16.7 6
1953 5 29.4 12 70.6 0 0.0 17
1954 1 25.0 0 0 . 0 3 75.0 4
1955 1 33.3 2 66. 7 0 0.0 3
1956 0 0.0 1 100 . 0 0 0. 0 1
1957 1 25.0 3 75 . 0 0 0.0 4
1958 2 33.3 1 16 . 7 3 50.0 6
1959 2 22.2 3 33.3 4 44.4 9
1960 8 38.1 8 38.1 5 23.8 21
1961 5 38.5 7 53.8 1 7.7 13
1962 4 40.0 3 30.0 3 30.0 10
1963 5 55.6 4 44.4 0 0.0 9
1964 6 33. 3 10 55 . 6 2 11.1 18
1965 2 22.2 7 77.8 0 0.0 9
1966 7 58.3 4 33.3 1 8.3 12
1967 7 53.8 5 38.5 1 76.9 13
1968 4 44.4 5 55.6 0 0.0 9
1969 9 69.2 3 23.1 1 7.7 13
1970 8 61.5 5 38.5 0 0.0 13
1971 5 50.0 5 50.0 0 0.0 10
1972 3 30.0 5 50.0 2 20.0 10
1973 6 60.0 3 30 . 0 1 10.0 10
1974 8 53.3 5 33.3 2 13.3 15
Total 111 43.7 112 44.1 31 12.2 254
< T l
Source: Data Compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington ;
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 19 74).
TABLE 14
Total Number and Percentages of 8(a)(2) Cases Involving Issues Relating to Financial and
Material Support of a Union Which Were Heard by the National Labor Relations Board,
1950-1974, According to the Mix of Unions Contained in Each Case
2 affiliated 1 affiliated 
1 unaffiliated
Individual Filed 
Charges
TotalYear
Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total
1950 3 42.9 4 57.1 0 0.0 7
1951 4 33.3 8 66.7 0 0.0 12
1952 1 12.5 6 75.0 1 12.5 8
1953 1 5.6 17 94.4 0 0.0 18
1954 1 16.7 5 83.3 0 0 . 0 6
1955 3 42.9 4 57.1 0 0.0 7
1956 1 50.0 1 50.0 0 0.0 2
1957 1 25.0 3 75.0 0 0.0 4
1958 1 33.3 2 66.7 0 0.0 3
1959 2 50.0 1 25.0 1 25.0 4
1960 5 35.7 7 50. 0 2 14.3 14
1961 6 42.9 8 57.1 0 0.0 14
1962 4 23.5 13 76.5 0 0.0 17
1963 3 33.3 6 66.7 0 0.0 9
1964 1 11.1 7 77.8 1 11.1 9
1965 3 25.0 9 75.0 0 0.0 12
1966 5 41.7 7 58.3 0 0.0 12
1967 5 35.7 9 64 . 3 0 0.0 14
1968 3 30.0 6 60.0 1 10.0 10
1969 6 46.2 7 53.8 0 0. 0 13
1970 1 16.7 5 83.3 0 0.0 6
1971 2 28.6 5 71.4 0 0.0 7
1972 2 28.6 5 71.4 0 0.0 7
1973 4 57.1 2 28.6 1 14.3 7
1974 3 50.0 3 50.0 0 0.0 6
Total 71 31.1 150 65.8 7 3.1 228
CTl
00
Source: Data Compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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domination and financial support. However, this percentage 
was not nearly as great as that which occurred in the domina­
tion cases. Additionally, 31.1 percent of the total 228 cases 
in this group involved two opposing affiliated unions, and a 
mere 3.1 percent were the result of individually filed charges.
Contract difficulties were encountered in more 8(a)(2) 
cases than any of the three previously discussed types of cases. 
A breakdown of these 468 cases is presented in Table 15. The 
traditional company union case accounted for only eighty-nine 
total or nineteen percent of the 468. Cases resulting from 
individually filed charges amounted to only 18.2 percent of the 
total (eighty-five of 468). Significantly, 294 cases involved 
two competing, affiliated unions. This was 62.8 percent of 
the total. Interestingly, for the years 1950-1959, the average 
number of cases deriving from two affiliated unions was seven 
per year. For the fifteen years after 1959, the average was 
fifteen. In the same time periods, the percentages go from 
averaging 47.4% per year to 80%. Clearly, in this category, 
cases involving two competing affiliated unions have through 
the years become much more important. Evident also was the 
fact that this was the only category of cases studied in which 
cases involving two affiliated unions outnumbered those involv­
ing independent unions.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that
TABLE 15
Total Number and Percentages of 8(a) (2) Cases Involving Issues Relating to Contract
Difficulties Which Were Heard by the National Labor Relations Board, 1950-1974,
According to the Mix of Unions Contained in Each Case
Year
2 affiliated 1 aff: 
1 unaJ
-liated
■filiated
Indiv
Cl
idual Filed 
larges
Total
Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total
1950 4 40.0 5 50.0 1 10.0 10
1951 9 45.0 2 10.0 9 45.0 20
1952 7 43.8 5 31.3 4 25.0 16
1953 9 42.9 8 38.1 4 19.0 21
1954 7 63.6 2 18.2 2 18.2 11
1955 12 57.1 4 19.0 5 23.8 21
1956 1 50.0 0 0.0 1 50.0 2
1957 6 46.2 3 23.1 4 30.8 13
1958 7 50.0 2 14.3 5 35.7 14
1959 7 35.0 2 10.0 11 55.0 20
1960 12 48.0 7 28.0 6 24.0 25
1961 12 48.0 8 32.0 5 20.0 25
1962 15 65.2 5 21.7 3 13.0 23
1963 17 89.5 1 5.3 1 5.3 19
1964 8 50.0 6 37 . 5 2 12.5 16
1965 12 70.6 3 17.6 2 11.8 17
1966 12 75.0 3 18.8 1 6.3 16
1967 21 75.0 5 17.9 2 07.1 28
1968 15 78.9 4 21.1 0 0.0 19
1969 17 68.0 3 12.0 5 20.0 25
1970 13 68.4 2 10.5 4 21.1 19
1971 18 81.8 3 13.6 1 4.5 22
1972 18 75.0 2 8.3 4 16.6 24
1973 15 93.8 1 6 . 3 0 0.0 16
1974 20 76.9 3 11.5 3 11.5 26
Total 294 62. 8 89 19.0 85 18. 2 468
o
Source: Data Compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 8 8 to vol. 216 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974).
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8(a)(2) cases involving contract difficulties have become the 
most important category of 8(a)(2) cases heard by the Board 
by virtue of their extremely large numbers. Additionally, the 
large increase in the number of cases involving two competing, 
affiliated unions leads to the hypothesis that this category 
of cases has become much more important over the years than 
the traditional company union case.
The above observation— that the traditional 8(a)(2) 
case involving an affiliated union and an independent company 
union has been diminishing in importance while cases involving 
two competing affiliated unions have been increasing in both 
number and importance— can be confirmed most simply by exami­
ning Table 16. From 1950 to 197 4 both the percentage and 
the absolute number of cases involving two affiliated unions 
has increased. In absolute terms the number of cases has gone 
from around ten per year to over twenty. In relative terms, 
cases involving two affiliated unions have gone from represen­
ting around thirty-five percent of the total number of 8(a)(2) 
cases heard by the Board per year to over sixty percent.
Statistical significance of this change can be confirmed 
by estimating the following regression equation:
AAi = Bq + 1^^  + "i
where AA^ represents the percentage of cases involving two 
affiliated unions, Y represents the year, and u^ represents 
the assumed normally distributed error term. The resulting
TABLE 16
Total Number and Percentages of 8(a)(2) Cases Heard by the National Labor Relations
Board, 1950-1974, According to Mix of Unions Involved in Each Case
Year
2 affi].iated 1 affi 
1 unaf
liated
filiated
Charges 
by indj
filed
vidual
Total
Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total Total
% of Yearly 
Total
1950 8 36.4 11 50.0 3 13.6 22
1951 11 36.7 8 26.7 11 36.7 30
1952 9 36. 0 11 44.0 5 20.0 25
1953 13 30.2 25 58.1 5 11.6 43
1954 8 33.3 10 41.7 6 25.0 24
1955 14 43.8 12 37.5 6 18.8 32
1956 1 20.0 2 40.0 2 40.0 5
1957 8 42.1 6 31.6 5 26.3 19
1958 9 37.5 8 33.3 7 29.2 24
1959 7 26.9 6 23.1 13 50.0 26
1960 20 39.2 18 35.3 13 25.5 51
1961 18 41.9 19 44 . 2 6 14.0 43
1962 19 39.6 19 39.6 10 20.8 48
1963 21 63.6 11 33.3 1 3.0 33
1964 17 37.0 26 56 . 5 3 6.5 46
1965 13 35.1 21 56.8 3 8.1 37
1966 15 53.6 11 39.3 2 7.1 28
1967 25 54.3 17 37.0 4 8.7 46
1968 21 63.6 8 24.2 4 12.1 33
1969 22 48.9 15 33.3 8 17.8 45
1970 20 60.6 9 27.3 4 12.1 33
1971 23 62.2 12 32.4 2 5.4 37
1972 22 57.9 11 29. 0 5 13.2 38
1973 20 66.7 6 20.0 4 13.3 30
1974 22 64.7 6 17.6 6 17.6 34
Total 386 • • • 308 • » • 138 • . • 832
Source: Data compiled from National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vol. 88 to vol. 216 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950 to 1974) .
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estimates are:
AA. = -43.43 + 1.43Y = .6242
 ^ (.2315) t = 6.18
where the calculated t value is greater than the critical t 
value at the .99 level of significance. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the coefficient of Y is significantly greater 
than 0. The conclusion can thus be drawn that for the twenty- 
five years of study, the percentage of cases heard by the 
Board which involved two affiliated unions has increased signi­
ficantly. A corollary to this finding is the conclusion that 
the remaining two categories of cases— those involving an 
affiliated and an independent union and those involving a 
single union (where the charges have been filed by an indi­
vidual instead of another union)— have been significantly 
declining.
In 1950, the most frequent type of 8(a) (2) case involved 
domination of a nonaffiliated union. By 1974, the most fre­
quent type of 8(a)(2) case involved a contractual dispute with 
an affiliated union.
Economic Implications 
Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act justi­
fies its existence by asserting that strife between labor and 
management burdens or obstructs commerce by, " . . .  causing 
diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substan­
tially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from
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or into the channels of commerce." It further states that 
business depressions are partially aggravated because of indus­
try's ability to depress, " . . .  wage rates and the purchasing 
power of wage earners in industry . . ." The solution proposed
by the Act was, therefore, to encourage the practice of col­
lective bargaining by guaranteeing workers, " . . .  full freedom 
of association, self-organization, and designation of repre­
sentatives of their own choosing . . . "
One of industry's most effective tools in its fight 
against the union movement was the company union.^ In Chapter 
Two this thesis emphasized the point that Section 8(a)(2) was 
directed at the elimination of company unions and company 
interference with unions. To the extent that company unionism 
was successful, legitimate unionism was invariably resisted. 
Thus, the economic effects of Section 8(a)(2) will hinge on 
whether or not unionism in general can successfully provide 
wage levels or other benefits in excess of those that would 
exist in the absence of unionism.
Many studies have been instigated for the purpose of 
determining whether or not unions affect relative wages.
Milton Friedman's thoughts on the subject appeared in The 
Impact of the Union— a book edited by David McCord Wright
See Chapter Two of this thesis and Benjamin J. Taylor 
and Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1979), p. 134.
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in 1956. Friedman contended that the effect of unionism on
the structure and level of wage rates is greatly exaggerated.^
In 1963, one of the most important studies regarding unions
and relative wages was published by H. G. Lewis. In this
study, Lewis found that unions raised wages en average of ten
2
to fifteen percent. However, Lewis did not include personal 
characteristics of workers in his formulation of a model to 
test for union effects. Leonard Weiss included personal 
characteristics and found that these characteristics accounted 
for a great deal of the wage differentials normally observed 
in the economy. Weiss concluded, ". . . employers who for
any reason pay high salaries receive "superior" labor in the 
bargain."^ In a later study, Frank Stafford with another data 
set also tested to see if unions affect relative wages. When 
Stafford included personal characteristics he found a signifi-
4
cant positive relationship between unionism and wages.
Milton Friedman, "Some Comments on the Significance 
of Labor Unions for Economic Policy," The Impact of the Union, 
ed. David McCord Wright (New York: Kelley and Millman, Inc.,
1956), pp. 204-234.
2
H. G. Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the United 
States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 193,
^Leonard W. Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," 
The American Economic Review, 56 (March, 1966), p. 116.
^Frank P. Stafford, "Concentration and Labor Earnings: 
Comment," The American Economic Review, 58 (March, 1968), p. 179
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Another line of studies was begun by Orley Ashenfelter
and George E. Johnson when they used a simultaneous equation
approach which determined wages, unionism, and labor quality
jointly. They stated in their conclusion, . . w e  are
prepared to say only that we are uncertain of the magnitude of
the effect of unions on interindustry wage differences."^
In a similar analysis Peter Schmidt and Robert Strauss concluded
essentially that unionism does not create high wages, instead,
2
". . . higher earnings make one more likely to be unionized." 
Finally, Lawrence M. Kahn in a very recent paper found that 
unionism does, indeed, raise wages, but it also induces firms 
to substitute skilled labor and capital for unskilled labor.
In other words, firms respond to union enforced higher wages 
by employing more productive workers.^
It seems clear from the above discussion that there 
is no consensus of views on whether or not unionism can affect 
relative wages. Thus, the labor economist is faced with the 
problem of determining why unions exist if they do not benefit
Orley Ashenfelter and George E. Johnson, "Unionism, 
Relative Wages, and Labor Quality in U.S. Manufacturing Indus­
tries," International Economic Review, 13 (October, 1972), p. 505.
2
Peter Schmidt and Robert P. Strauss, "The Effect of Unions 
on Earnings and Earnings on Unions: A Mixed Logit Approach,"
International Economic Review, 17 (February, 1976), p. 208.
^Lawrence M. Kahn, "Unionism and Relative Wages: Dir­
ect and Indirect Effects," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
32 (July, 1979), p. 531.
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the level of workers' wages. A concomitant difficulty is 
explaining why some employers fight unionism so intensely if 
its effects are so minimal. Generally, labor economists have 
fallen back on the argument that unions supply non-economic 
benefits to workers in the form of grievance procedures, 
seniority rules, and many other work related regulations.^ 
Whatever the effects of unions are, company unions 
have always been a powerful and potent tool in the fight 
against unionism. The first section of this chapter discussed 
trends in 8(a)(2) cases heard by the National Labor Relations 
Board. Clearly, the trend has been away from the traditional 
company union case where management initiates a union or 
financially supports it or uses overt discrimination in order 
to maintain its existence. Strictly on this basis it could 
perhaps be argued that 8(a) (2) has done its work. The tradi­
tional forms of domination and interference do, indeed, seem 
to be on the wane. However, a more subtle type of interference 
has taken the place of these more overt types. Interference 
in the form of signing an illegal contract has now become the 
predominant type of 8(a)(2) case. Furthermore, this case gen­
erally involves two affiliated unions instead of the traditional 
case involving an independent union along with an affiliated
See for example E. R. Livernash, "The Relation of Power 
to the Structure and Process of Collective Bargaining," The 
Journal of Law and Economics, 6 (October, 1963), pp. 10-40.
178
union. Obviously, the only reason management has to sign 
such a contract is to obtain favorable treatment from the 
contracting union. Labor economists refer to this type of 
agreement as a "sweetheart" contract and it has the same 
implications for organized labor as did the company union.
If 8(a)(2) were abolished, and sweetheart agreements 
were thus condoned, it is quite possible that unions signing 
such contracts would provide neither the wage benefits (if 
any exist) nor the non-economic benefits now provided by 
legitimate unions. At this writing, there has been little 
support for the abolition of this section of Taft-Hartley. 
Repealing it might weaken the rights that blue collar workers 
have obtained under the National Labor Relations Act.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Immediately following passage of Taft-Hartley the 
number of charges filed under Section 8(a)(2) declined. 
However, after 1958 the filing of 8(a)(2) charges began to 
increase. Over the years this trend has continued making 
study of this particular section highly pertinent.
One early difficulty with which the Board has fre­
quently dealt is that of what constitutes domination as 
opposed to unlawful support of a labor union. Prior to 
passage of Taft-Hartley, the Board disestablished indepen­
dent unions that had violated Section 8(2), but had merely 
used a cease and desist order against affiliated unions.
After passage of Taft-Hartley— which required equal treatment 
of affiliated and nonaffiliated unions under Section 10(c) —  
the Board changed its approach. Any union which was found to 
be dominated was disestablished while a union which was merely 
unlawfully assisted was issued a cease and desist order. The 
Board also decided to raise its standards for domination, and 
resorted to disestablishment in only extreme cases. Unfortu­
nately, this change in philosophy created some problems as 
discussed in Chapter Three. These difficulties resulted in a 
number of cases where trial examiners, administrative law
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judges, the Board, and the courts all disagreed as to what 
constitutes employer domination of a union. In this instance, 
it seems, the equal treatment provision of Taft-Hartley 
created more confusion than it eliminated. It appears that 
the same types of violations which occurred before Taft- 
Hartley (i.e. supervisors involved in unions and employer 
formation of unions) continue to occur after its passage.
On this basis an argument could be made for more disestablish­
ment orders instead of fewer.
Discriminatory treatment of employees or threats of 
such treatment which was a significant issue in 254 cases 
continues as a difficulty with which the Board must contend. 
Discriminatory discharge or disciplinary action in support of 
a favored union was quite a common occurrence as was the offer­
ing of concessions to favored unions. Additionally, shutdown 
threats continue to occur in representative numbers.
Chapter Five dealt with the unexpectedly complex issues 
of financial or material support of a favored union. Since 
Section 8(a)(2) specifically prohibits financial support. Board 
and Court decisions on this and surrounding topics might be 
thought to be rather cut and dried. However, the Board and 
the courts have consistently held that some cooperative assis­
tance to a favored union is legal. The difficulty arises when 
the Board and courts attempt to draw the line between legal 
cooperative assistance and illegal support. One important factor
181
considered in these decisions is whether or not the support 
in question interferes with the employees' Section 7 rights 
to a free choice of their own representatives. If the support 
does interfere with this right, an 8(a)(2) violation is found. 
Tvjo additional factors are generally considered by the courts. 
(1) Total company support of a union is typically found to be 
in violation of 8(a) (2). (2) The environment in which the
assistance in question occurred is also an important considera­
tion. If the assistance takes place in the context of wide­
spread company support of a union, a violation would normally 
be found. However, if the support occurs singly and has little 
effect, no 8(a)(2) violation results.
The very large number of cases dealing with questions 
of illegal contracts (over 400) indicates an important switch 
from the types of cases at which Section 8(a)(2) was originally 
aimed. This section originally focused on independent unions 
which were controlled by employers.^ However, a close examina­
tion of Chapter Six reveals an increasing number of cases in 
which the employer is caught between two affiliated unions 
attempting to organize his plant. Section 8(a)(2) comes into 
play when the employer assists one of these unions. Specifi­
cally, this chapter was concerned with assistance through the 
execution of a contract. The Midwest Piping doctrine holds
^See Chapter Two.
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that 8(a) (2) is violated if an employer, at the time of 
recognition, knows that a real question concerning represen­
tation exists in his plant. Through the years this doctrine 
has undergone many changes and has, thus, become a highly 
complex rule of law which arises in a large number of cases.
A violation of 8(a)(2) also occurs when an employer contracts 
with a minority union or a union with a tainted majority. 
Similarly, contracts which contain illegal union security 
clauses also violate 8(a)(2) by assisting the union with 
which the contract was signed.
Finally, it is evident by the increasing number of 
charges filed under Section 8(a)(2) that this section continues 
to exercise significant influence on labor relations in this 
country. However, it appears that the mix of cases heard 
by the Board and the courts has been undergoing significant 
changes. More and more charges are being filed by affiliated 
unions against other affiliated unions. Thus, the major diffi­
culties faced by the Board under this Section have shifted 
from overt company domination and interference to dealing with 
a subtler form of company interference— sweetheart contracts. 
The result of this change is an inordinate number of cases 
involving contract difficulties as seen in Chapter Six and 
Chapter Seven. Indeed, Section 8(a)(2) has not diminished in 
importance. Its direction of emphasis has just shifted.
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